841.6359/12–447: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)
niact
5103. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Re immediately preceding Deptel 5102.
“Recommendations Concerning a Program of Negotiations With the British and Canadian Governments Designed To Overcome Present Misunderstandings and To Increase the Amount of Uranium Ore Available to the United States
a. procedure
- 1.
- It should be made clear publicly at some suitable stage that this Government is obliged to take full account, in its plan for national defense and in the conduct of its foreign policy, of the fact that no agreement has yet been reached with respect to the international control of atomic energy.
- 2.
- The program outlined below, after approval by the United States members of the Combined Policy Committee, should be discussed with members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.
- 3.
- Once we are assured of an understanding attitude among interested Congressional leaders, we should invite the British and Canadians to join us in informal and secret discussions, within the framework of the Combined Policy Committee, concerning the situation arising from failure to reach agreement to date in the UNAEC and certain aspects of atomic energy development of common interest to the three nations.
- 4.
- In these discussions the United States will be prepared to discuss separately the question of information and the question of allocation of materials. We should maintain that the disposal of materials proposed by us should commend itself to the three participating nations in the light of military security and of the most expeditious development of the potentialities of atomic energy. When the British and Canadians raise the question of cooperation in the field of information we should be prepared to consider that, too, on its merits, with reference to the possibilities of mutual benefit and to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. We recognize, however, that the satisfactory solution of one problem will contribute to a satisfactory solution of the other.
- 5.
- Our position on each of the issues mentioned above should be generally as described in B. below.
- 6.
- If agreement is reached in the discussions, we should consider with the British and Canadian Governments the desirability and the mode of any public reference to these conversations.
b. position in which we should seek u.k.-canadian concurrence
(Here set forth in sequence for convenient reference. Actually con-concurrence would be sought separately on the separate headings and not on any consolidated document in which the sections were interdependent.)
General
1. The Combined Policy Committee and the organization now known as the Combined Development Trust will continue in existence as established by the wartime agreements. Except in this respect all other features of the several wartime agreements on atomic energy shall be mutually considered as suspended in toto. The Combined Policy Committee shall undertake a revision of the charter of the Combined Development Trust, with a view to changing its title and to introducing any alterations that may be called for by the spirit of present relations or by new developments with respect to supplies of source materials.
2. Each government will confirm to the others in an exchange of notes, or by conclusions to be recorded in the minutes of the CPC, or other such informal means as may be appropriate and agreeable to the parties, its intentions with respect to the policies it proposes to follow, as developed in these discussions.
3. The Combined Policy Committee, already established and constituted so as to provide equal representation to the United States on the one hand and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, shall carry out the policies provided for, subject to the control of the respective governments. To this end, the Committee shall
- (a)
- Allocate materials in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7.
- (b)
- Consider general questions arising with respect to cooperation between the three governments.
4. The three governments reaffirm that their policy with respect to international control of atomic energy remains that set forth in the Three-Nations Agreed Declaration of November 15, 1945, and regret that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has been unable to resolve the differences between the Soviet Union and Poland on one hand and thirteen other countries, now and sometime members of the Commission, on the other. They recognize that should full and effective international agreement be achieved, the present tripartite arrangements would be subject to basic review.
[Page 884]Disposition of Materials
5. Each of the three governments will take measures, so far as practicable, to secure control and possession, by purchase or otherwise, of all deposits of uranium and thorium, and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct, situated within its own Territory, that is within the United States, its territories or possessions, within the United Kingdom and within Canada. They will also use every endeavor with respect to the remaining territories of the British Commonwealth, and other countries, to acquire all possible supplies of uranium and thorium and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct. All supplies acquired under such arrangements will be generally placed at the disposition of the Combined Development Trust, under that title or as renamed as provided in 1 above.
6. The government of the United Kingdom will ship to Canada and the United States all of its present stocks of source material and fissionable material beyond the operating needs of its present project, as defined by the Combined Policy Committee, and will no longer stockpile source materials or fissionable material in the United Kingdom beyond these needs.
7. The materials thus acquired pursuant to paragraph 5 or stockpiled pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be allocated to the three governments in such quantities as may be needed for scientific research, military and humanitarian purposes. In making such allocations the three governments will recognize the principle that, in the interest of security, all source and fissionable material not required for operating needs of current projects in the United Kingdom and Canada and elsewhere, as defined by the CPC, will be allocated to the United States.
Information
8. Exploration of possibilities of cooperation in respect to information and experience will be designed to identify with particularity the areas in which it would be in the interest of our national security to consider arrangements for cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada. Such exploration will seek to determine the extent to which it would be of advantage to us to know of the progress and the results of developments that are now going forward in the United Kingdom and Canada. Reciprocally, in the course of the discussion it will be necessary to ascertain the areas of information and experience as to which the United Kingdom or Canada desire us to cooperate with them; and it will be necessary for us to appraise the effect that any arrangements for cooperation in these areas would have on our national security.
9. It is the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission, and of the [Page 885] Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board that there are areas of substantial importance in which cooperation with the British and Canadians in respect to information and experience would be in the interest of our own national security. After the proposed exploratory discussions with the British and Canadians (described in paragraph 8 above) as to the possibilities for cooperation in respect to information and experience, the question of the adoption by this Government of any proposed arrangements growing out of these discussions, will be considered in consultation with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.
Security
10. Any arrangements for cooperation in respect to materials, information and experience would be subject to agreement by each of the three governments that they will not, without the consent of the others, disclose information in the field of atomic energy to other governments or their nationals.”