Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling, August 27, 1946, Noon
Generalissimo stated that he had given careful thought to the proposal that a small committee be formed of Communists and Government representatives with Dr. Stuart as chairman, to reach an agreement on unsettled details regarding the formation of the State Council. He was now ready to proceed and would direct Dr. Soong to nominate the Government representatives, one or more according to the desires of General Chou En-lai.
He then referred to the recent public statement of General Chou and Democratic League representatives to the effect that what was desired was an order for cease firing and the reconvening of the PCC. He stated that in his view an order for cease firing was not required, as this had already been provided for in the agreement of January 10th. All that was necessary was for the Communists to cease fighting. He stated that the PCC had discharged its function by reaching certain agreements, and he saw no purpose in reconvening that council. He appeared to accept the necessity for the continuation of the Steering Committee of the PCC which had for its job the settlement of some of the details involved in the implementation of the PCC agreements.
[Page 84]He referred to our lengthy discussion of the previous Friday when I orally transmitted to him General Chou’s written statement handed to me5 just before my departure from Nanking, stating that General Chou had information of offensive operations about to be launched by the Government in Shantung and against Chengte, also rumors that the Government was shipping gas to Hsuchow. He said I could tell General Chou that so long as Communists attack, they must expect operations by the Government troops; that the recent mobilization order of the Communist Party was a declaration of open rebellion against the Government; and that regarding Chengte, Tatung was in the same war zone (the 12th).
I told the Generalissimo that I had not seen and therefore had not studied the recent public statements made by General Chou and the Democratic League Representatives, but that it appeared to me in all probability the desire was not so much for reconvening the PCC as it was for definite acknowledgement of a commitment to the PCC resolutions. I remarked that General Chou had insisted when the previous small group was formed to discuss local government in Kiangsu, that whatever agreement was reached should, as a matter of form, be confirmed by the Steering Committee of PCC. He again insisted on this procedure if the present small group committee was formed and reached an agreement. I stated that in my opinion, the Communists believed that the Generalissimo was endeavoring to bypass PCC procedure and commitments. Therefore the Communists were insisting upon positive evidence that the resolutions of the PCC were still being considered, therefore the insistence on confirming action, even merely as a matter of form, by the PCC Steering Committee. It was also the fear of the Communists that this matter would be so handled by the Government that other parties—Democratic League, China Youth Party and Non-party groups—would not participate in the discussions along with the Communists. Their presence was much desired by the Communists.
I then turned to the Generalissimo’s opening statement that the cease fire order was not necessary because the agreement of January 10th provided for the cessation of hostilities. I pointed out to him that there had been great changes in the military dispositions and that the January 10th6 agreement provided that troops would remain in the localities they occupied on January 13th until their redistribution was further agreed upon, in connection with reorganization of the armies and the reorganization of the government. I asked him [Page 85] whether or not he meant that the positions into which his troops had recently advanced in Kiangsu were to be evacuated in accordance with the agreement of January 10th or did he have in mind an exception. I also cited an example of this same point in places occupied by the Government troops along the Tientsin–Tsinan railroad since January 13th—actually in July and August. His answer to this involved a lengthy discussion of operations in general and I did not get a definite reply.
I then brought up the question of the points already agreed upon in the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria which involved the evacuation of those places occupied by the Communists subsequent to June 7th. In a reply which did not provide me with a clear understanding of what was in his mind, he stated that once the State Council had been formed, it would be a medium for the discussion and settlement of these various points. He previously stated in connection with his feeling that there was no justification for the reconvening of the PCC, that this State Council would provide the necessary medium for settling details which still remained to be adjusted.
I then referred to his four, and later five, stipulations as conditions precedent to the cessation of fighting and which cited his stipulation that the Government would take over local governments in Kiangsu and certain other points upon the withdrawal of the Communist troops. Did he mean now that this issue should be settled by the State Council when created, which had been General Chou’s contention all the time, or did he have in mind exceptions to his general statement regarding the immediate functions of the State Council? He made clear that he still insisted that the Government take over the local government in Kiangsu along the Tsingtao railroad and from Chengte to the south (and also I suppose in Antung, although he did not mention this) but that the issue could later be settled in the State Council along with the similar problem in other areas.
I stated that I was not certain as to what his views really were as to the cessation of fighting in relation to the organization of the State Council. He had seemed to imply that while the State Council could be in session discussing these general matters, the fighting would still be going on. I thought that was quite impractical. I said that possibly he had in mind something like this: Assuming the small group headed by Dr. Stuart would reach an agreement, that that agreement would be confirmed by the Steering Committee, that the representatives for the State Council were duly nominated and possibly that even the State Council had had its formal opening, then fighting should be terminated in somewhat the manner they had prescribed and agreed to for Manchuria. He replied that he thought [Page 86] that was a good idea, that he would give it careful thought, and that he would also consider whether or not the redistribution of troops could be decided upon by the State Council. I again questioned him as to whether he was making an exception of the situation in Kiangsu and Jehol and along the Tsingtao railroad. He said that he was.
The interview terminated with his statement that he would send immediately to Dr. Soong instructions to nominate one representative or representatives to the special group, and that he would give careful thought to the outline I had just given of the method of procedure.
P. S. I forgot to mention the Generalissimo’s comment regarding Manchuria. He referred to my view that once the fighting spread into Jehol, it would result in a general conflagration in Manchuria. He did not agree. He thought that if the Communists felt that they had the power for successful military action in Manchuria they would be fighting there now. I disagreed, and reminded him that this view of his was inconsistent with his statement some months ago that neither the Communists or the Soviets wanted to come out into the open in Manchuria, that they wished to accomplish their purpose or gain control under the cover of the Central Government. He made no reply.
- MM 133, August 22, p. 68.↩
- See memorandum by the Committee of Three to General Chiang Kai-shek, subject: Cessation of Hostilities, China, vol. ix, p. 125.↩