740.00119 Council/11–447
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Beam)
| Participants: | Mr. Hickerson |
| Mr. Reber | |
| Mr. Beam | |
| Sir William Strang | |
| General BrownJohn | |
| Mr. Allen |
Sir William Strang said he had heard that his Government was informally in general agreement concerning list of subjects and order of agenda discussed in US-UK informal meeting of October 24 (see memorandum of same date37) namely:
- 1.
- Austria
- 2.
- Economic problems
- 3.
- Provisional political organization
- 4.
- Four-Power demilitarization treaty
- 5.
- Other business.
British Foreign Office agreed that the Saar might be dealt with under economic problems rather than in the course of a separate discussion on frontiers, but were not sure whether the French would approve this procedure. British were inclined to feel that frontier claims of western nations should be taken up by CFM; they had no strong convictions on this point, however, and believed it could be dealt with under other business.
British Foreign Office confirmed advisability of discussing provisional political organization after economic problems. At the same time, political considerations could be brought in by US and UK in connection with treatment of economic problems, by way of testing any insincere Soviet proposals. Thus, economic and political would be inseparably bound together. Any sensational Soviet proposal for establishment of central government would be subjected to economic and political tests.
Strang envisaged that other business might comprise question of compensation to UN interests affected by reparations as well as frontiers. He did not favor discussion of limitation of forces since he believed Soviets would maintain their position that Soviet forces should equal double of US and UK. Strang indicated that Bevin will propose that deputies outline agenda for CFM. He said Foreign Office may wish to continue discussions with French on the lines of present informal talks with US and UK in Washington.
[Page 698]Mr. Hickerson emphasized US feeling that US-UK and French deputies should confine themselves to purely informal consultation regarding agenda and tactics and should not discuss substantive questions in advance or give impression that they were arriving at prior agreement without Soviets, which would make it difficult for CFM to succeed. With respect to French suggestion made to British that deputies present list of subjects for CFM, it was informally agreed there was no objection to discussion along these lines, although it might be hoped that subjects and their order would roughly correspond to list given above.
Mr. Hickerson again stressed that contact between US, UK and French deputies should be purely informal; that there should be no advance preparations for tripartite arrangement in event of CFM failure, and that if CFM broke down there should be a clean break between its discussions and subsequent consultations respecting tri-zonal organization. This applied equally regarding the conversion of the Four-Power disarmament treaty into one entered into by the three countries. Mr. Hickerson expressed the hope that there nevertheless would be effective liaison between the three delegations after the conference starts.
In response to British inquiry, Mr. Hickerson informed Strang that US had no objection to Foreign Office presenting British draft of Four-Power disarmament treaty to French at an early date.