SPA Files: Lot 55D3231

The Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Johnson) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)2

restricted personal

Dear Dean: I am enclosing a memorandum which we have prepared as a suggested procedure which might be followed by the Security Council when it receives the report of the Military Staff Committee on the Basic Principles Governing the Article 43 Agreements.3

I am not now recommending the proposal contained in this memorandum. It seems to us that it would be premature to attempt to decide what our course should be until we have a better picture of what the Military Staff Committee’s Report will contain. I believe it may be useful for you to consider the proposals in this paper as one of the possible alternative procedures, assuming that there remains a substantial area of disagreement when the Military Staff Committee Report is completed. I am sending it to you in advance in order that you may have plenty of time to give the matter full consideration. We feel that if a proposal along these lines is to be put forward, there are advantages in making the decision sufficiently early so as to have time to put the idea forward to some of our colleagues, informally, in advance of the Military Staff Committee Report.

We have had informal discussions here with the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee in connection with this memorandum. They also feel that it is premature to reach any definite conclusions on this subject at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

Herschel Johnson
[Page 447]
[Annex]

Position Paper Prepared in the United States Mission to the United Nations

Military Staff Committee Recommendations Suggested Security Council Action

problem

What action should the Security Council take on April 30 when it receives from the Military Staff Committee the progress report and recommendations as to basic principles which the Security Council requested in its resolution of February 13, 1947.

recommendation

It is recommended that the Security Council establish a Committee to be composed of representatives of all the eleven members to review the recommendations expected to be received from the Military Staff Committee on April 30 on the basic principles governing the organization of the international security force and further to recommend to the Security Council a course of action on this subject. Following debate on the entire Military Staff Committee report and simultaneously with the establishment of the Committee, the Security Council should request the Military Staff Committee to complete its examination of Article 43 from the military point of view.

background and argumentation

The Military Staff Committee has now devoted more than a year to the task of carrying out the Security Council directive of February 15 [16], 1946, to examine Article 43 “from the military point of view”. That part of the report containing recommendations on basic principles consists of an enumerated set of principles which frequently merely paraphrases the Charter. On many principles complete agreement has not been reached and this result will not be impressive, particularly in view of the length of time that has been consumed in their preparation. This is due largely to the Soviet Delegation’s tactics of obstruction and delay. Whereas four delegations submitted drafts of principles in April, it was not until September that the Soviet draft was received. They have been free to follow these tactics in the privacy in which the Committee conducts its operations. The request of the Security Council for recommendations from the Military Staff Committee by April 30 presents an opportunity to lift the matter into the light of day.

[Page 448]

The United States is interested in fulfilling promptly the Charter’s mandate to conclude the special military agreements “as soon as possible”. Moreover, the position which we have taken towards the regulation of armaments makes progress on the military agreements highly desirable. Now that the Commission for Conventional Armaments has been created and is operating, before regulation of armaments can be seriously considered the collective security system as projected in the Charter must be completed. An important part of this system will be the international security force.

The Security Council itself will probably not have the time to consider and decide on the merits of the recommended basic principles which should govern the organization of the international security force. It is not organized to do this nor would it probably wish to do so. It should be remembered that six of the Council members are unfamiliar with the year’s proceedings of the Military Staff Committee on this subject. Moreover, two new factors will be introduced into the situation when the report containing the recommendations comes before the Security Council. These are the participation of the six non-permanent members and the impact of public opinion. A Committee established by the Council and representing all its members would provide a desirable means for considering on behalf of the Council the Military Staff Committee recommendations. Such a Committee might be asked to examine the report and to prepare recommendations for the approval of the Security Council. The resolution providing for the establishment of the Committee should charge it with recommending the basic principles and simultaneously urge the Military Staff Committee to complete without delay its recommendations needed to fulfill the examination of Article 43 from the military point of view.

The only practicable alternative would be to re-commit the report to the Military Staff Committee, without a decision by the Security Council, for further negotiation by the military representatives. If this were done, the entire subject of the Article 43 agreements would probably become bogged down again in interminable controversy in the Military Staff Committee once the pressure of publicity had been removed. If this were done, the usefulness of the April 30 report would be very considerably diminished.

If the device of a Committee were to be approved numerous questions regarding its procedure would need examination. Among them are the following: whether it should arrange to hold some of its meetings in public; whether the documentation of the Military Staff Committee, especially the summary records of its meetings, should be called for by the Committee as an essential part of the material upon which to base its recommendations. If the report does not make clear the reason for the long delay in the Military Staff Committee these records might [Page 449] be published in order to demonstrate the nature of the difficulties under which the Military Staff Committee had been carrying on its work. Finally there would be the question of the relationship between the Security Council Committee and the Military Staff Committee.

  1. Two lot files containing records of the Office of Special Political Affairs and its successor organization, the Office of United Nations Affairs, include documentation on the regulation of armaments and collective security for 1947: Lot 55D323 and Lot 428.
  2. Appointed March 5.
  3. Prior to the adoption of the resolution on the regulation of armaments at its 105th Meeting, February 13 (see footnote 2, p. 411), the Security Council modified the final paragraph of that resolution in accordance with amendments submitted by the British and Australian delegations. The final paragraph requested the Military Staff Committee to submit to the Security Council as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency the recommendations for which it had been asked on February 16, 1946. The British addition, approved 9–0 (the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining), requested the MSC to submit not later than April 30. 1947, an interim report on basic principles governing the organization of United Nations armed forces.