Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
General Marshall to President Truman 21
1695. Dear Mr. President: Since my 1663 of October 17, the so-called Third Party Group consisting of the Democratic League, the Young China Party, and the politically active nonparty people have sent an important delegation to Nanking to act as intermediaries in the negotiations. The same morning, Monday last, General Chou En Lai returned in a United States Army plane. Unfortunately, the Generalissimo had previously been long scheduled to leave Sunday, the day before, for his first visit to Formosa in 40 years. He postponed his departure 24 hours so as to receive Chou and the Third Party Group personally on their arrival. His action in this matter, I am certain was without intention to influence one way or another the negotiations. Chou’s decision to return to Nanking was not made until late Saturday and was unknown to the Generalissimo until 8 p.m. Saturday. The previous information from the Government representatives who had gone to Shanghai to persuade Chou to return and had reported to the Generalissimo Saturday morning, was that Chou had refused to return.
Since arrival in Nanking the Third Party men have been continuously occupied in discussions with Government representatives, Communists, Doctor Stuart and me. They are acting as a united group, at least for the time being, and are very earnest in their endeavors to bring about a peaceful settlement. They state that unless certain commitments are made by the Government regarding the procedure for convocation, delegates, etc., for National Assembly, the Third Party will not attend. This incidentally is their principal weapon to influence action on part of either Government or Communists.
[Page 436]General Chou rejects the eight point statement of the Generalissimo, refusing to revive those portions of the June negotiations on which a tentative agreement had been reached. I think this action is based on two considerations, one pertaining to complete distrust and consequent misconceptions and the other one to establish a basis for maneuvers or trades in getting some concession regarding Kalgan and the continued Government military occupation of places recently taken over [. Incidentally, Antung in Manchuria was taken over]22 by the Government today and an operation against Chefoo is fully under way [.] The Communists are trading, I believe, between their stand for the return of all troops to their January 13th positions in China and June 7th positions in Manchuria, against the Government’s stand to continue in occupation of places recently taken over. Communists’ present occupation of Harbin might possibly be traded by them against Government possession of Kalgan, etc. The Communists had agreed in June to release Harbin to the Government, the Government on the other hand was then ready to accept continued occupation of Kalgan by the Communists.
Since Chou’s return he called on Doctor Stuart once, Tuesday. Doctor Stuart reported on this, “The interview was a long story of distrust and misconception”. Chou did not communicate with me until he appeared unannounced late this morning and had a two hour conference with me, not including the half hour we devoted to lunch.
Doctor Stuart and I have, in effect, kept clear of the negotiations this week, endeavoring to push to the public forefront the Third Party and Doctor Sun Fo. At the same time, the Third Party members have reported to us and consulted us.
Chou today recited most of the differences from the Communist point of view taking the stand that the Government had stipulated unacceptable terms which amounted to a surrender, and was at the same time determinedly pursuing a full dress military campaign. He said Yenan, learning of the Generalissimo’s departure, had recalled Chou. He had advised against his leaving Nanking for the next few days in the hope that some good might come from the Third Party effort. He then covered the military situation of aggressive Government actions and said he made those comments to me as a member of the Committee of Three. I asked whether or not he was suggesting an immediate meeting of the Committee and while his reply was a somewhat complicated statement, apparently he was not asking for such a meeting at this moment. I tried to disabuse his belief regarding the Formosa trip and informed him that the Generalissimo returns tomorrow, Sunday, at 2 p.m.
[Page 437]We had a long talk but it was without much effect as he adheres stubbornly to his belief in Government duplicity of intent as to the Kalgan truce episode and prejudiced action by Doctor Stuart and me in giving a press release on it, and regarding unreasonable or evil purposes of the Government in putting forward the eight points in the Generalissimo’s statement of October 16th. The important point of the interview today was the fact that Chou called on me despite his attacks on the impartial integrity of my actions and of my final statement in our Shanghai interview that by his own statements he had terminated my services as mediator.
I can make no predictions favorable or unfavorable. Negotiations are still under way and, very fortunately, I think, under the auspices of Chinese mediators instead of American. The Generalissimo’s return may either help or hinder. The Marine Corps incidents concerned with hunting parties complicate matters.23
The best we can do at the present moment is to wait and see. As you and the Secretary realize, above all men, the state of peace appears at times more difficult than the state of war.