IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/49 add. 1
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 13, 1947, 3:00 p.m.1
The Conclusion of Special Agreement Under Article 43
At the Secretary’s request, Mr. Blaisdell referred to SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. I,2 setting forth the tentative United States proposal as to what action should be taken regarding implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. Mr. Blaisdell emphasized that the paper was in preliminary form and the final position would depend on the outcome of conversations now in progress with China, France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, before taking the action proposed in the paper, the United States believed that the Security Council should make another effort to agree on basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations armed forces. Thus far all attempts to obtain an agreement on this topic had been unsuccessful. Only if this effort failed would the following recommendations come before the Delegation for final decision. In its present form the paper was favorably considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3
Mr. Blaisdell then read the following recommendations:
[Here follow the identical recommendations contained in position papers SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. 1 and SD/A/C.1/88.]
Admiral Hewitt stated that he personally felt that the proposal had considerable merit. However, it has not been favorably received by the [Page 657] Chief of Naval Operations. He read part of a letter (USMS/S/3719 August 25, 1947) of the Chief of Naval Operations as follows:
It should be recognized, however, that the deadlock in the Military Staff Committee is but a single example of Soviet tactics in the broad overall strategy of the Politburo to dominate the world. Breaking of the deadlock will not, of itself, bring any appreciable easing of the tension existing in the whole realm of Soviet relations with the Western World. We here are forced to the conclusion that, even should the United Nations Armed Forces be established, no effective use could be made of them by the Security Council in the resolution of the issues now threatening international peace . . . .
General McNarney outlined the position of the members of the Military Staff Committee on the estimates of the overall strength of the United Nations Armed Forces. He pointed out that the United States is actually in a minority of one in this matter in that the United States estimate is by far the highest of all, the other four estimates being relatively similar to one another. Political considerations of varied character have influenced the position of the members. The United Kingdom insists on an absolute equality of its contribution with the contribution of the United States. France similarly insists on an absolute equality with the United Kingdom but is willing to accord the United States twice as large a contribution, while China would be be willing to follow the majority. The Soviet Union would prefer no force at all and insists on an absolute equality of all contributions. The United States is the only member which desires that the United Nations should have at its disposal a truly effective force able to deal with any situation anywhere in the world. The General further pointed out that even if an effective United Nations Force is established, it will nevertheless be necessary for the United States to maintain considerable forces in addition to the complements placed at the disposal of the Security Council, until true international security is attained and international confidence fully restored.
A lengthy discussion followed on the subject of the relationship between the size of the United States armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council and the United States forces required for national security. General McNarney emphasized that under the Charter the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council could not in effect be used against a permanent member, but should, in the United States view, be able to cope with any coalition of non-permanent members. Mrs. Roosevelt4 raised the question as to the use of forces stationed within a certain region for enforcement action in such region. This, she thought, might make the enforcement [Page 658] action more effective. General McNarney saw a number of objections to this idea.
In answer to the Secretary’s inquiry, Admiral Hewitt explained that the United States insisted on including in its estimate three battleships, with three carrier task forces and three supporting forces, chiefly because of the anticipated need to project land forces and aircraft into hostile territory.
General Ridgway stated that the United States must insist that the forces at the disposal of the Security Council be homogeneous, balanced and equipped with all modern weapons including battleships and carriers. The Soviet Union opposes in effect such forces obviously in the belief that if the Soviet estimate were accepted a move might be initiated towards disarmament with the exception of the forces held available for the Security Council. That would result in stripping the United States of its modern arms.
General Ridgway enumerated four elements as guiding factors in the United States estimate of its overall forces: (1) the size of the United States contribution to the United Nations; (2) the requirements for the occupation of ex-enemy countries; (3) the requirements of a mobile, modern striking force and (4) the overhead cadre required for building up an army in case of a mobilization. General Ridgway, in reply to Ambassador Austin’s question, assured the latter that the action proposed by the United States in the recommended position paper, in the view of the United States Representative[s] on the Military Staff Committee, would not constitute a major departure from the Charter. Since no alternative appeared feasible, this would be the only course of action.
Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States proposal was motivated by the thought that the Soviets might be more inclined to agree to a tangible agreement obtained through the procedure outlined in the United States proposal than to the basic principles, since a discussion on these principles had ended in an impasse.
Mr. Dulles5 expressed his reservations on the proposal. In his view the Charter contemplates an international consensus obtained through the Security Council on the subject of armed forces placed at the Council’s disposal. It would be argued, Mr. Dulles continued, that the United States was searching for a good excuse to maintain a larger force than other members of the Security Council thought appropriate. Since the United States was unable to obtain agreement by other members, it now proposed to make an offer of availability of such larger forces and then say that it could not disarm since it had made this offer.
Speaking for the United States Army, General Ridgway reiterated [Page 659] that the two divisions proposed as a United States contribution to the United Nations forces certainly could not be termed too large. General McNarney, speaking for the United States Air Forces, declared that in the interim period of the next twenty-five to fifty years, pending the settlement of the most important problems, such as the international control of atomic energy, and the peace treaties, the United States must maintain a relatively large air force. Mr. Dulles emphasized that the question of the United States contribution to the United Nations, and of the total United States Armed Forces, should not be confused. The Secretary suggested that the entire problem should be help in abeyance for the time being.
- This document consists of the top secret portion of the minutes of the 5th Meeting; the remainder of the minutes, which dealt with other issues, was issued as US/A/M(Chr)/58, not printed.↩
- SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. 1, September 8, is not printed in its entirety. However, its recommendations, those read by Blaisdell below, are identical with the recommendations contained in position paper SD/A/C.1/88, also dated September 8, p. 632.↩
- The Department of Defense has been unable to locate any record of such consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
- Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, member of the United States Delegation; widow of the President.↩
- John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation.↩
- Adviser, United States Delegation.↩