I am not now recommending the proposal contained in this memorandum. It seems
to us that it would be premature to attempt to decide what our course should
be until we have a better picture of what the Military Staff Committee’s
Report will contain. I believe it may be useful for you to consider the
proposals in this paper as one of the possible alternative procedures,
assuming that there remains a substantial area of disagreement when the
Military Staff Committee Report is completed. I am sending it to you in
advance in order that you may have plenty of time to give the matter full
consideration. We feel that if a proposal along these lines is to be put
forward, there are advantages in making the decision sufficiently early so
as to have time to put the idea forward to some of our colleagues,
informally, in advance of the Military Staff Committee Report.
We have had informal discussions here with the United States Representatives
on the Military Staff Committee in connection with this memorandum. They
also feel that it is premature to reach any definite conclusions on this
subject at the present time.
[Annex]
Position Paper Prepared in the United States Mission to the United
Nations
[New
York,] March 28, 1947.
Military Staff Committee Recommendations Suggested
Security Council Action
problem
What action should the Security Council take on April 30 when it receives
from the Military Staff Committee the progress report and
recommendations as to basic principles which the Security Council
requested in its resolution of February 13, 1947.
recommendation
It is recommended that the Security Council establish a Committee to be
composed of representatives of all the eleven members to review the
recommendations expected to be received from the Military Staff
Committee on April 30 on the basic principles governing the organization
of the international security force and further to recommend to the
Security Council a course of action on this subject. Following debate on
the entire Military Staff Committee report and simultaneously with the
establishment of the Committee, the Security Council should request the
Military Staff Committee to complete its examination of Article 43 from
the military point of view.
background and argumentation
The Military Staff Committee has now devoted more than a year to the task
of carrying out the Security Council directive of February 15 [16], 1946, to examine Article 43 “from the
military point of view”. That part of the report containing
recommendations on basic principles consists of an enumerated set of
principles which frequently merely paraphrases the Charter. On many
principles complete agreement has not been reached and this result will
not be impressive, particularly in view of the length of time that has
been consumed in their preparation. This is due largely to the Soviet
Delegation’s tactics of obstruction and delay. Whereas four delegations
submitted drafts of principles in April, it was not until September that
the Soviet draft was received. They have been free to follow these
tactics in the privacy in which the Committee conducts its operations.
The request of the Security Council for recommendations from the
Military Staff Committee by April 30 presents an opportunity to lift the
matter into the light of day.
[Page 448]
The United States is interested in fulfilling promptly the Charter’s
mandate to conclude the special military agreements “as soon as
possible”. Moreover, the position which we have taken towards the
regulation of armaments makes progress on the military agreements highly
desirable. Now that the Commission for Conventional Armaments has been
created and is operating, before regulation of armaments can be
seriously considered the collective security system as projected in the
Charter must be completed. An important part of this system will be the
international security force.
The Security Council itself will probably not have the time to consider
and decide on the merits of the recommended basic principles which
should govern the organization of the international security force. It
is not organized to do this nor would it probably wish to do so. It
should be remembered that six of the Council members are unfamiliar with
the year’s proceedings of the Military Staff Committee on this subject.
Moreover, two new factors will be introduced into the situation when the
report containing the recommendations comes before the Security Council.
These are the participation of the six non-permanent members and the
impact of public opinion. A Committee established by the Council and
representing all its members would provide a desirable means for
considering on behalf of the Council the Military Staff Committee
recommendations. Such a Committee might be asked to examine the report
and to prepare recommendations for the approval of the Security Council.
The resolution providing for the establishment of the Committee should
charge it with recommending the basic principles and simultaneously urge
the Military Staff Committee to complete without delay its
recommendations needed to fulfill the examination of Article 43 from the
military point of view.
The only practicable alternative would be to re-commit the report to the
Military Staff Committee, without a decision by the Security Council,
for further negotiation by the military representatives. If this were
done, the entire subject of the Article 43 agreements would probably
become bogged down again in interminable controversy in the Military
Staff Committee once the pressure of publicity had been removed. If this
were done, the usefulness of the April 30 report would be very
considerably diminished.
If the device of a Committee were to be approved numerous questions
regarding its procedure would need examination. Among them are the
following: whether it should arrange to hold some of its meetings in
public; whether the documentation of the Military Staff Committee,
especially the summary records of its meetings, should be called for by
the Committee as an essential part of the material upon which to base
its recommendations. If the report does not make clear the reason for
the long delay in the Military Staff Committee these records might
[Page 449]
be published in order to
demonstrate the nature of the difficulties under which the Military
Staff Committee had been carrying on its work. Finally there would be
the question of the relationship between the Security Council Committee
and the Military Staff Committee.