Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Alean C. Gillem, Jr., to General Marshall

409. Forwarded all paragraphs, except the last, of your 8225948 to Wedemeyer,49 McClure50 and Byroade for information. Following is answer to last paragraph wherein the “Political jam” affects negotiations by the Committee of Three. (Political situation with reference to high governmental negotiations is being reported upon separately as [Page 716] requested in your 82420.51 I am having Mister Ludden52 prepare the reply.) The “jam” is reflecting itself directly in Manchuria. The principal question is, of course, the gaining of strategic control by one or the other side in an effort to improve their eventual economic and political set up. In this respect it appears that the Communists are definitely the aggressors and that they, during the past several months, have been improving their military situation by one means or another in order that their bargaining position in Manchuria will be favorable. The basic fact is that there are an estimated 300,000 Communists in Manchuria as of today where on V–J Day they had approximately 30 to 40,000. The increase appears to have built up from that day to this, notwithstanding the cessation of hostilities agreement53 which precluded movement of forces in all of China except in certain specified areas. The only specified area was Manchuria and in this instance the basic agreement permitted only National Government forces to move into or within Manchuria for the purpose of re-establishing sovereignty. In other words Communist forces in Manchuria which, at this date, are giving us so much trouble appear to be there through illegal means. It is likely that the difficulties will increase as the Nationalists move northward. At the same time there is the strong contention that the Communist Party is actively cooperating with the Soviets and that this cooperation is destroying the possibility of fully consummating, by the National Government, the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement. The Communists appear to be concentrating their attention on northern Manchuria, Reports continue to be received also, of Communist preparations to shift considerable bodies of troops from north China to Manchuria.

The National Government is not aware of this situation and the Generalissimo has recently ordered 2 additional armies to be moved to ports of embarkation for movement by U. S. resources to Manchuria. General Wedemeyer has asked me, “If these armies are accepted for movement will it result in a violation of any basic agreement between Communists and Nationalists in recent conferences?” It would seem that the solution is quite simple in view of the basic agreement. However, the situation has changed to a degree in that General Chou [Page 717] En-lai,54 bolstered by the fact that Communist forces are present in Manchuria in strength, now has me under pressure to resist National movements on the grounds that:

(1)
The movement is for the sole purpose of liquidating Communists, thus increasing probability of armed clashes and
(2)
The agreement for demobilization and reorganization contemplates only 5 National Armies in Manchuria after first 12 months; therefore the increased force will not only jeopardize a peaceful solution but will necessitate readjustment of large numbers of demobilized personnel. The Communists also are exerting pressure in the Executive Headquarters.

Have conferred with Wedemeyer in this matter and have informed him that additional movements to Manchuria are justified. I will placate Chou by referring to basic agreement and pointing out that there are to be only 5 National Armies after the first 12 months and that this vast area can absorb profitably discharged soldiers. At the same time I will constantly remind the National Representative on Committee of Three that there are to be only 5 after first 12 months. I conferred with General Chen Cheng on this subject today.

New subject. Generalissimo has designated General Chen Cheng, Minister of War, as temporary replacement for Chang Chih-chung on the Committee of Three. Chang is now in Sinkiang. Chen Cheng cannot physically stand trip to Mudken so General Yu Ta-wei will substitute for that party. Trip is set up for 5th April. Byroade has already gone in.

Another subject: Caughey55 is going to Canton tomorrow to attempt to resolve Kwangtung Communist problem.56 Colonel Pee and a Communist will accompany. They will be armed with new instruction from Generalissimo to Chang Fa-kwei.57 Regarding Soochow situation, Committee of Three decided to send a National-Communist Committee to that and other areas for the purpose of working out a solution. So far Chou En-lai is satisfied with the above two arrangements.

New subject: Today the Generalissimo adopted additional defence organization which will replace the National Military Council and will be similar to the U. S. wartime system. He ordered it done by the end of April. Generalissimo stated he personally would sit in on the writing of the reorganization.

  1. March 27, not printed; it dealt with officer personnel problems of Executive Headquarters. In the last paragraph, General Marshall said, “I am glad to see the teams are at last going into Manchuria. Let me have an estimate of the present political jam between the Kuomintang and the Communists. That cannot be allowed to brew up to an explosion. Something positive will have to be done.”
  2. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. Commanding General. U. S. Forces in China Theater.
  3. Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, U. S. Army.
  4. March 28, p. 159. For reply, see telegram No. 600, March 31, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 159.
  5. Raymond P. Ludden, Second Secretary of Embassy in China.
  6. See memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, January 10, p. 125.
  7. Representative at Chungking of the Chinese Communist Party.
  8. Col. J. Hart Caughey, Executive Officer on General Marshall’s staff in China.
  9. See pp. 613 ff.
  10. Chinese commander in the Canton area.