501.BC
Atomic/6–1247
Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A.
Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
State (Acheson)1
secret
[Washington,] June 13, 1947.
Subject: Conversation with Senator Austin re Ambassador
Gromyko’s Atomic Control Address.
According to the attached memorandum of conversation, Senator Austin believes
that the Soviets may have modified their insistence on outlawry of atomic
bombs before conclusion of the international control agreement. I fail to
see where in Gromyko’s remarks there is any justification for this belief,
even in the paragraph cited by Senator Austin.2
It seems to me that the best way of piercing through the camouflage would be
for Osborn to ask Gromyko directly whether there is any modification of the
Soviet stand on this point.3
[Page 506]
[Annex]
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
secret
[Washington,] June 12, 1947.
Senator Austin telephoned and asked to speak to Mr. Acheson, who was then
at the White House, and the call was referred to Mr. Gullion.
Senator Austin said that he had just seen the draft of a proposed
statement (Annex A)4 to be made by the Secretary with reference to
Ambassador Gromyko’s June 12 proposals for international control of
atomic energy.5 He
thought it would be a mistake to issue any such statement since in his
view it was not true that Gromyko had merely reaffirmed the Soviet
insistence on outlawry of atomic weapons prior to conclusion of an
international agreement for control of atomic energy to ensure its use
for peaceful purposes. Senator Austin read over the telephone a portion
of Ambassador Gromyko’s remarks (Annex B) which he believed showed that
the Soviets might actually have in mind “simultaneous” arrangements for
the outlawry of weapons and the installation of an international control
authority. He pointed out that the Soviets apparently contemplated two
separate treaties but nevertheless the net result seemed to be a
recession from the Soviet position, as previously understood by us, for
outlawry of atomic weapons as a condition precedent to an international
control treaty. The Senator thought that the word “simultaneously” in
numbered paragraph 1 of Ambassador Gromyko’s proposals was the key to
what might be a new Soviet attitude.
Senator Austin said that he realized that not everyone would agree with
his own interpretation. In fact, General Osborn did not, but he felt
that the possibility of a Soviet change of heart was such that we ought
in all conscience to give Gromyko’s remarks serious consideration before
issuing the negative commentary proposed as a press statement for the
Secretary.
Senator Austin said, further, that the whole of Gromyko’s speech should
have the close attention of the Secretary, since, again in his own
opinion, it was quite different from anything issued by the Soviets thus
far and contained much that was concrete and constructive.
I told the Senator that I believed no statement had yet been made by the
Secretary, that I believe none would be made without reference to his
views, and I assured him that his opinion would be communicated to the
Secretary and Mr. Acheson promptly.
