Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall, General Chen Cheng, and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 24, 1946, 10:30 a.m.
| Also present: | Col. Caughey |
General Chen Cheng opened the meeting by asking General Marshall if he had heard from General Chou En-lai concerning the Government’s eight proposals. General Marshall replied that he had not but, through Dr. Stuart, he had received a copy of what were supposed to be the 11 points, or questions, raised by the Communists.15
General Marshall stated that he had been more or less forced to withdraw from negotiations since the Communist Party is of the [Page 415] firm belief that he is backing the National Government. This is not so in Dr. Stuart’s case, nonetheless both he and Dr. Stuart are sitting on the sidelines at the moment. The third party group in the meantime is attempting to seek, as a neutral buffer element between the Communists and Nationalists, a solution from the existing confusing situation. General Marshall continued by stating that he gathered from the talk he had had with the third party members that the Communists’ real reason for objecting to the fact that certain of the tentative June agreements were brought forth in the Government’s eight proposals, whereas certain other of the tentative June agreements were omitted (such as adhering to military positions as of 13 January and 7 June), was based on the fact that the Communists probably would not now agree to establishing in Harbin a symbolic force of 5,000 troops and, at the same time, permit the Government to retain Kalgan which, according to the tentative June agreements, was to have been retained by the Communists. In other words, the real issue concerns an adjustment with respect to Harbin and Kalgan. General Marshall reiterated that the great hope in the present negotiations is the participation of the third party, and he hoped that the National Government representatives would receive this group wholeheartedly and graciously in an effort to find some peaceful solution.
General Chen Cheng agreed that the third party group was the big hope at the moment but he stated that its effectiveness had not yet been proven. On top of this, his study of recent Yenan broadcasts would indicate that the Communist Party was not in a frame of mind conducive for a peaceful settlement. He added that this attitude had continued for several months. At the outset of negotiations the Communists had initially refused to submit the list of troops, which they desired to be retained in the reorganized army, in accordance with the 25 February reorganization agreement. He stated that, if that agreement could not be put into force, discussion on all other issues, whether it be political or military, is so much idle talk.
General Chen Cheng stated that he had gone to Peiping not long ago for the purpose of issuing the necessary instructions to the various military commanders to put into effect the 10-day Kalgan truce. He stated that he had with him a 19-page confidential letter from the Generalissimo which indicated specific instructions that were to be followed. The major points of this letter were that all efforts would be made to abide by a temporary truce; that the attitude on the part of the Nationalist forces would be purely defensive; and that advances on Kalgan would cease, with the exception of taking over by the Nationalist forces of the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow [Page 416] railroad. General Chen Cheng said that this conference came to naught in view of the Communists’ refusal to accept the 10–day truce.
General Chen Cheng stated that the third party was going to have difficulty in resolving the major issues as is evidenced by the letter containing the seven political and four military points issued by the Communists. (General Yu Ta Wei submitted a Chinese text of the 11 points which is attached hereto.) General Chen Cheng then informed General Marshall that the Generalissimo probably would not be back from Formosa until the 31st of October since that was the date upon which he is to officially celebrate his birthday.
General Marshall told General Chen Cheng that the Generalissimo had told him he would be back from Formosa in a few days or would return upon four hours notice from General Marshall. General Marshall stated that a protracted stay in Formosa on the part of the Generalissimo would have a direct bearing on the negotiations and would appear to the outside world that the Generalissimo was deliberately avoiding negotiations.
General Marshall stated that the reorganization of the armed forces was the basic factor in the present negotiations. General Marshall remarked that the present Government attitude regarding the February 25th agreement was unrealistic wherein it attempted to locate only Communist forces whereas the 25 February agreement required the location of both Nationalist and Communist forces. To do otherwise would lead to fear on the part of the Communists that their forces would be to [so?] isolated to facilitate subsequent liquidation by Government forces.
General Chen Cheng stated that he had not had much experience in negotiating but did believe that the reorganization of the armed forces was the crux of the present situation. He stated that, based on the 25 February agreement, 59 Government armies had already been reduced to a division status. Thirty-one armies had yet to be reorganized into divisions, but these armies were the ones in North China and Manchuria which the Government could not reduce due to the present military situation in those areas. Aside from the fact that this demobilization was contemplated in the 25 February agreement, it was also an economic measure in order to try to avoid a financial situation which the Government could not support.
At this point Dr. Stuart entered the meeting.
General Yu Ta Wei stated that he had received a telegram from the Generalissimo in which the Generalissimo firmly holds to the third of the eight points in the Government’s proposal which concerns the adjustment of her military situation in Manchuria in accordance with tentative agreements reached in June. The Generalissimo also insisted that the Communist troops in Antung and Tunghua be withdrawn [Page 417] within 15 days after a cease fire order is issued and move north of the Sungari River within one month, and that redeployment of Communist troops in accordance with the tentatively agreed plan in June be completed by the end of one year. General Marshall asked if the Government thought it was logistically possible for the Communists to meet this schedule and General Chen Cheng answered that he thought so. General Marshall then asked whether the Generalissimo meant “all” Communist troops in Manchuria were to move north of the Sungari River or whether he meant just Communist forces in Antung and Tunghua. General Chen Cheng was not certain but said that he would check.
General Marshall then asked Dr. Stuart to recite the results of his meeting with General Chou (Dr. Stuart did so in Chinese at the request of General Yu Ta Wei. The gist of Dr. Stuart’s comments however pertained to the fact that the Communists could not accept the Government’s eight points). General Marshall stated that at the present time neither the Three Man Committee or the Five Man Committee could meet until the third party had an opportunity to try to work out some of the differences between the Government and the Communist Party.
General Marshall again mentioned, and Dr. Stuart agreed, that a protracted delay by the Generalissimo would be construed as a definite action to prevent successful culmination of present negotiations.
General Marshall asked General Chen Cheng what harm would result if the Marines were withdrawn. General Chen Cheng replied that the immediate reaction probably would be insignificant but that the overall effect, from a world security viewpoint, would have great implications since it would be a signal for Russian participation in Chinese affairs.