Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

760C.00/6–2146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Thompson)

[Washington,] June 21, 1946.

Participants:	Polish Ambassador, Dr. Oskar Lange
	Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson
	(Present—Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs)

The Ambassador said that he was returning to Poland next week and had called to say goodbye. He said one of the chief purposes of his trip was to settle the matter of the Ambassadorship and Polish representation at UNO. He emphasized that no decision had yet been taken but that he thought it was likely that he would be named as the Polish representative to the United Nations and that a new Ambassador would be appointed.⁶⁶ The Acting Secretary said that we would be very sorry to lose the Ambassador but he recognized the difficulty of carrying on both functions, and the importance of representation at the United Nations.

The Ambassador said that there would be other serious matters to discuss as he felt that Polish affairs were approaching a crisis for two reasons—the first political, the second economic.

With respect to the political situation, he said that the conception of the present Polish Government of National Unity had been premised upon unity of the Big Three with respect to Poland and that it had not been expected that the Polish Government would be faced with difficult and delicate choices.

With respect to the economic situation, the Ambassador said that he had always felt that, economically, Poland should be tied with the west for the reason that this was Poland’s natural market and that it could supply the commodities that Poland needed. With the exception of a temporary need for coal, the Soviet Union did not need Polish products and was not in a position to supply Poland’s needs except for a few items. He felt, however, that as a result of the recent visit of the Polish delegation to Moscow Poland was tending to become economically linked with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said that he had no official details of the recent Moscow negotiations but that from what he could gather from Polish press reports and from an assistant who had recently arrived from Warsaw, agreement had been reached on the following points:

(1) The Soviet Union had agreed as an emergency measure to supply wheat to Poland. The Ambassador said he did not know what amount was involved.

(2) The Soviet Union had agreed to forgive the Polish debt to the Soviet Union for the arming of the Polish military forces. He mentioned that this included General Sikorski’s⁶⁷ as well as General Berling’s⁶⁸ army.

(3) The Soviet Union had agreed to assist hi rearming the Polish army.

(4) The Soviet Union had agreed to supply to Poland as a gift sufficient gold to replace the gold reclaimed by Great Britain in the settlement with Poland. The Ambassador thought that the amount was £3,000,000.

(5) The Soviet Union had agreed to supply Poland with foreign exchange to cover purchases abroad for the reconstruction of Poland. The Ambassador was not aware of the amount involved.

The Ambassador said that the first question he would be asked by the Polish Government, as well as by individual Poles, would be to what extent the United States was prepared to assist in the reconstruction of Poland. The Acting Secretary said, with respect to the political situation, that this Government, of course, had hoped that the three powers which had agreed at Yalta would carry out that agreement and that we would all work together in the reconstruction of Poland and the other countries of eastern Europe that had suffered so greatly. He added that we still felt this should be done and that we saw no reason why it could not be accomplished. With respect to the economic situation, he pointed out that Ambassador Lane had within the last few days had a conversation with the Polish Foreign Office concerning the removal of the difficulties in the way of the implementation of the United States credit. With respect to a long-range program of economic assistance, he pointed out that our interest was well known and that the Ambassador would be able to explain the situation in this country, which had a large Polish population that followed these matters with intense interest, and the importance of public opinion in this country in relation to this matter.

The Ambassador said that with respect to the Polish community in this country his Embassy had followed a policy of having no policy toward these Poles and had only discussed with them relief questions and similar matters. He said he felt that this attitude had borne fruit and that the attitude of Polish-Americans had been evolving favorably toward the Polish Government. He felt, however, that the visit of General Bor-Komorowski had had an unfavorable effect, both on Poles in this country and on the Polish Government.⁶⁹ He felt that General Bor’s reception by General Eisenhower⁷⁰ had been particularly unfortunate and that he had even had serious inquiries as to whether General Bor was to lead an army of Polish émigrés in a war against the Soviet Union. He said he had also heard that an invitation had been issued by a Polish group in this country to Arciszewski⁷¹ to visit the United States.

The Acting Secretary said that the Ambassador would be able to explain that the visit of General Bor had had no political significance so far as the United States Government was concerned and he pointed out that he had personally been responsible for the decision to issue a visa to General Bor. He said that the application had been presented to him with another application of a Communist member of the Spanish government-in-exile and he had decided that there was no valid reason why both visas should not be granted. He pointed out that the visas had been granted to them as individuals and that it was unfortunate that the fact that General Bor had been received by General Eisenhower had been interpreted outside this country as an indication that the visit had any official significance.

The Ambassador said he thought it was also unfortunate that the press in this country constantly referred to only one Polish political party, namely the Polish Peasant Party, and said he thought this was misunderstood both in Warsaw and in Moscow. The Acting Secretary said that it was natural that the press in this country which probably knew little about Polish internal politics should refer to this party, which was an important one, and whose leader, Mr. Mikolajczyk, had visited this country and was well known. He hoped that the Ambassador would be able to explain these matters to his Government and he would look forward upon his return to more of these interesting talks with him.

66. Telegram 1116, July 19, from Warsaw, reported that Lange had stated that it had not been decided whether he would return to the United States as Ambassador or UN Delegate. “He explained that while he would be pleased to be the delegate, he had informed the government that he could not accept the position unless a decision was taken prior to his appointment to the effect that Polish policy would be independent and based solely on Polish interest. He added that he had not been satisfied with the role he had to play as UN delegate heretofore and while Poland would maintain most friendly relations with Soviet Union, he could not agree to being the delegate if Polish policy blindly followed that of Soviet Union.” (701.60C11/7–1946) According to a memorandum by Acting Secretary of State Acheson dated August 22, 1946, Ambassador Lange called on the Acting Secretary on the occasion of his return from Poland and stated that pending the appointment of a new Polish Ambassador to the United States he would continue to serve as Ambassador as well as representing Poland at the United Nations (860C.00/8–2246).
67. Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile and Commander in Chief of Polish Armed Forces, 1939–1943.
68. Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Berling, Commanding General of the First Polish Army in the Soviet Union which participated in the liberation of Poland in 1944 and 1945.
69. Gen. Tadeuz Bor-Komorowski, Commander of the Polish Home Army until his capture by the Germans in October 1944; following his liberation from prison. in May 1945, he assumed the post of Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces (of the Polish Government in Exile in London). During May and June 1946, Bor-Komorowski visited the United States as a guest of the Polish-American Congress and had occasion to meet with various American dignitaries including members of Congress, governors of states, and mayors of cities. In visits to the Department of State on April 29 and again on June 5, the Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Stefan Litauer, protested Bor-Komorowski’s visit to the United States and emphasized the unfortunate effect that the visit would have in Poland. On both occasions, officers of the Division of Eastern European Affairs reminded Litauer that freedom of expression was a fundamental tenet of the American form of Government and the fact that Bor-Komorowski had spoken against the Polish Provisional Government was not sufficient to exclude him from the United States. (Memoranda of April 29 and June 5, 1946, 860C.01/4–2946 and 711.60C/6–546, respectively). On June 19, the Polish Foreign Ministry handed Ambassador Lane a note characterizing the friendly reception given to General Bor-Komorowski as an unfriendly act towards the Polish Provisional Government (711.60C/6–2146).
70. During his visit to Washington, on June 12, 1946, General Bor-Komorowski was received, in the company of members of the United States Congress, by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
71. Tomasz Arciszewski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile in London, November 1944 to 1947.