Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
Meeting this afternoon with Under Secretary of State Lovett, Senator Vandenberg and Senator Hickenlooper.
Subject: Atomic Energy—Agreements with Britain in their relation to long-term aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan.1
Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper said that for some time they had been in possession of the knowledge as to the Quebec Agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill which bound the United States not to use the atomic bomb without the consent of Britain and Canada. [Under] Secretary Lovett explained that this was partly because of the British fear that in the event of the use of the atomic bomb by the United States in the European theater of war Great Britain would be exposed to reprisals.
He said that the objectives of the State Department would be three: (1) scrapping of the Quebec Agreement on the foregoing point and expunging from the record any other arrangements which we found embarrassing; (2) British agreement on shipment to Canada of the bulk of their present supply of 3250 tons of uranium, either for stockpiling or for use in this country if possible; (3) aggressive exploration and development by all three countries of additional sources of ore, with the British agreeing that all uranium produced shall be shipped to this continent except such amount as they themselves need for the development of industrial uses of atomic energy. The input to England should equal use and not be for stockpiling.
(Footnote: Mr. Lovett explained that so far as the agreement, nonconformance with which by the United States had so much irked the British, that there should be cooperative exchange of information between the two countries, was concerned, Dr. Bush had made the statement at the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee that so far as this being unfair to American interests, it was actually important that we should have such an exchange. The British have undoubtedly made developments in the field of abstract science of which we should be informed.)
Mr. Lovett said that the British were prepared to discuss the transfer of the existing stockpile in Great Britain. In response to a question by Senator Hickenlooper he said that the Canadians were quite willing to cooperate with us in urging the British to this action.
[Page 865]Mr. Lovett said he proposed to have a full discussion of these negotiations under discussion both with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House if they approved, and that he also proposed to discuss it fully with the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Congressional Committee in any event.
In State’s conversations with the British these considerations would be paramount in the American interest: (a) continuation of the Combined Development Trust, which is the name for the agency of the three governments of the UK, Canada and the United States for the development of atomic energy supplies (steps will probably be taken to change the name of the agency to eliminate the word “trust”); (b) to secure the suspension or renunciation of all previous agreements; (c) the three governments to agree on the use of stockpiles of uranium with primary consideration given to common military security; (d) the three governments to agree to pursue as vigorously as possible the development of additional supplies both in their own countries and on the outside—specifically this means that the British give their undertaking to further development of any sources in all possible parts of the British Empire; (e) allocations of the mineral to be made in terms of the common security; so far as the UK is concerned they to undertake that all future deliveries not required for the industrial possibilities of atomic energy in the United Kingdom itself, will be allotted to the United States; (f) the United Kingdom to ship all of the existing stockpile not needed for their present industrial plans to Canada.
Senator Vandenberg raised the question of the relation of long-term credits under the Marshall Plan to payment for uranium. He asked whether he would be able to say that among the quid pro quos for our aid there would be delivery of certain strategic materials. Mr. Lovett replied that in the first year and a half credits under the Marshall Plan would probably take the form of grants in aid to the extent of 65%, and 35% would be in the loan form. Senator Vandenberg said his point was: could not some arrangement be worked out whereby we would only pay for the deliveries of strategic materials if repayments of our long-term loan were being kept up. Mr. Lovett said this was a most interesting suggestion, that it would have many aspects in terms of exchange transfers which might have to be considered, but that nevertheless he thought it had sufficient merit to warrant study.
Mr. Lovett said he proposed to suggest to the Secretary of State that an early meeting of the American Combined Policy Committee be “called to bring together all of the Government thinking on the subject (and particularly to secure from the Atomic Energy Commission a precise statement of their requirements). Following that he proposed to make a presentation to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate as indicated above, and then get down to negotiations with [Page 866] the British through a meeting of the members of the Tripartite (Britain, Canada and the United States) Commission.2
- For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic crisis in Europe, see vol. iii, pp. 197 ff.↩
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The source text bears the following typewritten addition dated November 17:
“Senator Vandenberg, at the close of the conversation stated that he was well satisfied with the report which Mr. Lovett had made and thought the basis for negotiation with the British and Canadians was sound, but he did say he would be constrained to propose conditions in the long-term aid to England if the objectives outlined by Mr. Lovett were not accomplished.”
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