851G.00/12–1746: Circular airgram
The Secretary of State to Certain Missions Abroad77
Basic French-Vietnamese Difficulties
After conversations with French and Vietnamese officials and British, Chinese and US Consuls Hanoi Mr. Abbot Moffat, who is at present in SEA, has developed views in which Consul Saigon concurs along the following lines:78
The Vietnam Government is in control of a small Communist group possibly in indirect touch with Moscow and direct touch with Yenan. A nationalist group is utilizing Communist party techniques and discipline with which they are familiar. The people are conservative landowners and attempts to communize the country are secondary and would await successful operation of a nationalist state. Apparently some leaders, like Ho Chi Minh, consider collaboration with the French essential; those like Giap79 would avoid collaboration fearing French domination but might not reject French influence and aid. Nationalist sentiment runs deep among the Vietnamese as does opposition to the French, and they might easily turn against all whites. French influence is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence [Page 73] but to protect Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism. Delay in achieving a settlement will progressively diminish the possibility of ultimate French influence.
The honesty of both French and Vietnamese officials is questionable in connection with recent incidents. O’Sullivan believes the Vietnamese were responsible for the November 20 incident, but it seems clear that with a different French commander at Haiphong than Colonel Debes, … the trouble might have been confined to the original incidents.
According to the French, the Vietnamese enlarge their claims after each agreement and are so impractical and doctrinaire that all conversations are ineffectual. The Vietnamese feel that the French renege on each agreement and are trying to reestablish control. However, both say they have approximately the same objectives, although Giap says Vietnam opposes a political Indochinese federation but favors a federation dealing with common economic problems. Moffat has mentioned to the French three apparent basic troubles: (a) complete mutual distrust, (b) failure of the French to resolve their own views on “free state within French Union”, (c) almost childish Vietnamese attitude and knowledge of economic questions and vague groping for “independence”. Agreement cannot be reached by trying to reach accords on incidental problems. Basic Vietnam powers and relations with France must first be established. Not only new faces are needed but neutral good offices or even mediation may be essential.
- At London, Moscow, and Nanking.↩
- Telegram 479, December 12, 1946, 5 p.m., from Saigon (851G.00/12–1246), transmitted Mr. Moffat’s report in which he stated he had left Hanoi on December 9 before receiving the Department’s telegram 305, December 5, 3 p.m., p. 67.↩
- Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of National Defense.↩