Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867.00/7–1547

Report of the United States Ambassador Concerning Assistance to Turkey¹

[Extract]

secret

Ankara, 15 July, 1947.

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15. Conclusions.—It is concluded that:

a. The primary mission of the Turkish armed forces is to provide a deterrent of such a nature to a potential aggressor that an all-out costly war would be necessary for the aggressor, in order to realize territorial or political objectives in Turkey.

b. In case of war Turkey could place in the field a ground force of approximately 1,500,000 trained men (including reserves) within one month.

c. The size and effectiveness of the Turkish navy and air force would not permit them to carry out satisfactorily in case of war the tasks assigned to them by the Turkish general staff.

d. The equipment of all the Turkish armed forces is in general inadequate and outmoded.

e. Russia could over-run Turkey eventually if these two countries only were involved in war.

f. If Turkey, in case of attack by Russia, were aided promptly by the United States and/or Great Britain, there is a probability that she could hold out until arrival of effective aid, provided that her armed forces were completely provided with modern equipment.

g. The Turkish air and ground forces should be balanced, in order to permit them to present effective opposition unaided, until such time as allied assistance could be furnished.

h. Reorganization of the upper level of the Turkish defense establishments is desirable, in order to place the naval and air forces on an organizational parity with the ground forces, and to provide more effectively for the supply of all armed forces.

i. Certain reorganizational changes at lower levels within the ground, naval, and air forces will result in increased efficiency.

j. In general all elements of the Turkish armed forces require training with more modern weapons and equipment.

k. A United States mission should be sent to Turkey to train the Turks in the technical use and maintenance of any materiel which we may furnish them.

l. The British should be encouraged to continue to assist the Turkish armed forces in both equipment and training.

m. The United States and British missions to Turkey should work closely with one another, but not under a single head.

n. The aid to Turkey, which is authorized under the present United States aid program, should be furnished at the earliest possible date.

o. The aid to be furnished to Turkey under the present program will be totally inadequate to insure that its armed forces will be able, in case of attack by Russia, to hold out until outside assistance can arrive.

p. Although serious economic instability or social unrest are improbable in Turkey during the next two years, the economic burden of maintaining the present army of approximately 600,000 men is resulting in curtailment of essential governmental services, reduction in current economic productivity, and diminished potential for capital development necessary to raise the standard of living of the Turkish peasant and worker. Continuance of this situation for an extended period of time will have serious adverse effects upon Turkey’s capacity for resistance to armed aggression or infiltration of communistic ideas.

q. Turkey is not likely to reduce substantially her present armed forces until such time as the international situation eases materially.

r. Despite the burden of national defense, Turkey’s international credit position is sufficiently favorable so that Turkey should be able to obtain foreign financial assistance for sound economic development projects from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

s. [If?] The Turkish Government carries out its recently expressed intension to provide more favorable conditions for private enterprise in Turkey, both local and foreign private capital may also be available for economic development.

t. To the extent that economic development projects require the utilization of local labor and materials, possibilities of economic development will be limited unless the national defense burden can be reduced.

u. The funds made available for Turkey under Public Law #75 Eightieth Congress can most effectively be utilized for provision of modern military equipment, equipment for manufacture of ammunition and small arms, a military training program, and equipment and technical assistance for the initiation of a construction and maintenance program for strategic highways. The latter program will also substantially benefit the economy of Turkey.

v. The recommended program, taken as a whole, should not necessitate any significant increase in the proportion of Turkish national income or resources devoted to national defense purposes. Certain budgetary effects of a bookkeeping nature resulting from payment of customs duties by the Ministry of National Defense on imports of equipment under the program may require legislative action (See Paragraph 8 (h) above.) Possible small increase in foreign exchange requirements for fuel for operation of equipment in connection with the recommended training program will be more than offset by savings resulting from the provision of equipment which the Turkish Government would otherwise have had to purchase with its own funds.

w. To the extent that aid program equipment must be carried on the already overburdened Turkish State Railways, distribution of commodities for the civilian population, will be curtailed. This effect appears unavoidable, but can be minimized by proper phasing of deliveries.

17 [16]. Recommendations.—It is recommended that:

a. Equipment and supplies be furnished the Turkish army, navy, and air force in amounts and priorities as indicated in Annexes B, C, and D² insofar as possible from allotments of $18,500,000 for ground forces, $14,750,000 for the navy, and $26,750,000 for the air forces.

b. Road construction and maintenance equipment to the value of $5,000,000 as listed in Part Two of Annex E, be provided for improvement of Turkish roads.

c. Improvement of Turkish arsenals be provided as listed in Part Five of Annex E at an amount not to exceed $5,000,000.

d. The Turks be advised that it is believed that reorganization of their general staff and supply system, as discussed in Par 4, and reorganization of various units at lower levels, as discussed in Annexes B, C, and D, would improve the efficiency of their armed forces and reduce the burden of maintenance.

e. The United States send to Turkey, to train the Turks in the technical use and maintenance of the equipment we furnish them, army, navy, air-force and civilian missions as indicated in paragraph 9.

f. Arrangements be made for members of the Turkish armed forces to attend military and naval schools in the United States, as discussed in Annexes B, C, and D.

g. The British be encouraged to continue aid to Turkey in both equipment and training.

h. British and American missions in Turkey be instructed to cooperate closely with one another, but that they not be under a single head.

i. The various items of equipment and supplies to be furnished Turkey be made available at the earliest possible moment, except naval radar. Motor equipment should arrive with or ahead of the equipment with which it is to be used.

j. Supervision of the utilization of the equipment to be furnished Turkey should be exercised only to the extent of assuring ourselves that the Turks know how to use it. This can best be accomplished by the groups which are sent to give instruction, under the supervision of the Ambassador to Turkey.

k. The United States Government, as a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, give favorable consideration to the forthcoming request of the Turkish Government for financial assistance from that institution for economic development purposes, but only after a thorough survey by economic, industrial, and agricultural specialists designed to determine the types of development which will be consistent with the principles of world economic organization set forth in the charter of the International Trade Organization, and the particular projects which will contribute most to improvement of the well-being of the Turkish people within the limits set by Turkish resources of manpower and materials.³

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1. Transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Wilson in despatch 1750, July 15; according to telegram 573, July 15, 11 a.m., from Ankara, the report was to be hand-carried by General Oliver, who was scheduled to leave Istanbul on July 18 (867.00/7–1547).
2. The annexes referred to in paragraph 16 are not printed.
3. Ambassador Wilson’s report, as originally transmitted to the Department, contained 12 recommendations. As a result of subsequent developments, recommendation k was deleted and recommendation l was relettered as k. Similarly, paragraphs 15 and 16 were originally numbered 16 and 17. Recommendation k originally read: “The program of aid to Turkey be extended by authorization of aid to the extent of $100,000,000 annually for an additional four (4) years.” For an explanation of these developments, see telegram 437, July 23, to Ankara, p. 258.