501.BC/2–647
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Boss)
Following two telephone calls from Mr. Noyes reporting on the present situation regarding the procedural resolution on the disarmament matter, I telephoned Senator Austin. Referring to telegram No. 119 from New York,1 I told the Senator I felt the language in the draft Australian working paper requiring the proposed new Commission to report on substantive matters “within the space of not more than three months” was likely to be misleading. The prevailing view in Washington was, first, it is unrealistic to think that the Commission could accomplish very much in this highly complex and technical field in so short a time. Second, progress in disarmament is closely related to progress in solving the many problems inherited from the war including the peace treaties with Germany and Japan. The Soviet tactical position called for substantive accomplishment by the new Commission in a short time. If we gave in to this now we might find it difficult to defend ourselves against charges made later (for propaganda purposes) that the United States was not sincerely interested in disarmament.
The Senator said he had kept these factors in mind but that it had been necessary for him to agree with the other members of the subcommittee yesterday on this point. He thought we were protected by the subsequent conditional phrase “which the Commission may be in a position to formulate” which applied to any substantive proposals. It was also provided (but not yet agreed upon) that the Commission should first prepare its plan of work.
The most important considerations, the Senator said, were (a) to insist on language in the resolution which would protect the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission from impairment by the [Page 401] new Commission, and (b) to insist on language which would make it clear beyond any possible risk of future misunderstanding that information to be called for under the brief Assembly resolution of December 14, in implementation of the longer resolution of the same date, did not include information about atomic energy. He had talked with Gromyko on the telephone this morning and these were the points on which Gromyko was most inflexible. The Senator said he intended to fight for these two points; in order to win them, however and he expected to win, he had to be prepared to make some compromises and sacrifices on less important points.2
- See footnote 1, supra. ↩
- In telegram 124 from New York, February 7, Austin reported that the subcommittee had agreed that day to report to the Security Council a draft resolution containing two alternative texts for paragraph 3, one including only language acceptable to the Soviet Delegation, the other including additional language upon which the United States isisted (500.A/2–747). For the text of the subcommittee’s recommendation, see GA (II), Suppl. No. 2, p. 71.↩