Subject: Minimum Strength of U.S. Forces in Europe
[Enclosure]
Staff Study Prepared in the War Department
the problem
1. To outline War Department views on minimum U.S. forces which should be
authorized for the accomplishment of occupation missions in Europe as of
1 July 1947 and 1 July 1948.
facts bearing on the problem
2. a. As of 1 February 1947 the following armed
forces were on foreign soil in Europe: (See Tab “A”4 for detailed tabulation)
| United States |
202,000 |
| British |
247,000 |
| French |
80,000 |
| U.S.S.R. |
1,110,000 |
b. The following factors in connection with U.S.
troop strengths are pertinent:
- (1)
- U.S. forces in Italy will be withdrawn when the Italian Peace
Treaty comes into force. A total of 5000 troops will remain in
Trieste for an indeterminate period.
- (2)
- U.S. forces in Austria totalling 11,500 should not be reduced
until after the conclusion of an Austrian peace treaty.
- (3)
- Of the present 150,000 U.S. troops in Germany, approximately
38,000 are in AAF units. General
McNarney,5
AAF and the War Department
concur that this air strength could be reduced to between 8,000
and 12,000 without jeopardizing the occupation mission. The
State Department, considering the overall situation in Europe,
has been reluctant to see such a major removal of U.S. forces
from Germany for fear it might be interpreted as partial
abandonment of the U.S. occupational commitment and thus
adversely affect the U.S. negotiating position in the
conferences on Germany. Action is in progress to request the
State Department to reconsider its position on this
matter.
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c. In connection with U.S.S.R. troops on foreign
soil in Europe, the War Department Intelligence Division estimates that
some sizeable reduction will be effected by 1 July 1947. These
reductions should be viewed with reserve because of the Soviet practice
of retaining demobilized soldiers in civilian and quasi-military
capacities in countries where Soviet troops are stationed.
d. Consultation between the War Department and
the State Department in November 1946 during discussion of the question
of reduction of Allied forces in Europe in the Council of Foreign
Ministers resulted in the following U.S. proposal for troop ceilings: (See Tab “B” for War Department study
furnished Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Cohen)
|
Germany (Allied Occupation) |
| U.S. — |
140,000 |
|
| U.K. — |
140,000 |
|
| France — |
70,000 |
(approximate existing forces not subject to reduction in
1948) |
| U.S.S.R. — |
200,000 |
|
|
Poland (Protection of Communication
Lines) |
| U.S.S.R. — |
20,000 |
|
|
Austria (Aid for re-establishment of
Independence) |
| U.S., U.K., France, and U.S.S.R. — |
10,000 each |
|
|
Hungary (Protection of Communication
Lines pending Austrian Treaty) |
| U.S.S.R. — |
5,000 |
|
|
Rumania (Protection of Communication
Lines pending Austrian Treaty) |
| U.S.S.R. — |
5,000 |
|
discussion
3. During the past several months, War Department concern over budget and
manpower restrictions has caused a concentrated effort to reduce U.S.
forces in occupation areas to a “bed-rock” minimum which is consistent
with the accomplishment of occupational objectives. In November 1946,
General McNarney advised the War Department as follows: “The occupation
forces must be such as to provide the small amount of leeway to permit
our governmental authority to operate
[Page 720]
in the event of a refusal or failure of the German
people or quadripartite agencies to function, rather than be completely
at their mercy. The ground strength (117,000 other than air for Germany
and Austria) presently authorized for 1 July 1947 is the minimum which
can accomplish the missions in the areas assigned.” It is the view of
the War Department that this force might be unable to maintain order in
the event budgetary restrictions force a drastic reduction in the food
which is supplied the German people. Assuming that conditions continue
to be most favorable, however, some reductions in troop strength might
be possible by abandoning or reducing such activities as:
-
a.
- Commitment to displaced persons.
-
b.
- Occupation of Austria.
Reduction of air strength in Europe will also reflect a
minor saving in service type personnel.
General McNarney reaffirmed his position in a message to the War
Department on 20 February 1947 that reductions in resources available to
him below those presently planned could not be absorbed without
jeopardizing his occupational mission.
4. Troops in Italy must be withdrawn within 90 days after the Italian
peace treaty comes into force. It is assumed that the treaty will be
ratified by the signatories and no discussion is believed necessary
except to note a maximum of 5,000 troops from each U.S., Britain, and
Yugoslavia will automatically be available to the Governor in Trieste
for a period of 90 days after he assumes office. These forces must then
be withdrawn unless the governor requests their retention through the
Security Council of the United Nations.
5. War Department Intelligence reports an increase in the Soviet practice
of retaining demobilized soldiers in foreign countries in civilian or
quasi-military capacities. These former soldiers are recruited into the
Russian Secret Police, put in charge of cooperative farms, placed in
responsible positions in industrial concerns, etc. All of these
activities are largely controlled by the Kremlin and give the Soviets a
degree of control disproportionate to the troop strength in such
countries as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Austria, and
Poland.
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6. It is considered that Russia will correctly appreciate U.S., French,
and British difficulties in maintaining sizeable occupation forces
during peacetime. This appreciation will probably cause Russia to view
troop ceilings as a stratagem on the part of the Western Powers to force
a material reduction in Russian military strength in Europe, while at
the same time resulting in no real reduction in planned strengths on the
part of the Western Powers. Another important factor is the Russian
capability for rapid mobilization, which puts her in a position to upset
any agreed balance of force in Europe practically overnight.
7. This analysis is premised on continued occupation of Germany for a
considerable period or until a treaty is concluded along the lines of
the text of the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and
Demilitarization of Germany announced on 30 April 19466 and Mr.
Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech of 6 September 1946.7 It is considered that if such a treaty were
concluded the troop strengths shown herein will still apply during the
interim period until the treaty takes effect.
conclusions
8. a. Conditions have not changed to allow a
reduction in the troop ceilings for 1 July 1947 which should be provided
for the Allies in the various European countries since the U.S. view was
transmitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1946.
b. In the absence of unforeseeable difficulties
these forces might be reduced by one quarter to one third by 1 July
1948. This reduction is subject to such earlier withdrawal from Austria,
Rumania and Hungary as may be required by an Austrian treaty, and in the
case of the U.S. would consist mainly of Air Force troops.
recommendations
9. It is recommended that:
A copy of this study be furnished to the Department of State for guidance
in the forthcoming Moscow Conference.8
