Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

Files of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs: Lot 55 D 36

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 1, 1947.

problem

The problem is to determine the policy of this Government concerning the final disposal of Italy’s territorial possessions in Africa, namely, Libya (comprising Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland.

recommendations

It is recommended that the policy of the United States with respect to the future of each of these territories should be as follows:

1. Libya. That Libya be placed under the international trusteeship system, with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority, under terms of trusteeship which would provide for the people of Libya to become self-governing at the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the establishment of such trusteeship, at which time Tripolitania and Cyrenaica would be permitted individually to elect whether they desire to (a) become separate independent states, (b) remain united as an independent Libya, or (c) become federated with other states or territories.

2. Eritrea. That Eritrea be ceded in full sovereignty to Ethiopia, except for the area in the northwestern part of Eritrea inhabited by Moslem-Sudanese, which should be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

3. Italian Somaliland. That Italian Somaliland, together with British Somaliland, be placed under the international trusteeship system, with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority, under terms of trusteeship which would provide for eventual self-government but which would not fix the period of time within which the area would become self-governing.

discussion

At meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the Peace Treaty with Italy, various proposals were made regarding the disposal of the Italian Colonies in Africa. These proposals, as well as what are believed to be the present attitudes of the Governments of Italy, Ethiopia, and Egypt, and of the Arab League, have been summarized in Annex 1² to this memorandum. The Foreign Ministers were unable to agree upon any definitive solution to the problem. They finally agreed in principle, however, to a suggestion of the United States Delegation that Italy be required to renounce sovereignty over the Colonies, which would be held in trust by the Four Powers for a period of one year from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy, during which time the Foreign Ministers would endeavor to determine jointly the final disposal of these territories. This principle was incorporated in Article 23 and Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty (see Annex II³).

In the present international situation, none of the proposals previously made regarding the disposition of the Italian Colonies is satisfactory from the point of view of the United States and the Western World.

It is in the interests of United States security to prevent any potentially hostile power from obtaining a hold in the Middle East, the Mediterranean area, or in Africa. It would, therefore, be contrary to the policy of the United States, and to United States military interests, to accept any disposition of the Italian Colonies which would give the Soviet Union either unilateral or joint control of any of the colonies in question, even if this control were obtained in the guise of a trusteeship under the United Nations. The objections to collective trusteeship are based on our difficulties in obtaining Soviet cooperation in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Korea.

A decision to grant any of the Italian Colonies immediate independence would result in the creation of weak states which would be exposed to Soviet aggression or infiltration. Moreover, the Soviet Union could exercise effective control over any of these Colonies if their administration should be entrusted to a state in which there is a possibility that a communist government may come into power. For this reason, it would be disadvantageous to the United States to allow Italy to resume control of any of its former colonies unless it had previously become clear that the future Government of Italy will be non-communist and affiliated with the Western democracies. This consideration is over and above the consideration of whether Italy would be able to maintain peace in the Colonies, which appears to be doubtful in view of the limited armed forces permitted Italy by the Peace Treaty. It is doubtful also that the Italian Colonies in Africa could ever become self-sustaining, and their return to Italy would place an added burden on Italy’s already strained economy. Nor would the return of the Colonies to Italy alone solve that country’s problem of over-population.

Aside from the foregoing considerations, it is believed that the Arabs in Libya would resist by force any return to Italian rule. In view of the strong ties existing between the various states of the Arab world, armed conflict in Libya between Italian forces and local Arab forces would be extremely harmful to the interests of the United States. Moreover, any action by the United States openly supporting the return of the Colonies to Italian administration would further impair our relations with the Arab states, which are already strained as a result of the Palestine and Egyptian issues. Among other damaging results, a hostile attitude on the part of the Arabs would threaten from the rear the position we are striving to hold in Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

On September 19, an Aide-Mémoire⁴ was received from the British Embassy stating that, now that the Italian Treaty has come into force and the year has begun within which the Four Powers are to decide upon the disposal of the Italian Colonies, the British Government would welcome a meeting of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers at an early date to discuss procedural matters in connection with the implementation of Article 23 and Annex XI of the Treaty, including instructions to be given to the Commission, and to decide on the future program generally. It seems highly unlikely, however, that agreement will be reached by the Foreign Ministers. The question of the disposition of these Colonies, therefore, will in all probability go before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In view of the situation in the Mediterranean area, we cannot wait until the commission of investigation has had time to visit the areas and make its report to decide what our attitude regarding the future of the Italian Colonies will be. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Great Britain would be our most probable and most important ally in the event of another war, and it would be extremely unfortunate, from our point of view, for British troops and materiel to be removed from the Near Eastern area. There is already a tendency in certain British circles to withdraw entirely from the Near and Middle East, leaving no great Power established in that area and thus exposing it to Russian aggression or infiltration unless the United States is prepared to fill the vacuum. We strongly believe, therefore, that Britain should continue to maintain a base in the Eastern Mediterranean area, and that facilities must at all times be available somewhere in the area of Palestine–Egypt–Cyrenaica which will enable the United Kingdom sea, land, and air forces to operate in this area. It appears unlikely that the British can continue to maintain bases in Palestine. Moreover, we believe that British troops should be unconditionally withdrawn from Egypt at the earliest practicable date and that bases in Cyrenaica are the only available substitutes. Cyrenaica is, therefore, more important than ever from the point of view of British and United States strategic interests. It has already been decided that we should inform the British Government that if it would like to transfer its troops and materiel from Egypt to Cyrenaica immediately, we would have no objection thereto; and that we would be disposed eventually to support arrangements for the establishment of permanent British bases in Cyrenaica, when the final disposition of that territory is decided, provided such arrangements could be effected in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and provided the making of such arrangements proves to be practicable in the light of the then existing international situation.

It is accordingly recommended that the United States support the principle of placing Libya under the international trusteeship system with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority. The terms of trusteeship should provide for the peoples of Libya to become self-governing at the end of ten years from the date of the establishment of such trusteeship, at which time Tripolitania and Cyrenaica shall be permitted to elect individually whether they desire to become separate independent states, remain united as an independent Libya, or become federated with other states or territories. By making a definite provision in the trusteeship agreement for self-government at the end of ten years, there would appear to be a good chance that this proposal would be acceptable to the Arab states. It might be possible, particularly in case the friendly backing of the Arab world could be obtained, to rally the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly necessary to give Great Britain a non-strategic trusteeship over Libya. Also, in view of the friendly relations existing between the British Government and the Senussi, an independent state of Cyrenaica, or even an independent Libya, might be willing to give the British Government permanent bases in Cyrenaica.

The Government of Ethiopia has made claims to Eritrea. From exhaustive study given this question in the Department, we feel that there is ample historical, ethnological, linguistic, religious, and economic justification for the cession to Ethiopia, with appropriate safeguards, of the greater part of Eritrea, which would provide Ethiopia with its much needed access to the sea. It has recently been reported from Ethiopian sources that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union have given Ethiopia assurances on the Eritrean question. If Ethiopia is unsuccessful in obtaining this area, one of two courses appears to be likely: (1) Ethiopia will fall into the hands of reactionaries and be set back many years politically, economically, and socially; or (2) Ethiopia may turn towards the Soviets. From a strategic standpoint, Ethiopia is becoming increasingly important to British Empire security and, therefore, to our own security. An increase in Soviet influence in Ethiopia would constitute a direct threat to British control of the strategically important southern entrance to the Red Sea. It is known that the British Government is establishing bases in Kenya Colony and is considering plans for a central African life-line extending from Nigeria to Kenya. We understand that British troops and matériel already are being transferred to Kenya from India. It is in the interest of Great Britain to protect the flanks of this life-line, and it seems obvious to us that a strong, friendly, and peaceful Ethiopia is necessary to achieve this purpose. We recommend that Eritrea be ceded in full sovereignty to Ethiopia, except for the northwestern part, which is inhabited by Moslem–Sudanese who are more closely akin to the peoples of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan than to the Ethiopians and which, we believe, should be incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Because of the strategic location of Italian Somaliland with respect to Kenya colony and the Aden protectorate, we believe that it would be advantageous to the United States and Great Britain for the latter country to assume responsibility for the future administration of Italian Somaliland. It would thus appear that the most desirable solution is for Italian Somaliland to be administered along with British Somaliland as a unit, and for the area so created to be placed under the international trusteeship system with the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority. We are opposed, however, to the proposal previously made by Great Britain for joining Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, and the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia under an international trusteeship. We see no justification for including the Ogaden, which is and should remain a part of Ethiopia. In view of the backward state of development of the Somali-lands, no definite time for their attainment of self-government should be specified in the trusteeship agreement, but the agreement should provide for their development toward eventual self-government.

Lot W. Henderson

1. The source text was included as Annex XII of a bound dossier of documents entitled “Pentagon Talks of 1947”.
2. Annex I, not printed, was largely a review of positions taken by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and the United States during the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, April 25–May 15 and June 15–July 12, 1946. For the records of that Council session, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, pp. 88 ff.
3. Annex II is not printed.
4. Supra.