Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

891.00/6–1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Tehran, June 10, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received June 10—1:45 p.m.]

821. In long conference with Qavam this morning I explained to him in all frankness what, I felt confident, American reaction would be to certain of his policies and recent communiqués.⁵⁹ As regards latter I found three points which are particularly objectionable from American points of view: (1) Tendency to castigate any opposition to Qavam as reactionary, Fascist and traitorous; (2) tendency to give Qavam himself personal credit for all policies and accomplishments of his Government; and (3) warm expressions of friendship for USSR without any reference to any other nation. As regards first two objections I said they would remind the American public of communiqués issued by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Personal build-up of Qavam himself would remind Americans of similar build-ups for Franco, Hitler and Stalin and would seem to point towards a personal dictatorship. As regards third objection I said United States naturally welcomed friendly relations between states and that if relations between Iran and Soviet Union were on genuinely solid foundation, we could only rejoice. However I reminded him that American public is thoroughly aware that United States made strenuous efforts during past 12 months to obtain early withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, and that when we were unable to obtain agreement from other powers, we withdrew our troops anyway at considerable sacrifice in effort and shipping taken from other areas. I said American public was also well aware that we had supported Iran’s right to be heard before Security Council, even to extent of adversely affecting our relations with our great Soviet ally. American public could not help wondering why these efforts on our part in Iran’s behalf remained without any evidence of appreciation in Qavam’s communiqués. To put it quite bluntly I said certain people in US would begin to wonder whether we had made a mistake in our policy towards Iran. Perhaps if we had retained our troops here illegally until we had got such concessions as we desired out of Iran and if we had organized and supported a revolt against the Central Govt behind our lines perhaps Iranian Govt communiqués would now be fawning over the United States.

As regards Qavam’s policies, I cited his suppression of opposition newspapers and arrest of political opponents without specific charge or public hearing. I expressed strong doubt that he would permit any newspapers to publish articles against the Soviet Union similar to those published every day against the United States and Americans.

Qavam said that his communiqués were for Iran and not the United States. He also believed they had been poorly translated to me. He said primary purpose of his latest communiqué was to quieten rumors that his policy of division of public domain would extend to private property. I said that it was not this feature of communqué to which I was raising objection.

In parting Qavam expressed much appreciation for my bringing these views to his attention so frankly. I believe interview will have salutary effect, at least in letting Qavam know that American reaction must be reckoned with, and that he will be more mindful of this factor in future.⁶⁰

Allen

[A 15-point agreement between the Iranian Government and the local authorities in Azerbaijan was signed at Tabriz on June 13 by Mozzafar Firuz and Jafar Pishevari. The text as printed in the Tehran and Tabriz press was sent to the Department from Tehran in despatch 53 and from Tabriz in telegram 193, both dated June 16. The despatch noted that the phrasing of the agreement made it appear that the seven articles of April 22 (see telegram 578, April 23, from Tehran, page 434) had been accepted in full and that the agreement was merely an interpretation of the articles. It noted also that while the agreement was being publicized as a full and final settlement, a number of the most important provisions called for further agreement as soon as possible. (891.00/6–1646)

Under the terms of the agreement, the Iranian Government recognized the existing National Assembly of Azerbaijan as the Provincial Council; was to select the Governor General of Azerbaijan from a group of names presented by the Provincial Council; would incorporate Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces into the Iranian Army and gendarmerie, respectively, their status to be determined by the Iranian Government and the Provincial Council; and agreed that 75% of Government receipts in Azerbaijan were to be appropriated for local expenditures, the remainder going to Tehran. The agreement also was made applicable to the Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians residing in Azerbaijan.

According to despatch 280, July 24, 1946, from Tabriz, the National Government of Azerbaijan was formally dissolved by a resolution adopted by the third and last general session of the Azerbaijan National Majlis on June 25 (891.032/7–2446).]

59. In telegram 817, June 8, 4 p.m., Ambassador Allen had expressed his concern at the seemingly steady trend of the Qavam Government toward outright appeasement of the Soviet Union and Leftist Iranian elements and his apparent effort to consolidate his position by crushing internal opposition from Rightist elements. After spelling out the matters which concerned him (along the lines of telegram 821), the Ambassador had concluded: “… it is time we recalled to Qavam that he should bear in mind reaction to his policies in US as well as in Russia and that remedy for former repressive and pro-British policy of the Right does not lie in repressive, and pro-Soviet policy of the Govt now.” (891.00/6–846)
60. In telegram 507, June 11, 7 p.m., to Tehran, the Department approved Ambassador Allen’s statements made to the Iranian Prime Minister as set forth in telegram 821 and commended him for his initiative (891.00/6–1046).