893.00/9–2546
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform you of the latest developments in the efforts of General Marshall and myself to end the civil war. During the past few days the Communist representative, Wang Ping-nan, has been to see me daily. On September 20 in response to his anxiety over the spreading hostilities and the desire of his group for a guarantee that further negotiations would really end the fighting, I explained once more at length the only sense in which we could “guarantee” this. This was in effect that once the Government was convinced by the results of my informal committee that the Communists were sincerely cooperating in the establishment of a coalition structure the Three-Man Committee would meet for the avowed purpose of agreeing on the military adjustments necessary to the issuing of the cease-firing order; that we were confident this was the intention of President Chiang; that we would bring every inducement we properly could to hasten this; and finally that in so strongly advising the Communists to take this course we were virtually assuring them that they would not be disappointed nor deceived. He seemed finally to be impressed asking only that I secure General Marshall’s confirmation of my interpretation of this guarantee. This I did and so informed Mr. Wang the next day when he told me he was sending men to Shanghai at once to convey our message in person to General Chou En-lai.
The next morning, however, he delivered to General Marshall a letter from General Chou which was promptly sent on to me. Mr. Wang after discussing the matter with General Marshall came to report all this to me. When he commented again on how critical the military situation was becoming and the necessity of immediate action to remedy it and asked for my reaction I merely expressed my deep regret at this outcome and my sense of impotence to help in securing peace in view of this repudiation of our proposal. So that General Chou’s point of view can be understood, a copy of his communication is enclosed herewith.91
There seem to be only two possible explanations of conduct so detrimental to their own obvious interests and so inconsistent with the previous attitude of General Chou and his associates:
- 1.
- It is an extreme instance of a fear complex or a psychosis of distrust.
- 2.
- It is a deliberate attempt to eliminate American participation in view of the benefit this is—unintentionally on our part—giving to the recognized Government. With the withdrawal of American armed forces and the stoppage of other material aid to China, they may intend to appeal to the Security Council through Russia or ask that Russia and Great Britain be associated with the United States in further mediation.
It may well be that their present recalcitrant behavior is caused by a fusion of these two elements, beginning with the former and crystallizing into the latter. Their course of action may have been somewhat opportunistic from the arrival of General Marshall in China and continues to be one of temporizing, aggravated now by the unfavorable military trend, the possible changes in American policy as influenced by their propaganda, the Wallace episode,92 etc.
President Chiang is due back in the capital this week. We shall take no further action until after consultation with him.
Respectfully yours,
- Memorandum by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall, September 21, p. 212.↩
- For President Truman’s statement on September 20 in regard to the resignation of Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Commerce following disagreement on foreign policy, see Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1946, p. 577. For Vice President Wallace’s mission to China in 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 216 ff.↩