IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/59

Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, New York, October 3, 1947, 9:15 a.m.

secret
Present Ambassador Austin
Ambassador Johnson
Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Fahy
Mr. Thorp
Ambassador Sayre
Mr. Stevenson
General Hilldring
Ambassador Ailing
Mr. Bard
Mr. Bohlen
Dr. Corrigan
Ambassador Dawson
Mr. Dickover
Admiral Hewitt
General McNarney
Mr. McKeever
Mr. Mills
Mr. Osborn
Mr. Popper
Mr. Power
Mr. Notter
Mr. Raynor
Lieutenant General Ridgway
Mr. Noyes
Mr. Ross
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Stinebower
Mr. Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel Truman
Mr. Wainhouse
Mr. Winslow
[Page 676]

Overall Strength of Armed Forces To Be Made Available to the Security Council

Mr. Rusk recalled that the question of the United States position’ on overall strength of armed forces to be made available to the Security Council had been taken up by the Delegation three weeks before (September [13])1 when it was holding its initial briefing sessions, because the question was raised in the Security Council report. It was mentioned more specifically because of the impasse on the question in the Security Council and because consideration was being given to having certain Delegations offer to provide forces. The interest of the Delegation at that time showed the need to have a concise statement on the question, together with the latest information available.

Mr. Rusk pointed out it would be easy to reach the conclusion that the forces provided for under Article 43 of the Charter would never be used, especially if it were assumed that the forces were not to be used against one of the Big Five. When there was no unanimity the armed forces could not be used. However, the Charter required that forces be set up under Article 43, and public opinion wanted such forces. Moreover, the political situation of the world might change.

SWNCC and the Chiefs of Staff have assumed, in setting up armed forces under the Charter, that it was impossible to suppose that Permanent Members would be acted against by such a force. Thus the question of the size of the force needed against a Permanent Member could be disregarded. However, the middle and small powers were generally tied to the great powers, and thus the veto worked on their behalf. Moreover, there were also regional arrangements, such as the USSR and its satellites and the Inter-American defense system. So it could almost be concluded that there were not many states against whom the Security Council could act, and these states could not stand against the Security Council. However, it was important that the forces should be on their face the kind of forces that the Security Council would require. There should not be established a cynical farce. Moreover, the prestige of the Great Powers was involved. At the same time, it was desirable to reduce the forces to the smallest size feasible because of the political and economic factors involved. On the other hand, some of the Big Five did not have balanced forces, for instance, lacking long-range air forces or navies. Any force established should be set up on a basis so that all of the Big Five could contribute to it.

One of the difficulties was in foreseeing what the small nations would want to do in the Way of contributing to the forces of the Security Council. A good number of them could offer bases, or the right for passage of forces, but others apparently wanted to contribute small [Page 677] amounts of armed forces. Among such states were Poland and Australia. Therefore, it would be wise not to be rigid regarding the overall total until it was clear what other states wanted to do.

Mr. Rusk warned that it should not be assumed that action should be against a middle-sized power, such as Poland, Pakistan or Australia, but cited, as an example, the fact that the Dutch had played with the idea of resuming hostile activities in Indonesia a few weeks ago, and it had been necessary to warn them regarding the consequences of the Charter and point out that sanctions could be employed. It was also quite possible that several states would find themselves in defiance of the Security Council at the same time. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the draft peace treaties with Germany and Japan referred to forces which could be quite substantial. It was possible that the Security Council might be given enforcement responsibility in other places where troops would be useful and convenient as, for example, Palestine, Trieste, or the Italian colonies. When these possibilities were added together, a substantial potential problem was found. It was also clear that it was hard to say how large the forces should be to give effect to the Charter, avoid cynicism, be useful (but at the same time small enough so that the force might be shared), the Congressional war-making power not be cut and resources not be over-taxed.

general considerations

[Here follow statements by the United States Representatives on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, General McNarney, Admiral Hewitt, and General Ridgway. Each statement consisted mainly of a portion of Doc. USMS/S/23/18, September 29, 1947, “U.S. Position on the Overall Strength of Armed Forces to be Made Available to the Security Council,” not printed, which had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States Representatives.]

possible developments during the general assembly

Mr. Dulles stated that it was his understanding that the United States was not putting in any resolution on the subject of military forces. The purpose of consideration of the question of the present meetings was in anticipation of a general discussion of the Security Council report.

Ambassador Austin said he was not certain about this because the paper under discussion stated that the General Assembly might call upon Members to tender offers of armed force.2 Mr. Dulles inquired whether that was still a live proposal.

Ambassador Austin inquired of the Military Staff Committee how [Page 678] the matter stood at the moment. It had been his understanding that the Navy had not approved this project. He inquired whether any further progress had been made.

General Ridgway said that he understood that the question had been dropped. Mr. Ross said that this was his understanding, and Mr. Popper confirmed that that was the consensus of opinion.

Mr. Dulles said that he felt very strongly that the project for making offers of force should be dropped. He said that it was a constitutional question, for the Charter provides that the Security Council should negotiate on this question. There already was a feeling that the United States was by-passing the Security Council and dumping questions into the General Assembly. He thought that adding this question to the Assembly’s agenda might break the back of the good will which the United States enjoyed in the Assembly.

General Roadway said that he wanted to make an individual comment that if such an offer of troops were made by the United States and accepted by the Assembly, then the Security Council might use such forces in Palestine. He did not believe that the Joint Chiefs had thought out this possibility. He thought it should be understood that if an offer were made it would lay the United States open to having troops sent to Palestine.

request to department

Ambassador Austin said that in the circumstances he thought the Department should be asked to draft a new paper on the question of overall strength of armed forces and be asked for a definitive decision on whether the United States should introduce in the Assembly a resolution recommending that the Members of the United Nations make specific offers of armed forces to the Security Council, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. Moreover, a statement should be prepared for the use of the United States Representative to be used in Committee I, if, during the discussion of the Security Council report, the activities of the Military staff are considered.

The meeting adjourned at 10:15 a.m.

  1. Reference is to the 5th Meeting of the Delegation, September 13; for the pertinent portion of the minutes of that meeting, see p. 656.
  2. Reference is presumably to position paper SD/A/C.1/88, September 8, p. 632.