893.00/8–3046
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 33 of August 7, 194625 and to state that since submitting it some slight though distressingly slow progress has been made on the issues dealt with therein. For instance, my suggestion of an informal committee to prepare the way for the beginning of a Coalition Government was made to President Chiang on August 1. Only yesterday I learned of the names of the two government representatives, General Wu Tieh-cheng, Secretary-General of the Kuomintang, and Mr. Chang Li-sheng, Minister of Interior. They have left today for Kuling for specific instructions, returning perhaps tomorrow. The two Communist members have been long since determined on: Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu. I hope, therefore, that the little committee can meet on September 2.
The issues to be discussed will probably be confined to details of membership and of veto rights on the State Council. This, according to the agreements reached last winter, was to consist of forty members—twenty appointed by the Government, twenty others to be [Page 112] divided among the Communists, two other minor parties and those representing no party but named by President Chiang. Shall the Communists have eight or nine or ten members, and how can they be assured that the previous agreements be not violated? These appear to be the main Communist anxieties. They regard the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) agreements as their life-line and seek protection against any alterations in these. Perhaps a two-thirds majority vote on any such proposed changes might give them this protection. In any case the issues involved do not seem too difficult if both sides really want to find a solution. Assuming that they can and do reach a settlement, this would be regularized by the so-called Steering Committee (ten members—two for each party and two non-party), and plans could be put into effect at once for calling a meeting of the State Council. This in turn would serve as a sort of Interim Congress arranging for the National Assembly and the adoption of the Constitution on November 12.
Meanwhile General Marshall and I are still trying to find a formula for the cessation of hostilities. President Chiang remarked to General Marshall as the latter was leaving Kuling on August 27 that the fighting would stop as soon as the Communists stop attacking. We are playing with the idea of “calling his bluff” by asking him what he would do if Mao Tse-tung actually gave a cease-firing order for a three- or four-day period. General Marshall is leaving today for Kuling largely with this in mind, and General Chou En-lai is telegraphing to Yenan to ascertain Mr. Mao’s reaction to such a proposal. If this fails we shall, in the light of whatever progress is made in the political approach, urge President Chiang again to assist in bringing about an early end to the fighting. The Communists seem genuinely eager to stop the fighting.
There is one other somewhat encouraging item to report. I have, as described in my despatch no. 1 dated July 21, 1946,26 been arguing with the Government leaders that the most effective, if not the only way to conquer Communism is by doing more for the welfare of the people than the Communists, and by drastic internal reforms. Dr. T. V. Soong showed me yesterday documents in preparation for agrarian reforms which are as yet being kept strictly secret. The plan in brief is to purchase land from the large owners with payment in grain rather than money. He also told of new measures in process against official graft, etc. Once peace is restored and the single-party system ended, we can hope for more of such reforms and constructive developments.
[Page 113]In the meantime we must attempt to cross the immediate barrier in the manner described above. Respectfully yours,