501.BC Atomic/6–2347

The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that their views on the interpretation to be given the phrase “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” be transmitted for your information, so that you may be advised of the military thinking on this problem. Accordingly, enclosed herewith is a study, the work of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which may be considered as accurately reflecting their views.

Sincerely yours,

Robert P. Patterson
Forrestal

Enclosure

Study Prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

discussion

1.
The phrase “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” first appeared in the text of the Declaration on Atomic Energy issued in Washington, D. C., on 15 November 1945 by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee of Great Britain and W. L. Mackenzie King of Canada. It again appeared on 27 December 1945 in Section VII of the communiqué issued in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom recommending, “for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters.”
2.
Subsequently, the phrase was used in Section V of a resolution passed by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946 in which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was directed to make specific proposals “for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” The phrase is now included in the language of the resolution [Page 532] adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1946 on the subject of the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. This resolution recommends to the Security Council, among other things, that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to insure the adoption of measures for the early “elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction.”
3.
The matter of cognizance of weapons of mass destruction has already been raised in the Security Council of the United Nations in order, among other reasons, to delimit the functions and responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and it is to be expected that argument on the question in the United Nations will continue. The position of the United States to date has been that the Atomic Energy Commission has and must retain cognizance of all weapons of mass destruction and that another agency, intended to deal with conventional armaments, should not be brought into the same picture if anything effective is to be accomplished. The identification of “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,” by definition or otherwise, is obviously, therefore, of importance not only as a basis for determining what weapons should be eliminated, but also in connection with the question of jurisdiction of the two commissions.
4.
A definition is “a brief explanation of the exact meaning of a term.” In this case we are not dealing with a term, but with a phrase which includes the terms “major,” “adaptable” and “mass destruction.” To explain the exact meaning of a term would be comparatively easy, but in general only the makers of a phrase can explain exactly what is meant by it.
5.
The Declaration on Atomic Energy of 15 November 1945 makes it quite clear that the makers of this phrase were concerned primarily with the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes. However, they wrote as follows:

“We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense . . . .1 No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic weapons.” (Underlining supplied)

6.
It is implied in the above quote that “other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” should include only those weapons which constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy and those weapons against which there can be no adequate military defense. From the words “nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other (than atomic) weapons” it could be deduced that the authors felt there were at present no known major weapons adaptable to mass destruction other than atomic weapons. However, available information indicates this is not entirely true and that the authors, while certain that atomic weapons were adaptable to mass destruction, also felt it quite likely that other weapons, such as biological warfare weapons, should be classified as weapons adaptable to mass destruction on the basis that there could be no adequate military defense against them.
7.
The statement of Messrs. Truman, Attlee and King speaks of “new methods of warfare” and there are indications that some nations will attempt to seize on these words and use them as reasons for eliminating means and/or methods of mass destruction from the practices of war. However, a full reading of the text of the quoted Declaration on Atomic Energy indicates clearly that the authors of the Declaration did not intend literally to outlaw any known method of warfare, but were using “method” in the broad sense as applying to possible future developments that might provide a means, i.e., a weapon, comparable to the atomic bomb in destructiveness. It is also quite clear that when the authors of the Declaration spoke of means of destruction they had in mind weapons such as atomic weapons and not the method by which the weapons can be, or are, applied against an enemy.
8.
There could be endless discussion concerning what are major weapons. However, in this case, the weapon is to be eliminated only if it is adaptable to mass destruction. But, it is clearly the intention of the authors that all weapons adaptable to mass destruction shall be eliminated. Hence, we do not have to determine what weapons are major weapons and must determine only those weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
9.
A weapon is any “instrument for inflicting, or defending from, bodily harm.” There must be an inclination on the part of some nations to classify instruments which are not in fact weapons as weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The obvious example is the long-range bomber aircraft. However, this aircraft is not a weapon in itself although the bombs, cannon and machine guns it carries are weapons. It is a carrier or a vehicle. But can this vehicle be easily fitted or made suitable for mass destruction? Individually, it cannot if only conventional weapons are carried by it. Collectively, long-range bomber aircraft employing conventional weapons can achieve mass destruction [Page 534] if they are used en masse. However, such employment is a technique and does not make the carriers of the weapons involved either weapons themselves or weapons of mass destruction. The long-range bomber aircraft is therefore adaptable to mass destruction only in the same sense that artillery employed en masse for the purpose of achieving widespread destruction is also adaptable to mass destruction. The same is true for guided missiles employing conventional explosives in their warheads. It is true that the guided missile in its present state of development cannot achieve the accuracy of the individual long-range bomber aircraft and produces only comparatively indiscriminate destruction; and it cannot as yet be used with discrimination against purely military installations or military personnel. There is therefore more reason from this viewpoint to classify the long-range guided missile as a weapon of mass destruction than there is so to classify the long-range bomber aircraft. But, keeping in mind the intention of the authors of this phrase to eliminate only those weapons which constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic weapons or those weapons against which there can be no adequate military defense, it appears that the long-range guided missile is not adaptable to mass destruction.
10.
It is believed that the intention of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 is to eliminate all weapons adaptable primarily to the indiscriminate destruction of human life, particularly large masses or communities of the civilian population. From the viewpoint of the security of the United States the emphasis in our discussions should certainly be on the word indiscriminate. Modern war cannot be fought for long unless large masses of the civilian population are producing the weapons of warfare. Discriminate destruction of these production facilities is essential to the successful prosecution of modern war and is thus a proper and important objective. That civilians may be killed in the process of such destruction is not an acceptable reason for eliminating air attacks against industrial facilities.
11.
It is clear from the Declaration on Atomic Energy that all atomic weapons (the effectiveness of which is attained by explosive force, by heat, by radioactivity, or by combination of these effects) are generally considered as “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”
12.
Accordingly, it may be reasonably assumed as a point of departure that the phrase “other major weapons” was intended to include only those weapons of comparable effectiveness, when employed indiscriminately against population masses, that might now or in the future become available. Thus, in determining what other “mass destruction” weapons should appropriately be associated with the atomic warfare problem, we should consider only those having characteristics [Page 535] comparable to those of atomic weapons, leaving all others for consideration in connection with the general subject of the regulation of conventional armaments.
13.
At the present time, the foremost atomic weapon is the atomic bomb. Its characteristics, to a very great extent unique with respect to conventional weapons, are:
a.
The relative futility of other than totally successful, and hence the extremely difficult nature of, defense against it,
b.
The almost inevitable, and certainly the readily possible, widespread and indiscriminate lethal and disabling results of its use,
c.
The practical impossibility of providing beforehand, in the attack area, measures for minimizing to any reasonable degree its lethal and disabling effects,
d.
The lingering aftereffects of the attack, for which there is no practicable alleviative and, finally,
e.
The overwhelming catastrophic results if used in a general attack on numerous heavily populated centers and the still greater effects that are possible if such a general attack be made suddenly and without warning.
14.
It is believed that radioactive, lethal chemical and biological weapons possess the capability of being developed and employed in such a manner as to approximate the above characteristics of the atomic bomb, particularly the vast peril to human life, coupled with minimum opportunity for defense and escape, that we now associate with that weapon. Their potential characteristics are probably not ultimately so terrific as those of the atomic bomb and they can produce no appreciable explosive or heat effects. On the other hand, they cannot possibly be employed for other than lethal and disabling purposes and their other characteristics are comparable to those of the atomic bomb, while certainly this can be said of no other known weapons. Therefore, it is believed that the atomic bomb, atomic explosives delivered by other means, and radioactive, lethal chemical and biological weapons should be classed as “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” and that no other known weapons should be so classified. It is possible that new weapons may be developed that in the future may meet or even exceed the general definition of comparable characteristics outlined above. If and when any such weapons are developed, consideration should be given to classifying them also as “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”
15.
In view of the foregoing discussion the Joint Strategic Survey Committee believes that the interests of national security can best be protected by agreement that:
a.
The characteristics of the atomic bomb that have caused it to be classified as a major weapon adaptable to mass destruction are:
(1)
The relative futility of other than totally successful, and hence the extremely difficult nature of, defense against it;
(2)
The almost inevitable, and certainly the readily possible, widespread and indiscriminate lethal and disabling results of its use;
(3)
The practical impossibility of providing beforehand, in the attack area, measures for minimizing to any reasonable degree its lethal and disabling effects;
(4)
The lingering aftereffects of the attack, for which there is no practicable alleviative and, finally;
(5)
The overwhelmingly catastrophic results if used in a general attack on numerous heavily populated centers and the still greater effects that are possible if such a general attack be made suddenly and without warning.
b.
These characteristics define in general terms all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The only known other weapons that are capable of being developed so as to approach these characteristics are atomic explosives delivered by other means and radioactive, lethal chemical, and biological weapons.
c.
All atomic, radioactive, lethal chemical, and biological weapons should therefore be classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
d.
No other known weapons should be so classified.
e.
Any weapons developed in future with characteristics comparable to those of the atomic bomb should be classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
16.
In view of the foregoing the following appears to be a suitable definition for major weapons adaptable to mass destruction:

“Major weapons adaptable to mass destruction are all atomic explosive, radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological weapons; and, in the future, and weapons developed which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”

  1. Omission indicated in the source text.