501.BC Atomic/11–1447

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Secretary of State

secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Confirming conversation of this date with Mr. Rusk, I am enclosing report of recent conversation with delegates to the Atomic Energy Commission.

It was agreed that if conversations on Staffing and Organization were carried on in the informal sub-committee of Committee 2, we would limit ourselves pretty strictly to the subject matter of 3 (a) in the subject list on Page 7 of the Second Report; namely, Organization [Page 695] and Structure. Subject 3(b), Relations to Other Organs of the United Nations, would be omitted so as to avoid at this point discussion on such subjects as the veto, and these matters would be referred to in later sections.

On this basis the United States Delegation is in agreement with the action proposed by the other delegations consulted, and as indicated in the attached memorandum, and recommends it to the State Department for their approval.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick Osborn
[Enclosure]

Report of Conversations With Major Delegates to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

1. Decision as to introduction of atomic energy in debates of present session of the General Assembly.

It is the feeling of the American Delegation, concurred in by other major delegations, that there would be no value in debating atomic energy in the present session of the General Assembly. There is neither time for a full discussion, nor is the emotional atmosphere right for an unbiased and technical discussion. Such a debate should therefore be avoided if possible.

If the Soviet precipitates a debate in the form of a speech by Vishinsky, which may include a reintroduction as a Soviet resolution of paragraph 4 in their previous war-mongering resolution,1 a reply of course will be necessary. It would be desirable that the first replies should be made by other than the United States, particularly by Canada, France and the United Kingdom, leaving the American reply to follow. All replies should be brief and as unemotional as possible and deal lucidly with the facts at issue. If the Soviet reintroduce their resolution it is considered desirable that an amendment be introduced immediately, such that the resolution as amended would include the entire terms of reference of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946.

2. Basic considerations in formulating future plans.

It is the general opinion that at the present time there is no likelihood of the Soviet entering in good faith into an acceptable agreement for the control of atomic energy. It is believed that the Soviet will not be ready to consider such a step unless and until (a) Europe is restored to sufficient strength to put up serious resistance to a Soviet invasion, [Page 696] (b) the Soviet become convinced that the United States will not suffer an economic breakdown in the next depression.

We are therefore all agreed that it would be unwise to go forward with specific proposals on the balance of the subjects which would need to be included in a treaty (other than staffing and organization), namely, financing, strategic balance, sanctions and stages. These subjects are more political than those previously covered and should be considered under the conditions existing at such time as the Soviet Union desires to enter into a treaty. The subjects on which specific proposals have been developed to date, as embodied in the Second Report, are, in general, technical subjects having to do with the functions and control powers of the international agency, and therefore are essentially nonpolitical. Having reached unanimity on these technical subjects, it is highly desirable that this unanimity should not be destroyed, and that the First and Second Reports be kept intact for use if and when the Soviet are ready to come in. From this general background, it is felt that these are the objectives which it is desired to achieve:

a.
To develop the widest public appreciation of the Second Report of the Commission.
b.
To maintain the initiative in the Atomic Energy Commission at least to the extent of protecting the First and Second Reports of the Commission, and to keep a united front.
c.
To prevent the Soviet from taking over the initiative by focusing attention on new proposals incompatible with the previous work of the Commission, or by such a maladroit cessation of activity on our part as would give the appearance of lack of sincerity as to our adherence to the Commission’s Reports.
d.
To continue the Atomic Energy Commission in being against the possibility of Soviet agreement at some future time.
e.
To make it absolutely certain that the United States is not withdrawing its “offer” and is not suspected of proposing to withdraw its “offer.”

3. The alternative procedures which may be followed to achieve the desired objectives.

The group has considered that the next few months might be taken up by any one of the following:

a.
The development of consideration of specific proposals on staffing and organization.
b.
The discussion of biological warfare and other weapons of mass destruction.
c.
The discussion with the Soviet Union on their reasons for refusing to accept the Second Report of the Commission, particularly the paper on inspection. This would give the best opportunity for developing public appreciation of the Second Report.

If proposals (a) and (b) were selected they would probably be followed by proposal (c) in order that a final conclusion could be reached and a third report made to the Security Council submitting the dead [Page 697] lock to them. Against the advantage in courses (a) and (b) taken above, there are some serious objections, which are as follows:

On the proposal to discuss staffing and organization, there is the danger that this paper would become quite controversial and that we might not be able to get the same full agreement as was obtained on other papers. If it should involve the discussion of the relations of the control agency with other agencies of the United Nations, of the veto, of sanctions, and by-passing the Security Council, the Soviet would be given new ammunition for their propaganda. However, these matters might be deferred to later papers. The solution which has been suggested by Canada has been that we should go along on staffing and organization in informal conversations of Committee 2 and if we find there is going to be serious disagreement, withdraw at that point, and not include the subject in any further report.

The difficulty with respect to the consideration of biological warfare and other means of mass destruction is that the Poles, who suggested such a program,—probably at the instigation of the Soviets,—have in mind that there is no means of controlling these things and that the only solution would be a convention prohibiting their use, and that having developed this course it would then be easy to propose that atomic warfare be similarly prohibited, pending agreement on controls. There is also the disadvantage that no governments working on biological warfare would be anxious to give up their real or assumed secrets. The Soviets would probably look on this as a fishing expedition and then complain bitterly if any other governments refused to send their best expert witnesses to the Commission.

4. Final steps and reference to the Security Council.

It is obvious to all the delegations we have talked to that at some point the Commission will have to recognize that it can go no further with its work in the face of Soviet intransigence, and so report to the Security Council and General Assembly. We are therefore concerned with the following questions:

a.
When will the appropriate time arrive?
b.
Should such a report be designed to precipitate a considerable public debate in the Security Council or in the General Assembly?
c.
Should such a report ask for a definite mandate from the General Assembly to proceed along the lines of the Second Report and the general principles laid down in the First Report, or some other proposed action?

The decision as to when to report this impasse to the Security Council and what recommendations should accompany such a report may perhaps be left to sometime in the future. The general feeling is that it is too early to take such action now.

At a further meeting on November 14th of delegates (Canada, U.K., France, U.S.), at which this paper was discussed and approved, the [Page 698] United Kingdom delegate brought up the matter of further discussing the Soviet proposals, and the following actions were recommended:

1.
A meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission should be called about December 15th while the French have the chair.
2.
Committee 1 should be assigned the work of further consideration of the Russian proposals of June 11th in the light of the replies to the U.K. questions.
3.
Committee 2 should undertake work on Staffing and Organization in informal sessions.

It was the feeling that this work would take some months and would result, probably, in a Report to the Security Council which would state that the Commission was unable to reconcile its differences with the Soviets and could go no further for the present.

  1. For documentation on United States concern regarding the resolution on war-mongering proposed by the Soviet Union in the General Assembly, see pp. 76 ff.