851G.00/12–346: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Saigon (Reed)
us urgent
305. For Moffat: Assume you will see Ho in Hanoi and offer following summary our present thinking as guide.
Keep in mind Ho’s clear record as agent international communism, absence evidence recantation Moscow affiliations, confused political situation France and support Ho receiving French Communist Party. Least desirable eventuality would be establishment Communist-dominated, Moscow-oriented state Indochina in view Dept, which most interested info strength non-communist elements Vietnam. Report fully, repeating or requesting Dept repeat Paris.
[Page 68]Recent occurrences Tonkin cause deep concern. Consider March 6 accord and modus vivendi as result peaceful negotiation provide basis settlement outstanding questions between France and Vietnam and impose responsibility both sides not prejudice future, particularly forthcoming Fontainebleau Conference, by resort force. Unsettled situation such as pertains certain to offer provocations both sides, but for this reason conciliatory patient attitude especially necessary. Intransigence either side and disposition exploit incidents can only retard economic rehabilitation Indochina and cause indefinite postponement conditions cooperation France and Vietnam which both agree essential.
If Ho takes stand non-implementation promise by French of Cochin-china referendum relieves Vietnam responsibility compliance with agreements, you might if you consider advisable raise question whether he believes referendum after such long disorder could produce worthwhile result and whether he considers compromise on status Cochin-china could possibly be reached through negotiation.
May say American people have welcomed attainments Indochinese in efforts realize praiseworthy aspirations greater autonomy in framework democratic institutions and it would be regrettable should this interest and sympathy be imperilled by any tendency Vietnam administration force issues by intransigence and violence.
May inform Ho Caffery discussing situation French similar frankness. For your info, Baudet in Dec 3 conversation stated 1) no question reconquest Indochina as such would be counter French public opinion and probably beyond French military resources, 2) French will continue base policy March 6 accord and modus vivendi and make every effort apply them through negotiation Vietnam, 3) French would resort forceful measures only on restricted scale in case flagrant violation agreements Vietnam, 4) d’Argenlieu’s usefulness impaired by outspoken dislike Vietnam officials and replacement perhaps desirable,73 5) French Communists embarrassed in pose as guardian French international interests by barrage telegraphic appeals from Vietnam. Caffery will express gratification this statement French policy with observation implementation such policy should go far obviate any danger that 1) Vietnamese irreconcilables and extremists might be in position make capital of situation 2) Vietnamese might be turned irrevocably against West and toward ideologies and affiliations hostile democracies which could result perpetual foment Indochina with consequences all Southeast Asia.
[Page 69]Avoid impression US Govt making formal intervention this juncture. Publicity any kind would be unfortunate.
Paris be guided foregoing.
Sent Saigon as 305 rptd Hanoi as 18 and Paris as 6322.
- In telegram 307. December 6, 1946, 4 p.m., to Saigon, the Department stated that Paris had expressed the hope that the Department would emphasize to Saigon and Hanoi the confidential nature of the source of the opinion on Admiral d’Argenlieu. This was repeated to Hanoi. (851G.00/12–646)↩