Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/88

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

confidential

[Washington,] September 8, 1947.

The Conclusion of Special Agreements Under Article 43 and Organization of the United Nations Armed Forces

Note: The final form of this proposal and actions under it depend upon the outcome of conversations now in progress with China, France, and the United Kingdom.

the problem

To determine what action the United States should take in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly regarding implementation of Article 43 of the Charter.

recommendations

Subject to the necessary approval by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee:

1. The United States delegation should propose to the General Assembly that it consider means of accelerating as much as possible the placing at the Security Council’s disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter.

2. The United States delegation, in the course of debate on this subject, should urge the desirability of the earliest possible implementation of Article 43 and should impress upon the General Assembly the improbability of achieving this end in the near future if agreement on the general principles of the Military Staff Committee Report must first be reached.

3. The United States delegation should introduce a resolution (draft of which is appended hereto) recommending:

a. That the Members of the United Nations each inform the Security Council not later than March 31, 1948 of the armed forces, assistance, and facilities which they will offer to make available to the Council on its call in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.

b. That the Security Council accept such offers promptly and conclude agreements with the Members accordingly, reserving the right to renegotiate such agreements from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to such general principles as may thereafter be agreed upon.

discussion

1. U.S. Position

The United States has always favored action to bring about the early conclusion of the “special agreements” governing the numbers, types, degrees of readiness, and general locations of the armed forces, and the natures of the facilities and assistance, which the Members of the United Nations have undertaken by Article 43 of the Charter to make available to the Security Council on its call. The President in his address before the General Assembly on October 23, 1946, said in this connection:

“At the same time [that the United States seeks agreements which will establish the international controls of atomic energy and will remove the deadly fear of other weapons of mass destruction]¹ we shall also press for preparation of agreements in order that the Security Council may have at its disposal peace forces adequate to prevent acts of agression.”

In approving SWNCC 219/17² (classified Confidential) the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on June 27, 1947, reaffirmed as United States policy the attainment of the following objective:

“The early conclusion of special agreements conforming to the provisions of Articles 43 and 45 of the United Nations Charter which will make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including bases, rights of passage, and the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45, adequate with regard to strength amount, composition, training, equipment, readiness, location, and in all other respects, to fulfill any need which might arise by reason of the Council’s functions under the Charter with reference to the maintenance of international peace and Security.”

The United States has consistently maintained that the conclusion of arrangements making armed forces available to the Security Council on its call is, among other things, one of the essential steps in building up the collective security which is a prerequisite to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. That alone would call for vigorous U.S. advocacy of effective action to implement Article 43.

2. Action to Date

The first action toward carrying out the mandate in Article 43 that the “[Special] agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council” was taken by the Council on February 16, 1946. On that date it adopted without discussion a directive proposed by the U.K. representative calling on the Military Staff Committee, as the latter’s first task after meeting in New York, “to examine from the military point of view the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter and submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council in due course.” The question of action to implement Article 43 was not again taken up in the Security Council until January 1947.

Action by the Military Staff Committee to comply with the Council’s directive of February 16, 1946, was initiated on March 27, 1946. By directing a subcommittee (subject to final confirmation by the Soviet Delegation) to “formulate recommendations to the Military Staff Committee as to the basic principles which will govern the organization of the United Nations Forces”, the Committee on that date established the course of action to implement Article 43 which has ever since been followed both in the Security Council and in the Military Staff Committee. The wording of the directive adopted by the Committee was proposed by the U.S. Delegation, but the action for which it called was much the same as that envisaged in proposals submitted by the U.K. and French Delegations.

Within a week the U.S., U.K., French, and Chinese delegations each submitted drafts of the basic principles proposed, but despite attempts by those delegations to get the Soviet Delegation to do likewise, that delegation did not submit anything of the sort until September 18, 1946—nearly six months later. On that date it submitted, not a draft of the basic principles proposed, but a draft statement of the purposes for which the Security Council could use the armed forces made available to it. This was cast in the form of a distorted restatement of certain provisions of the Charter which, if accepted and adhered to, would have seriously restricted the use which the Council would be able to make of any forces placed at its disposal. In addition the Soviet Delegation insisted that the Military Staff Committee, after completing its action on this statement of purposes, should await the completion of action on it by the Security Council before proceeding to the consideration of other basic principles. The submission of this statement marked the abandonment by the Soviet representatives of the purely dilatory pattern of obstruction which they followed during the first six months of action to implement Article 43. Since September 1946 the pattern of Soviet action on this question, both in the Military Staff Committee and in the Security Council, has to an increasing extent conformed to the pattern of the two actions just described—namely, the submission of a proposal which, if accepted and adhered to, would seriously restrict the Council’s freedom of action under the Charter, and insistence that until all action on that proposal had been completed in the Council as well as in the Committee, the Committee should refrain from considering any other aspect of the question before it.

When the General Assembly met in October 1946 information about the action taken in the Military Staff Committee, beyond that given in the Committee’s brief report to the Security Council, was presumably known only to the governments represented in that committee; but it was generally understood that not much progress had been made toward the implementation of Article 43. While the question never received separate consideration by the Assembly, the importance of concluding arrangements which would make forces available to the Security Council on its call, or of accelerating action to that end, was brought up on a number of occasions by the representatives of various nations. The result was the inclusion of the following in the resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments unanimously adopted by the Assembly on December 14, 1946: “the general assembly, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament, recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter.”

The question of what should be done to accelerate the placing of forces at the disposal of the Council received the attention of the Security Council during the debate in January and February 1947 on the action to be taken to implement the General Assembly’s resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments. After rather heated debate the Council voted to include in the resolution which it adopted on February 13, 1947, a request that the Military Staff Committee accelerate its action to carry out the Council’s directive of February 16, 1946. The inclusion of that request in the form finally adopted received the affirmative votes of nine members with the USSR and Poland abstaining. The important part of the request was that the Committee “submit to the Security Council not later than 30 April 1947 its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force.”

In compliance with this request the Military Staff Committee on April 30, 1947, submitted a report containing its recommendations on the “General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations.” This report revealed wide divergences of views between the USSR and the other four permanent members on the following important points: the USSR insists on what it calls the “principle of equality”, which would place restrictions unacceptable to the other members on the strength and composition of the forces which each permanent member is to make available to the Council. The USSR insists that the forces pledged to the Council must remain within their home territories or territorial waters when not employed by the Council; this restriction also is unacceptable to the other permanent members. The USSR insists that a predetermined limit be fixed on the time after conclusion of an operation during which the forces employed by the Council may remain away from their home territories or territorial waters without special authorization of the Council; this restriction also is unacceptable to the other permanent members. The USSR denies that bases are included in the assistance or facilities which all Members have undertaken by Article 43 of the Charter to make available to the Council; the other permanent members consider that bases and rights of passage are the most important items to be furnished in the way of “assistance and facilities.”

While the views of the non-permanent members have not been so clearly established as those of the permanent members, Poland appears generally to hold views similar to those held by the USSR, and the other non-permanent members appear generally to hold views similar to those held by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China.

Discussion of the Military Staff Committee Report took place at eleven meetings of the Council (the 138th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 142nd, 143rd, 145th, 146th, 149th, 154th, and 157th). It was then interrupted by the pressure of other business, and resumption of the discussion has not since been feasible. During the discussion efforts were made both by discussing the general principles recommended and by attempting to discuss specific figures, to resolve the divergencies of views between the USSR (and Poland) and the other members; but neither method of approach resulted in any apparent progress toward that objective. Throughout the debate the USSR was unyielding in its attitude; and its representatives in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee have repeatedly made statements indicating that until agreement has been reached on the general principles they will oppose any other action to implement Article 43.

3. Soviet Position

It appears reasonably certain that the Kremlin does not look upon the United Nations as a means for maintaining international peace and security based on a due regard for the interests of nations and a reasonable give and take among them. It looks upon the United Nations rather as an arena in which to pursue its aims inimical to governments which it does not control, so long as that appears profitable to it. The Kremlin may hope eventually to gain control of the United Nations and make it a useful instrument for Soviet expansion, but until that time is clearly in sight the Kremlin probably hopes to keep the United Nations weak in order to minimize its value as a possible anti-Soviet alliance.

The apparent objectives of the Soviet Government in relation to the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available for use by the Security Council are consistent with that attitude. The actions of the Soviet representatives in the Council, the Military Staff Committee, and the General Assembly since March 1946 indicate that those objectives are:

a. To prevent, or failing that to delay greatly, the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call.

b. To establish “principles”, or to secure commitments or understandings of some other nature relating to the provision, organization, use, or support of any forces or facilities eventually made available to the Council, which will help to accomplish one or more of the following purposes:

(1) To keep such forces weak and ineffective, at least as regards the use in the Eastern Hemisphere of components furnished by nations other than the U.S.S.R. or its satellites.

(2) To guard against the possibility that components of such forces furnished by nations other than the U.S.S.R. or its satellites might enter the U.S.S.R. or Soviet-dominated areas.

(3) To prevent or to hinder the use against the U.S.S.R., or against operations favored by the Kremlin, of any forces eventually made available to the Council.

(4) To further the efforts of the Kremlin, made through negotiations concerning the control of atomic energy or the reduction of armaments and through subversive and propaganda activities as well as in this manner, to better the war-making position of the U.S.S.R. in relation to other nations, particularly the United States.

c. So far as is feasible without unduly sacrificing or jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives described under a and b to avoid antagonizing opinion in foreign countries. The balance between the Soviet efforts to attain those conflicting objectives cannot be predicted with any certainty and is likely to be subject to sudden changes made for tactical reasons.

It is possible that the Soviet Government would stop trying to prevent or to delay the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council, if it were to conclude that the other permanent members of the Security Council would accept all the “principles” or the like advocated by the U.S.S.R. to govern the provision, organization, use, and support of any forces made available to that organ. But in view of the Soviet attitude toward the United Nations it is improbable that the U.S.S.R. would willingly assent to any arrangements of that character which it considered likely to strengthen the United Nations to a material extent.

The Soviet advocacy of restrictive “principles” may in some instances stem wholly or in part from an intention to cause delay by proposing restrictions estimated to be unacceptable to other members of the Council, rather than from any hope of getting the “principles” accepted.

The U.S.S.R. has never openly opposed the conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Security Council or openly denied the desirability of concluding such arrangements. But representatives of that government have denied that the conclusion of such arrangements is in any sense a prerequisite to the regulation or reduction of armaments.

4. Positions of Other Governments

The other permanent members of the Security Council, the non-permanent members other than Poland, and many other United Nations Members have expressed strong dissatisfaction with the slowness of the Council in carrying out the intention of the Charter that the special agreements mentioned in Article 43 be negotiated with a minimum of delay, or have urged that action to that end be accelerated. There do not appear to be any differences of opinion among members of the Council which would be likely to constitute serious obstacles to the implementation of Article 43 if Soviet opposition and obstruction were to cease.

5. Reasons for Attempting to Accelerate Action

It is undeniable that the enforcement machinery provided by the Security Council is inherently unsuitable for any use which is strongly opposed by a permanent member of that organ. Aside from the veto power conferred on such a member by Article 27, the fact that the agency charged with military planning for enforcement action undertaken by the Council and responsible under the Council for the strategic direction of the forces placed at the latter’s disposal is composed of the chiefs of staff of each permanent member of the Council, or their representatives, would make it difficult, if not impracticable, for the Council to use force effectively for any purpose strongly opposed by a permanent member. But in spite of this there is good reason to believe that the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call would help materially to promote international peace and security.

Despite these weaknesses, the conclusion of such arrangements would constitute a relatively long step toward the provision of effective means for international enforcement action for the maintenance of peace and security and would represent an advance beyond anything of the kind which has been accomplished before. The representatives of many Members of the United Nations have made it clear that their governments on that account attach great importance to the early conclusion of such arrangements. Continued inability to complete them seems likely to have a worse effect on the prestige of the United Nations and its support by the Member nations than would the demonstration of inability to agree on the use of force, when force is needed, which would be likely to occur after the arrangements had been completed. There appears to be little if any danger that any arrangements of this nature which could be concluded within the foreseeable future would cause the U.S. public to rely too heavily on international enforcement action and for that reason fail to support the maintenance of an adequate national military establishment.

The conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Security Council would provide means for the establishment of precedents for the international enforcement of law. Even a small beginning of that kind might ultimately prove to be of great importance.

The conclusion of arrangements making U.S. armed forces available to the Council would go far toward committing the United States irrevocably and openly to participation in world affairs.

After arrangements had been completed making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council it should become more difficult than at present for a permanent member of that organ which desired to prevent enforcement action by the Council, or which desired to take improper military action itself outside the framework of the United Nations, to do either of those things without making its true purpose apparent to all observers.

While the Security Council enforcement machinery could probably not be used in the early stages of military action against a permanent member which had embarked on a course of aggression, it might well prove to be of material value, particularly with regard to the provision of bases, after the Council had been reconstituted following the expulsion or withdrawal of the permanent member which had embarked on a course of aggression. It might very well take less time to reconstitute the Council on that basis, and to obtain any necessary reaffirmation of the pledges of forces, assistance, and facilities previously made to it, then to bring into existence by other means an equally widespread and effective military alliance.

The evident desire of the Soviet Government to prevent, or at least to delay as long as possible, the conclusion of arrangements which would enable the Security Council to carry out its enforcement functions under Article 43, and to emasculate any arrangements of that nature which may finally be concluded, indicates that in the opinion of that government the conclusion of such arrangements in accordance with the intention of the Charter would strengthen the United Nations or impede the international activities of the U.S.S.R.

The pledge to the Security Council of certain kinds of weapons, aircraft, or vessels might impede the efforts of the Soviet Government by means of propaganda, disarmament negotiations, and other maneuvers, to force the United States by the pressure of public opinion or by other means to abandon them.

It appears that generally speaking the interests of the United States would be better served by the early conclusion of arrangements making some forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call than by the delayed conclusion of arrangements which would make more adequate provisions of those natures. Once the forces of a nation have been committed to a military operation it becomes very difficult for the nation to limit its involvement or to withdraw.

6. Possible Courses of Action

The course of action to implement Article 43 which has been followed in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee since March 1946 would be well adapted to its purpose if all the permanent members of the Council desired to strengthen the United Nations and with that in view to implement Article 43 in accordance with the intentions of the Charter, but that is clearly not the desire of the Soviet Government. The course of action followed has, however, served a valuable purpose in bringing about wide areas of agreement and understanding among the members of the Council other than the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

The Soviet representatives have taken the position that until agreement has been reached on all the “principles” in the Military Staff Committee Report the U.S.S.R. will not assent to any other action toward making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council. Further discussion could apparently continue indefinitely without resulting in such an agreement; and in the unlikely event that such an agreement should appear imminent the Soviet representatives could, and almost certainly would, advance apparently plausible reasons for bringing up additional matters requiring discussion and agreement as prerequisites to the implementation of Article 43. The present course of action therefore presents the U.S.S.R. with just the opportunities it desires to delay the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council, and to emasculate any arrangements of that character which may eventually be concluded. And it appears reasonably certain that the U.S.S.R. would use its powers as a permanent member to block any proposals initiated within the Council to adopt any alternative course of action which might, within a reasonable period of time, result in the implementation of Article 43 in accordance with the intention of the Charter.

For the reasons just given it is unlikely that any action taken by the Assembly which did not bring about some radical departure from the course of action now being followed would actually accelerate to any material extent the conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Council.

While it is true that a recommendation of the General Assembly is not binding upon the Security Council, and that the U.S.S.R., despite adoption by the Assembly of a resolution along the lines recommended, could nevertheless prevent, by its adverse vote in the Council, the conclusion of “special agreements” in the case of each individual member, it seems unlikely that it would find it expedient to follow such a course of action. The prospect of frustrating, by a succession of vetoes, the manifest desire of Members to assume obligations plainly contemplated by the Charter is apt to be a distinctly distasteful one. Thus the recommended course of action should do much, by removing the problem from the realm of abstract principles and bringing it down to the hard facts of specific offers, to make the continuation of present Soviet tactics more difficult and more embarrassing to the U.S.S.R.

The making by important Members of the United Nations of the offers contemplated by the recommended resolution would in itself constitute an important step toward making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council.

The Soviet representatives may take the position during debate in the General Assembly on any proposal such as that now recommended that any decisive action on this matter by the Assembly would be premature until the exact measure of agreement on the general principles in the Military Staff Committee Report has been determined in the Council. In order that the respective positions of the U.S.S.R. and the other members of the Council concerning the principles and related questions should be defined as clearly as possible before any action relating to the provision of forces came up for consideration by the General Assembly, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was instructed to press for a vote in the Security Council on each of the principles on which agreement had not been reached. But effective action of that nature was prevented by the pressure of other business before the Council and could not now be taken in time to be useful in connection with the Assembly’s consideration of any proposals made during the forthcoming session. However, while votes on the principles in disagreement have not been taken in the Council, the permanent members have already made their positions on all of them pretty clear, and during the debate in the Council most of the non-permanent members have given many indications of their positions.

Appendix

Draft Resolution

In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to enabling the Security Council, at the earliest possible time, to exercise its responsibilities under Article 42 of the Charter,

The General Assembly

Recognizes:

1. That the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter is essential to enable the Security Council to discharge its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” under the Charter;

2. That, notwithstanding the recommendation of the General Assembly contained in paragraph 7 of the resolution of December 14, 1946 (A/267) that the Security Council “accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter,” no such forces have yet been made available to the Security Council and Article 43 remains unimplemented;

3. That the present lack of agreement in the Security Council on general principles governing the organization of forces under Article 43 of the Charter should not prevent the Members of the United Nations from carrying out at the earliest possible date their undertakings, as set forth in Article 43, to conclude agreements making available to the Security Council, on its call, armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security; and

4. That in view of such lack of agreement in the Security Council it is desirable, in order to effect the early implementation of Article 43, that the Members of the United Nations be enabled to make available to the Security Council on its call such armed forces, assistance and facilities as they may individually offer.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly

Recommends:

1. That each Member of the United Nations inform the Security Council not later than March 31, 1948 of the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, which the Member offers to make available to the Security Council on its call; and

2. That the Security Council, as expeditiously as possible, accept such offers and conclude agreements with the several Members accordingly, such agreements to be subject in each case to the right of the Security Council to negotiate at any time for their revision in order to give effect to such general principles governing the organization of forces under Article 43 of the Charter as may be agreed upon by the Security Council from time to time.

1. Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.
2. Ante, p. 492.