Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[New York,] October 20, 1947.

Dear Mr. Rusk: 1. After some weeks of quiescence some of the delegations on the Atomic Energy Commission have been raising the question whether we should again take up our work.¹ Thus far, the United States delegation has sought, and has been successful in maintaining, a non-committal position.

2. As you know, we have Mr. Heneman² with us working on the problem of staffing and organization, which is the next topic on the list of principal subjects of the Commission’s work program. His work is not yet very far advanced but even in the preliminary consideration that we have been able to give to this phase of the work, it is evident that this subject will necessarily involve consideration of very difficult problems, such as: the relations between the Agency and the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and the General Assembly; the question of which actions of the Agency should be subject to review and which should not; whether amendments to the Charter are necessary, particularly in relation to voting procedure in the Security Council, the substance of Article 51, and the possible strengthening of the General Assembly as against the Security Council.

3. Apropos of this problem of relationships we must recognize that our success or failure to obtain the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly and the precise characteristics of that Committee³ will have an important bearing on staffing and organization problems of the Agency.

4. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the drafting of the Specific Proposals of the Second Report. While it abstained from voting on the First Report and later submitted amendments to it, the Soviet Union rejected unequivocally the Specific Proposals of the Second Report and voted against their adoption. In the discussions leading to the final vote, the Soviet Union made it clear that they were not willing to try to amend the Specific Proposals because they were fundamentally wrong. Thus, it would seem that the possibilities of reconciling points of disagreement are virtually nil.

5. The majority of the Commission is firmly convinced that the Specific Proposals of the Second Report, taken together with the General Findings and Recommendations of the First Report, are the essential basis for an effective system of control. Any work that may be decided upon with regard to further Specific Proposals must, in our view, be based squarely on the Second Report and the General Findings and Recommendations of the First Report.

6. The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission contains in its Introduction the following statement of the present state of affairs:

“It is evident that until unanimous agreement is reached on the functions and powers of the international agency, there will be limitations on the extent to which proposals on other topics in the ‘Summary of Principal Subjects’ can be worked out in detail. Clearly, much remains to be done before the final terms of a treaty or convention can be drafted. The Commission intends to proceed with the remaining topics in the Summary and, at the same time, will continue its endeavors to clarify and resolve, where possible, the existing points of disagreement.”

This statement on limitation applies not only to such questions as stages, strategic distribution and sanctions but to staffing and organization as well. In other words, the majority of the Commission is on record that there will be limitations on any further work beyond that already done and contained in the First and Second Reports.

7. There would seem to be the following alternative courses of action:—

a. Attempt no further work on the remaining topics. If this course were decided upon we could remind other delegations of the above-quoted statement of limitation and could point out further that we think it would be difficult for some delegations to staff meetings of the AEC during the current General Assembly session. We could also stress that the results of the General Assembly session might have an important bearing on the decision to carry forward our constructive work in the Atomic Energy Commission. This approach would leave open with the other delegations the question as to whether negotiations should be either suspended or terminated.

A decision to do no further work on the topics still remaining might be handled tactically in the following ways:

1. Recommend that no meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission or its committees be held at least until the General Assembly session is over.

If the Russians or the Poles should call a meeting to draw the red herring of biological warfare across our path, we could discuss that problem in general terms as long as they wanted to.

2. Meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission might be convened for sole purpose of debating at length the points of difference between the majority and the minority.

It is, of course, evident that this move would not advance the negotiations but could be used as a means of making even clearer the rift between the majority and the Soviet Union. These discussions could go on interminably.

It should be pointed out, however, that such discussions could backfire. The Soviets might very well gain considerable propaganda advantage. They would not be constrained in such discussions by any sense of verity or responsibility. Furthermore, there is danger that some members of the majority would attempt to weaken and modify the majority position in the illusory hope of attaining agreement.

b. Continue work on the remaining topics.

A decision to continue constructive work would, of course, be based entirely on the majority proposals to date and would, in all probability, be carried on without the cooperation but rather with the active opposition of the Soviet Union.

There are two principal tactics available under this alternative:

1. Continue work only on the question of staffing and organization

A working group is already established on this subject. It has done some preliminary work and could be reconvened with a minimum of fanfare. Discussion could proceed very slowly, informally, and tentatively. This problem could take several months to work out. As indicated above, however, it is evident that this problem contains many difficult aspects and may be susceptible of several different solutions. There may, in fact, develop serious differences of opinion, even among the majority, as to the best solution of some aspects of this problem, particularly as regards relations with other organs of the United Nations.

2. Continue work on the entire remaining portion of the Summary of Principal Subjects.

Most of the remaining topics are extremely difficult. No useful purpose would be served if we were to lay before the world our ideas on stages and strategic balance in the absence of even a token payment on the part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the solutions to these problems will change not only for technical reasons, such as atomic energy developments in other countries, but more particularly with changes in our relations with the Soviet Union. If work were done on the remaining topics only the most general considerations should be advanced. It would seem most unwise to attempt to make specific proposals on them.

8. It seems to us that no intelligent decision can be made concerning the several alternatives outlined above except in the context of U.S. policy as regards the United Nations and general U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, no intelligent decision can be made without taking fully into account the status and the timing of side conversations with the British, the Canadians and others. The arguments given above pro and con for the enumerated alternatives have no real significance, except in the context of these considerations. Atomic energy negotiations cannot lead but must follow and be a part of our over-all foreign policy.

9. In view of the foregoing and subject, of course, to broader policy considerations, we recommend that negotiations be terminated or suspended either on the basis of work done up to the present, or after a paper on staffing and organization has been completed. Because of the many difficulties involved in dealing with staffing and organization, as indicated above, our preference is for the former.

10. We consider that the questions posed in this letter are of the gravest concern. We feel that the answer to how we should now proceed must come from the highest levels.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick Osborn

1. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had adjourned in September to await consideration by the Security Council and the General Assembly of its Second Report. The latter bodies took no action on that document in 1947. The ABC did not reconvene until January 16, 1948, although its Working Committee did meet once in December.
2. Harlow J. Heneman of the Division of Organization and Budget.
3. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 166 ff.