Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 29, 1946, 5 p.m.

Nanking, August 29, 1946, 5 p.m.

Also present:	Col. Hutchin
	Mister Chang

General Chou: I had a talk with Doctor Stuart yesterday. Did Doctor Stuart talk to you on the points which he and I discussed?

General Marshall: I have not seen Doctor Stuart since that talk, but he did ask Colonel Hutchin to take up one matter with me. I do not know whether or not it included your specific points. If you would review them for me, maybe I can tell. He only communicated with me regarding one thing. What were the points you made?

General Chou: I talked with Dr. Stuart on four points. First, Dr. Stuart said that according to you, the Generalissimo had mentioned the cessation of hostilities to the effect that if the Communist Party would stop fighting, there was no reason for the Government not to stop it. I discussed this point with Dr. Stuart, whether it is feasible to put that on trial. On the Communist side there should be no difficulty with implementing a truce. If the Generalissimo’s expression is definite, then we could immediately issue an order to cease fire on the Communist part and field teams may be sent to all places to witness whether, in the various trouble spots, the Communists have stopped fighting. Then the Government may immediately follow that with the issuance of a truce order. I think there would be no difficulty with sending forth teams for there are many Americans in Peiping. I would like to know whether the Generalissimo had that clearly in mind.

General Marshall: Is that about all that Doctor Stuart said of my conversations with the Generalissimo on that subject?

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: To begin with, that is not a complete statement and might be misleading to you. As a matter of fact, the Generalissimo said that there was no necessity of issuing an order for the cessation of hostilities, in that the agreement of January 10th provided for that and that all that was necessary was for the Communists to stop their fighting. He continued with some comments in regard to the State Council affording a basis for settling details.

I replied that that was almost identical with your proposal and that I wished to be certain that he meant exactly what that statement conveyed to me. In the first place, the agreement of January 10th included certain provisions as to the places occupied on January 13th. In the next place, he had made specific points regarding certain regions—North Kiangsu, the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, Chengte and the matter of local government in certain areas. Now how does he relate those factors to that statement?

While the following discussion was not precise in statement, I gathered fairly clearly that he was not withdrawing the conditions he had made regarding Northern Kiangsu, the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad, Chengte, and local civil government in those particular places, nor did I get a clear understanding of his conception of the application of the agreement of January 10th to the present situation. Now that is where that particular discussion terminated. I wanted you to have the same understanding as I did of what had taken place. Quite evidently, that will give you a different impression than you got in your discussion with Doctor Stuart, but it will give you a clear impression of what transpired.

Doctor Stuart gave me, through Colonel Hutchin, some idea of his discussion regarding the possibility of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, himself, issuing an order that in three or four days, the cessation of fighting would take effect for the Communist armies, with the understanding that I would undertake to exert all the influence I possess on the Generalissimo to follow that with a similar order to the National armies. Despite the fact that that discussion by you was not based on a complete understanding of the matter, I have been turning the matter over in my mind to see if, even so, there is a possibility. I will discuss the matter very frankly. Would such action by Chairman Mao Tse-tung favorably influence the Government representatives in this small group? It would either influence them or embarrass them.

Assuming this small group (I will call it the Stuart group) reached an agreement, would this action by Chairman Mao Tse-tung exert a favorable influence on the adjustment of military differences? I have tried to think of the probable reaction of the Government officials, particularly the militarists who, I think, are strongly disposed to a policy of force. I anticipate that those leaders would claim that the Communist action was to take advantage of the present Communist dispositions, particularly near Tatung and was intended to embarrass the Government in its movements for what it claims as defensive action—what I would normally characterize as retaliation. If such an order was issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and was followed by a similar order by the Generalissimo, would there inevitably be a resumption of fighting when we came to these conditions that the Generalissimo has been insisting upon regarding Kiangsu, the railroad and Chengte? I gathered from Doctor Stuart’s report to me that the idea was to have the order issued by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and that that would be the first intimation to the Government of such intention and then it would be for me to exert pressure on the Government to issue a similar order. Is that correct?

General Chou: Yes.

General Marshall: Now, what would happen if I informed the Generalissimo that his statement had been repeated to you and that you were considering, with Yenan, the merits of Chairman Mao Tse-tung issuing such an order. At least there would be an opportunity for the Generalissimo to express himself as being antagonistic to the whole procedure and completely distrustful. It might be that it would cause him to take immediate action himself, though I doubt it, to anticipate Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s action.

I have raised the various considerations that I can think of so that in contemplating any action, you will know in advance what I think are the possible complications or advantages of procedure. With further reference to the matter not directly relating to it, I think I should give you some additional reports of my conversations with the Generalissimo.

The Generalissimo stated that he saw no reason for the reconvening of the PCC because it had discharged its functions when it reached certain agreements. He felt that the State Council would then be the proper body to settle details. I expressed my opinion that the Communist Party felt, or feared, that the purpose of the Generalissimo was to by-pass the PCC and in effect, to abandon its actions. For that reason (this being my opinion) you had always insisted that whatever small committee action was arranged, the agreements reached, if any, should be confirmed by the Steering Committee of the PCC. I then secured the Generalissimo’s agreement to such action by the Steering Committee to confirm whatever agreement is reached by the Stuart Committee.

I also discussed at considerable length the idea that the State Council would be an appropriate body to reach a settlement of the various political factors concerned and many of the military factors. In fact, he made such a complete inclusion of military factors that I questioned that he meant quite that, and it developed that he had exceptions. For example, his statement was so general that I questioned him as to whether or not he was referring the problem of local government in Kiangsu to settlement by the State Council rather than the previous stipulation that the Government insisted on taking over that local government. He stated that the question of the local government in Kiangsu could be settled by the State Council, but on further questioning by me, he stated that until the State Council reached a settlement of the matter, the Government would take over the local government which would have been in accordance with his original insistence.

In discussing the rather general statement he made regarding cessation of hostilities, I stated that the situation was greatly changed since January 10th and the matter was not as simple as he had indicated by his statement. If I were to be concerned in the mediation of details, I would have to have a very clear understanding of just what was intended. He did not make a clear explanation for the treatment of details and said he would have to have a map and certain information. I went ahead to describe what might be a procedure.

That is, assuming that the Stuart group reached an agreement, assuming that the Steering Committee confirmed the agreement, assuming the individuals were designated to form the State Council and possibly assuming that the State Council gathered in an opening, first to give it being but not to negotiate, then we should turn to the immediate termination of hostilities if it could not be accomplished before that time. He said that appealed to him and he would carefully consider the matter. I went on to say this, that time was the consuming factor. That my own view was that if this situation was permitted to develop much further, neither he nor Chairman Mao Tse-tung could bring it under control, short of a very prolonged fighting. In other words, negotiations would be, at least for a long time, out of the question. Therefore, whatever was to be done had to be done quickly, that there had already been, I was afraid, fatal delay.

Now, it was only during this last conference with the Generalissimo in which I secured his agreement to the Stuart Committee and to the confirming action by the Steering Committee of the PCC, a discussion which incidentally was not concluded until 1:30 of the day I left Kuling. In a preceding conference I had given him your message,¹⁷ to which he replied that the Government had no poison gas and that, regarding Chengte for example, I was to say to you that that was in the same War Zone as Tatung and that the Government felt free to defend itself by such actions as were necessary in view of the Communist actions at Tatung. Incidentally, they just gave me a note while I am sitting here from Yu Ta Wei that Communist forces had evacuated Chengte 9:30 this morning and the 13th Army had moved in.

Now, in connection with all this, I think I should give you my own estimate of the Communist Party at the present time. You will know whether I am correct or not. But you can utilize my estimate in interpreting my part in this discussion with the Generalissimo.

I have assumed that the Communists have practically reached the conclusion that the Government is intent on going ahead with military operations to gain at least more favorable positions and proceed to follow a general policy of force. I have assumed that the Communist Party is endeavoring to prevent the Government forces from getting the Communist forces into a weak position and is also endeavoring to strike such blows as possible in the hope of convincing the Government that it will not be profitable to follow a policy of force. I have assumed that if the foregoing assumptions are correct, the further effort of the Communist Government to proceed without embarrassment by any negotiations with which I am concerned, which I assume is particularly the reason for the considerable propaganda directed against me. And, I repeat my belief that if the situation continues to develop very much further it will get entirely beyond control of either the Government or the Communist Party.

So far as the Government is concerned, I have assumed there are individuals, particularly military leaders, in the Government who are firmly convinced that the policy of force is the only practical course, and they are also of the opinion that it is within their capability of carrying out such a policy. I have assumed that a certain political group within the Government agrees with the military group that I have just referred to; but also that there is a considerable liberal group that has an opposite view.

General Chou: I appreciate your giving me the details of the discussion with the Generalissimo at Kuling. The result of that discussion was in no way surprising to me but rather confirms rather well my expectations. That is why when I heard from Dr. Stuart about the Generalissimo’s statement, I did not immediately make that statement as a basis for working out a procedure because it seemed still questionable whether it can be done or not. But since it seems that there might be such a possibility, I made this positive proposal and discussed it with Dr. Stuart. This proposal entered into my mind merely at that moment because I was very anxious to find a way out of this situation. I did not obtain any previous instruction from Yenan, nor had I considered that formula with Yenan, nor did I report to Yenan about yesterday’s discussion because I preferred rather to have Dr. Stuart talk it over with you again and that I, myself, would also confer with you today in order to make sure whether such a proposal can be submitted or not. I wish to repeat this is only my suggestion and my purpose is entirely to find a settlement. Though I doubted from the very beginning whether such a proposal would be practicable or not, it expressed my anxious desire for peace. Now, after your statement, the situation is perfectly clear and it seems that my proposal is rather superfluous. But it might still be a subject for consideration. At the same time, from your statement I also made consideration on many other things and I wish to speak very frankly to you as you did to me.

General Marshall: I do not know as that is entirely superfluous; that suggested action by you. I urged very strongly similar action by the Generalissimo when he went to Mukden, that without consulting anybody he would do it. I had him ready to do this until his military leaders got hold of him up there. I think he would have gained a great improvement in the situation and it would have been to his great advantage. Now the shoe is on the other foot. I repeat again that I am not so certain that your proposal is so superfluous an idea as you suggest, but I wanted you to know all the conditions so that you would not labor under any misunderstanding.

General Chou: I wish to make clear that in considering any proposal for peace we cannot link up the mediation with the situation in the front because if we connect those two, then there would be almost no means to find out a settlement because the situation in the front is changing every day. If we based our formula for mediation on that basis, the result would be that fighting will merely grow larger and larger. I received a report yesterday, for example, that in North Kiangsu the Government lost two divisions and one regiment—one division from the 99th Army and the other from the 56th—comprising about 15,000 men.

Of course, on the other hand, we have the other report that the Government forces have taken Chengte and I certainly surmise that they took it by force. It may, therefore, evoke Communist retaliations around Tatung. Now if we link up those two matters then any peace mission will seem almost impossible. So, on my part I never connect up the two. Of course, in conferences with the Generalissimo or our military leaders, we have to connect it up but when contemplating any possible matters to achieve peace we should not connect it up. It was in that spirit that I thought of that proposal.

Now that is true with the State Council. Originally I endorsed Dr. Stuart’s proposal and accepted your suggestion that we first discuss the reorganization of the Government so that as soon as an agreement has been reached the fighting can be stopped. But, in view of the present circumstances, it seems that that hope has no foundation because the crucial point now seems to be that while we expected that as soon as the discussion on government reorganization had been completed and that we have demonstrated our good faith by participating in that government, the Government would agree to issue an order for the cessation of hostilities. But, according to the Generalissimo, he will still insist on taking over North Kiangsu, the Tsingtao–Tsinan railroad and Chengte—not only the city but also the region to the south of it—after the government reorganization and before the agreement has been reached regarding the local governments. In case he could not take over those places according to his wishes peacefully, then he would resort to force. In that case, even when we reach an agreement on government reorganization and even when the Communists participate in that government, a resumption of fighting could still not be prevented. In that case the situation will be grave and, therefore, if we now comply—if we follow the course of the Generalissimo—we would have no guarantee that the fighting will be stopped.

I wish to make clear that according to the original suggestion by you and Doctor Stuart, we would first tackle the problem of government reorganization in order that we might accomplish the issuance of a cease fire order. But now, according to the analysis of the Generalissimo’s intention, it seems that even if the Government has reorganized and that the Communists are situated in the Government, there will still be no achievement of peace because, by that time, either we have to yield those disputed places to the Government, thus violating the PCC resolution, or he (the Generalissimo) would take those places by force. Such a course would be contrary to our and Doctor Stuart’s original expectation.

Now, the third question is regarding the PCC. As to the reorganization of the government, I am now given to understand that the Generalissimo agrees to the fact that an agreement could be worked out by the Stuart group and the various parties will be notified of confirmation by the Steering Committee of the PCC. However, as regards the draft constitution, it is my opinion that that cannot be taken up by the State Council, because the PCC itself has created a special body for the purpose of completing that draft constitution. Therefore the work should still be continued by that body—Constitutional revision committee—it will then subsequently be passed by the Steering Committee of the PCC. This has nothing to do with the State Council.

Another question is regarding the representatives of the National Assembly. The final arrangements of delegates should also be made by the Steering Committee of the PCC, because this does not come under the jurisdiction of the State Council for two reasons:

1. In case it will be discussed by the State Council, it would be against the PCC resolution.

2. Within the State Council, any transaction will be passed by a simple majority.

Special consideration cannot follow that procedure. They would be overruled by the Kuomintang elements. Those considerations have been specifically expressed in the PCC resolutions. They are not the ordinary administrative matters. This points out that in many ways we are still at great variance from the Government.

General Marshall: I would like to add this comment right now. I accepted in the first place, the great difficulties involved in reaching an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. We had utterly failed to get action. I realize the complications about delegates to the National Assembly and also about drafting a constitution, but I approached this present problem, at this time, in trying to find one thing we could do and reach an agreement on, and which would be a positive evidence of the beginnings of a coalition government. Having reached such an agreement my hope was that the reaction would be so effective that it would increase the probability of our finding an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. In my discussions with the Generalissimo I took his general statements, which appeared favorable, and deliberately searched out every difficulty in my questions so that we would have a clear understanding of just what the difficulties were and not be moving in the dark. I was not surprised by the difficulties. I was surprised by the general statement which seemed so favorable.

General Chou: The reason why we were interested in the idea of discussing government reorganization was that we share the hope that in case an agreement could be reached on this subject, we would promote the securing of a truce and thus make the hope of the people, here and abroad, for a peace in China, a reality. As the matter now stands, it seems not difficult to reach an agreement on the government reorganization if the government would not use that discussion for stalling. But it is still absolutely uncertain whether, after such an agreement is secured, the government would issue a cessation of hostilities order.

Now, just as you have analyzed, there are still many complications and issues unsettled. Therefore I am turning over in my mind whether by following such a procedure, it might not leave an illusion that peace is in sight, when actually there is no prospect. Following such a course would be tantamount to deceiving the people, because the result of such a procedure would be to obscure the government’s intention to carry on the war. Under such circumstances, the American government may also continue its assistance to China. It seems that it is perfectly permissible to continue assistance when peace is in sight. But the result will be that while the Communist Party is being subjected to all kinds of commitments, the war-like elements on the government side would enjoy every facility to continue the war.

I am turning over in my mind the advisability of simply stating to the people how the situation actually is in China. That the war-like elements on the Government part insist on prosecution of the war and while we have been exerting every means to secure peace, they would not come to terms. By revealing actual facts to the public, we may arouse the opposition of public opinion against the continuation of war in China. The American Government may also stop its assistance to the Chinese Government. In this way, public opinion may eventually put all pressure to bear to secure a cessation of hostilities. Otherwise we would never get the result of peace. So what I am thinking is that while on the one hand we should by every means try to convince the Government that its reorganization would be profitable to their side, while on the other hand, public opinion should make emphasis that a policy of force will be opposed by everybody.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that Dr. Stuart’s group may meet for informal discussion about government reorganization, and I feel pretty sure can iron out the differences in two or three days. I also hope that you and Dr. Stuart would give some kind of assurance to the effect that in case a common ground has been worked out by Dr. Stuart’s group and in case the government still refuses to stop fighting, then you would make some explanations to show that the responsibility for the continuation of the war rests with the Government side. In other words, in case the Government could still not be persuaded to stop the fighting, the American Government would clarify its own disposition toward the situation.

Otherwise, the actions of the American Government, while serving on the one hand as a mediator between two parties, on the other hand, it aids the Government side in a civil war. It would make the American policy difficult for the Chinese and the American people to understand. It is natural that under such circumstances the Communists might complain and make criticisms. It appears to me that while we accept Dr. Stuart’s proposal to make a future effort towards securing peace, we are actually undergoing another trial to see if we can stop the fighting. By adopting this procedure, we should no way permit the Government to take advantage of it for a stalling and for facilitating the war actions on the part of the Government. Instead of continuing this present state of affairs, we should rather explain to the world that there is a total war in China and that the Government is refusing to negotiate. It would at least make the mind of the general public clear and it would also help the American Government to clarify its own state of affairs. That would be much preferable than the obscurity of the general situation we have which seems to me very dangerous. Therefore, this is my attitude toward the informal discussion of Doctor Stuart’s group.

General Marshall: I want to say this at this moment. It was with great difficulty that I persuaded the Government to agree to this special group to promote the organization of the State Council. The Government was not trying to persuade me—I was trying to persuade the Government. The Government was insisting that the Communist Party would not go through with any agreements and would follow a policy of obstruction. The Government was insisting that the Communist military actions were not justified. Under those conditions I pressed for this action—not the Government.

The next point pertains to your reference to American support of the Government. In my opinion you are confusing propaganda with fact and Chinese propaganda is far from fact. It consists in exploiting of any item that can be found, regardless of whether or not there is any actual support of hostilities involved. I have stopped, I think, almost every direct support of the Government in a military way and yet the propaganda would seem to indicate that the fight could not go on a week without the military supplies and support the U. S. Government is alleged to be giving the Kuomintang Party—otherwise the Government. The procedure that you outline with relation to this propaganda effort and with relation to the U. S. Government and its prospective action merely means to my mind that we go ahead with the war to ultimate disaster for the people of China.

I received your message¹⁸ regarding this surplus property committee. I presume you have read their statement.¹⁹ A major, and possibly the most serious, charge in your communication related to an air agreement. That actually consisted of Mr. McCabe agreeing the night before the plane left to bring out a representative of the State Department in no connection with the surplus property affair, but having to do with a long range matter that pertains to the world. It is useless to expect the U. S. Government to black out China and have no consideration whatever for its relation, for example, to this air matter the State Department wished to discuss in connection with the international meeting held in San Francisco some time previously. The campaign that has been going on on the part of the Communist Party against practically everything pertaining to the U. S. Government in relation to China, I just accept as political propaganda, because it virtually has had no relation to the operations at the present time in actual effect. But it has been said so often, which is the purpose of propaganda, that the people that prepare it probably have begun to believe it. Now to depend on that propaganda to win the battle is a vital mistake. Just as depending on the action against the Marines to drive them out of China was an even more vital mistake. I trust that you will not let all these preposterous statements deceive you into decisions that I consider would be fatal to the interests of the Communist Party.

I will sacrifice a source of intelligence by telling you that I have access, and have since last March, not through the Chinese, but otherwise, to all the instructions from Moscow to the Soviet representatives in Shanghai for propaganda, and also the reports of the Shanghai group in answer to questions and in explanation of their propaganda efforts. I have had that in detail once a week since last March. I don’t issue any propaganda statements. I practically issue no statements, but I would like you to have in mind the Central Government’s propaganda, which at times has been adverse to me, your own party’s propaganda which has certainly been condemnatory of me, and now this Russian propaganda which has an international purpose, but which parallels Yenan propaganda. Not that I assume collusion, but it is a similar treatment of the same situation. There is no respect whatever for fact. There is a complete disregard of fact and almost every action can be timed with other considerations.

For some time past, for a definite period of weeks, I personally have been under attack. At the same time I have been reading the instructions of the Russians from Moscow regarding me personally along the same line of propaganda. We can’t ignore such procedure, but on the other hand, I think it will be fatal if you form a conclusion from it. Conclusions should be based on facts. I have regarded all this propaganda as inevitable. It is the technique and the method employed by the parties concerned. I want you to have in mind that there is no American propaganda at all, other than individual reflections on this wealth of propaganda in China. I find myself in the very difficult position with the irreconcilable members of the Kuomintang Party, who were largely opposed to all I have been trying to do, rejoicing in the attacks of me by the Communist Party as being to their advantage. On the other hand, the situation reverses itself in a good many considerations of the Government propaganda as well as other actions—which embarrass me. I am sitting in between the two trying to be tolerant and understanding and patient. I assume I am misunderstood, in fact I know I am misunderstood by many in the Government and if not misunderstood, I am bitterly resented. I don’t have to tell you what the feeling is regarding me on the Communist side. But my own position is purely impersonal in this; without offense, even without irritation, except that I am deeply concerned as to the extent which such a situation makes more difficult or impossible the termination of hostilities.

Dr. Stuart entered the meeting at this point.

General Marshall: It is getting rather late and so long as Doctor Stuart is here I would suggest to you that informally and without any record, you outline directly to Doctor Stuart a little of what we have been discussing, with no translation for me.

17. MM 133, August 22, p. 68.
18. See telegram of August 27 from the Consul General at Shanghai, p. 1052.
19. Ibid .