Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, September 28, 1946
| Also present: | Lt. Col. Hutchin |
Dr. Stuart informed General Marshall that the Generalissimo had sent for him last evening. The Generalissimo wanted chiefly to have [Page 240] a report from Dr. Stuart, who then went over the entire business of the last few weeks to include his several discussions with Wang Ping Nan and Chou En Lai. Dr. Stuart reiterated to the Generalissimo all the old arguments that seemed to periodically crop up on both sides. He told the Generalissimo that he was not sure whether the Communists were just being cautious, or whether they were suspicious and afraid, or whether their actions were part of a deliberate policy to delay negotiations by every obstruction possible. He urged the Generalissimo to give the Communists the benefit of the doubt and to consider that the Communists were still extremely anxious to have a coalition form of Government.
The Generalissimo seemed skeptical but agreed that the best course of action was to give the Communists every chance to participate in the Government. The Generalissimo seemed to really want them to come in to the Government.
The Generalissimo also spoke of the joint letter to General Chou2 and asked if Dr. Stuart thought there would be a reply. Dr. Stuart felt that General Chou would be inclined to hold back until he learned what move the Government was going to make now that the Generalissimo had returned to Nanking.
General Marshall commented that our joint letter to Chou En Lai was a face-saving device for Chou. It asked General Chou to come back to participate in negotiations. If Chou chose to publish it, then the public would see he returned to Nanking because of special representations by the American mediators instead of because he felt that perhaps his bluff had not worked and therefore he was turning to a new approach with consequent loss of face.
General Marshall said he had emphasized one point with the Generalissimo in his conference of yesterday morning. He had discussed the threat of Chou En Lai to publish the minutes and then told the Generalissimo that he was not certain that the Communists would make them public. Even if they did, it wouldn’t particularly matter. However, he doubted that they have the intention to take this step. General Marshall emphasized to the Generalissimo that Chou En Lai’s letter3 was just one small piece of their propaganda effort involving a situation, Mr. Wallace’s recent statement, Byrnes and Molotov at the Paris Conference, Gromyko’s statement in the Security Council at Lake Success, etc. It was probably intended merely to create the suspicion that something in the minutes was being concealed.
The Generalissimo had said to General Marshall that he wanted to talk with his advisors to discuss the necessity or desirability of perhaps [Page 241] making a public statement. He also wanted to discuss this with General Marshall but first suggested that General Marshall think it over. General Marshall told the Generalissimo that he had been thinking it over and that in fact he had taken the liberty of preparing a draft statement for the Generalissimo’s consideration.4 The reasons General Marshall had taken this liberty were: First, he felt his position was more detached than the Generalissimo’s, and, second, he wanted to illustrate the expression of an attitude of tolerance on the part of the Government and the avoidance of any irritating or provocative statements. General Marshall emphasized the necessity for avoiding provocative statements which would defeat the supposed purpose of the statement and would lead nowhere. General Marshall then handed the Generalissimo the draft of a statement in English and suggested that it be translated into Chinese before he considered it at his convenience.
Dr. Stuart confirmed that the Generalissimo had read the statement drafted by General Marshall and he had given it considerable thought. The Generalissimo had indicated he planned to put it out but there would probably be a few changes. Generally he liked the statement very much.
General Marshall thought Dr. Stuart might emphasize to the Generalissimo that the American mediators would have no part in the statement if it were not tolerant in its expressions.
Dr. Stuart suggested that it might be a good idea for him to see the Generalissimo’s secretary and tell him that. General Marshall agreed.
Dr. Stuart then suggested that perhaps Mr. Fugh and Mr. Wang Ping Nan might go to Shanghai with a view to encouraging Chou En Lai to return to Nanking at an early date. Dr. Stuart stated that when he had given the joint letter to Wang Ping Nan, Mr. Wang had seemed very pleased that he had been sent for, was delighted with the joint letter, and seemed glad that the matter had been reopened. The Generalissimo had calculated that we ought to give Chou En Lai until Monday morning in order to allow time for relaying the joint letter to Yenan and for Yenan to send an answer back to Chou.
General Marshall stated that it was his belief that the Generalissimo ought to make the statement now, immediately, and not wait for Chou to come back. He suggested that Dr. Stuart, in talking with the Generalissimo’s secretary, bring out the desirability of issuing the statement at this time rather than later, as well as repeating the need for it to be tolerant as opposed to being irritating and provocative.