Department of State Atomic Energy Files2

Memorandum of Conversation, Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)

top secret

The British Ambassador, calling at his request to see the Secretary, thanked him for the interim reply on the atomic energy inquiry.3 He stated he believed it would be wise if the British and US experts have some discussion on this matter before this Government sends its considered reply. He said he had mentioned this to Mr. Acheson.4

The Secretary said Mr. Acheson had talked with him about it. He said this matter is very disturbing to him and he expected to give some thought to it over the weekend. He said as he now sees it, any course we take will give us trouble, and the problem will be to decide which course will give the least trouble. He said he was conscious of the trouble the British will have and will certainly consider the matter from that angle. The Secretary mentioned the agreement between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt,5 of which the people of neither country [Page 782] have been informed, and stated he believes the people should know of this. He told the Ambassador we do not have a copy of the agreement, a photostatic copy of which was furnished by the British. He said he had spoken to the President about having Mr. Roosevelt’s papers searched for this agreement. He said further there will be quite a story if it develops we do not have the paper.

The Ambassador said he was not well enough acquainted with the problem as yet.6

The Secretary told him he did not believe Bevin7 was either, that in New York Bevin had suggested discussing the matter but did not have the files and was not familiar with what has taken place. The Secretary had then suggested they take it up when Bevin had received the file, but no mention had been made of the matter thereafter, so he assumed Bevin could not obtain the file.

The Ambassador said he thought Bevin had decided that Mr. Attlee should ask the President for a reply to his communication.

The Secretary said that in view of the changed situation that has resulted from the enactment of legislation establishing the Commission,8 the President should be familiar with this subject, but he is afraid he is not. The Secretary said he saw at least a dozen questions that should be considered before the public is advised. He said he considered it important to advise them as early as possible because some member of the new Commission may at any time make a statement, not knowing the full facts. He said he would greatly regret having any statement made that would cause misunderstanding between the peoples of the two countries.

The Secretary inquired what the situation is in Britain concerning their Prime Minister making an agreement such as the one on atomic energy.

The Ambassador said there was no objection to the Prime Minister signing an agreement and thereafter advising Parliament. He did not need Parliament’s assent.

The Secretary said Mr. Acheson had told him of having discussed with the Ambassador this whole question and he believes we should reach some agreement that would supersede these indefinite things and make the relationship more firm. The Secretary brought out the fact that UN has not been advised of this agreement, and as the outstanding proponents of UN with its requirement that any agreement between the Governments should be filed, it leaves us in a bad position. Certainly we cannot be left in the position of failing to notify UN of an agreement and expect to hold anyone responsible in the future.

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The Secretary said he assumed we would turn over the information to an international organization as soon as an agreement has been reached.

The Ambassador said that any understanding reached between the two governments would be superseded by an international agreement.

The Secretary agreed.

  1. Lot 57D688, the consolidated lot file on atomic energy, 1942–1962, located in the Department of State, including the records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy and the records of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
  2. In a telegram to President Truman, June 7, 1946, British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee had urged that steps be taken to establish full and effective cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, p. 1249. President Truman sent an interim reply in a telegram of December 28, 1946; for text, see Ibid., p. 1259.
  3. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State.
  4. Reference is to the aide-mémoire of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944; for text, see Foreign Relations, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492493. The agreement stated, inter alia, that cooperation between the two nations in developing atomic energy for military and commercial purposes would continue after the conclusion of the war. The American copy of the aide-mémoire could not be located for some years after the death of President Roosevelt. It was ultimately found misfiled in the papers of Adm. Wilson Brown, Roosevelt’s naval aide. The British had provided the United States with a copy in 1945, prior to the Potsdam Conference.
  5. Lord Inverchapel had presented his credentials on June 5, 1946.
  6. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  7. Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which established the United States Atomic Energy Commission.