Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/7–1747

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 17, 1947.

Subject: The Greek Situation

Reports reaching the Department indicate that the situation in Greece has deteriorated seriously within the past week. The Greek Communists have openly proclaimed their aim to establish a revolutionary government in areas held by the Greek rebels and armed attacks of considerable strength have been made from across the Albanian border. It is possible that the United Nations may be incapable of taking effective action in time to protect Greek independence and territorial integrity. The British Foreign Office shares our concern at the present developments.

The Embassy at Athens and American representatives on the UN Balkan Subsidiary Group at Salonika have not yet had time to submit to the Department either full or substantiated information regarding the extent of the military operations or the success of the Greek forces in containing the immediate danger. There is, however, sufficient information to show that an extremely explosive situation exists which may easily become the precursor of what the Communists would term a Greek civil war, but which would in fact be open hostilities between the Soviet-dominated Balkan States and Greece.

The following is a summary of the information received to date from Ambassador MacVeagh and Lieutenant Colonel Miller, the American representative on the UN Subsidiary Group, which, although obtained for the most part from official Greek sources or from evidence heard by the Subsidiary Group’s investigating team on the spot, appears to be reliable. It is to be noted that as soon as the present incidents occurred, the Greek Government urgently requested the Subsidiary Group to make a full investigation. This the Subsidiary Group has not yet decided to do, pending the report of the investigating team.

At dawn on July 12, a guerrilla force estimated at 2,500 men crossed the Albanian frontier into Greece along the line of the Aous River. They had unusually heavy armament and were well equipped with pack animals and supplies.

The attackers seized the strategic bridge at Bourazani, isolating and attacking the town of Konitza. The early reports of the fall of Konitza were later denied and the bridge was said to have been recaptured after Greek Army reinforcements had been flown in.

Greek aerial reconnaissance disclosed bodies of troops in what appeared to be army uniforms concentrated just inside the Albanian frontier. The pilot and observer of one Greek plane, interviewed by the investigating team after five flights over the guerrilla formations on July 13, stated that many of the guerrillas wore peculiar uniforms consisting of a blue coat, reddish shirt and black trousers. They appeared unusually highly-trained in the technique of taking cover at the approach of aircraft. The plane was damaged by a heavy calibre machine gun bullet.

It appeared originally that the rebel forces were advancing toward the strategic town of Joannina, but were stopped by Greek Army reinforcements. Another band was reported ready to occupy Chamouris. The two-week-old operations in the nearby Grammos region continued.

The above-mentioned attacks followed closely on the heels of a well-documented case of flagrant assistance given the guerrillas by the Yugoslavs at Beles-Kouka, and investigated by the UN team. In mopping up operations near Beles on the night of July 4–5, the Greek Army encountered strong resistance. Two Greek brigades supported by artillery had, however, by July 6 pushed an estimated 600 guerrillas into a narrow zone along the frontier where a stalemate developed since the Army could not use artillery or aircraft for fear of violating Yugoslav territory. The guerrillas held extremely strong positions supported by machine gun fire from several Yugoslav frontier posts, by mortar fire from the reverse side of Beles mountain (which is in Yugoslavia), and by supplies which Greek soldiers saw arriving from Yugoslavia. The Greek operations were consequently unsuccessful, and the greater part of the guerrillas escaped into Yugoslavia.

The following events appear to be connected with the recent outbreak of heavy fighting in northwestern Greece:

(a) Greek Communists at a Communist Congress held at Strasbourg (France) toward the end of June proclaimed their intention of establishing a “free democratic Government” in northern Greece and appealed for international assistance for their cause.

(b) A police search of the Athens port of Piraeus July 1 disclosed stores of revolvers, explosives and revolutionary proclamations in the headquarters of the Communist-dominated National Liberation Movement.

(c) A serious fire of undetermined origin broke out on July 5 in the building housing the offices of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, British Headquarters, and the headquarters of the Greek Air Force, killing several persons.

(d) The responsible Ministers of the Greek Cabinet declared that overwhelming evidence of a Communist coup being planned in Athens before the arrival of Governor Griswold made the arrest of the principal known Communists imperative. The Prime Minister agreed when the Ministers refused to accept further responsibility for the safety of the Government or public unless they received permission to act. The arrests began on the morning of July 9. Actually many of the leading Communists are reported to have escaped. Arrests total around 9,000 but may reach 14,000 or higher if and when the Communists proceed to establish a separate Government and launch the threatened International Brigade. As to the latter, no confirmed information from American sources has yet been received as to the existence of such a brigade or of participation of international elements in the recent fighting in northwestern Greece.

(e) The Athens Communist newspaper Rizospastis stated on July 12 that Zachariades, Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, had returned to Athens after attending the French Communist Congress. The paper also printed an inflammatory “message” from Zachariades to the effect that the interest of the nation required a definite moral and material separation of the “democratic world” from the reactionary right and center by the creation of a “new free democratic government” in the “free democratic districts” of Greece.

(f) The Konitza attack began on July 12, coinciding with the arrival of Governor Grisf old in Greece.

It seems likely that the USSR may veto our resolution now under consideration in the UN Security Council. This resolution provides for the establishment of a continuing UN Commission to deal with disturbances along the northern Greek frontier and in particular external aid to the guerrilla forces. The Department is considering other proposals which might be presented to the Security Council or, failing a favorable decision by that body, to the General Assembly which meets in September. Among the possible courses of action under immediate consideration are:

(a) The presentation of a case by the United States in the Security Council charging that there has been a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Chapter VII of the Charter.

(b) The establishment of a Security Council Commission within Greece (if Greece so requests) to act as a surveillance body.

(c) Recommendation that the Security Council itself meet in Belgrade, Salonika or somewhere in the area.

(d) Action under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter pending the taking of effective action by the Security Council. (This Article provides that nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a United Nations member. In invoking this Article, the United States would presumably rely upon the theory that an attack against one member of the United Nations may nearly always be considered as an attack against all.)

(e) If time and circumstances permit, the presentation of the entire matter to the General Assembly if Security Council consideration proves abortive.

Consideration is also being given to other action within the spirit, although not within the procedural framework, of the United Nations Charter. Such action may be in concert with other UN members or simply with the British. It would be predicated on the principle that members of the United Nations are not precluded from taking action in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter by a policy of obstructionism of another UN member. The action which might be taken could take various forms.

It is possible, however, that before we can exploit all possibilities of United Nations action, a revolutionary government may have been established in northern Greece or the military situation may have disintegrated to such a degree that Greek independence and territorial integrity can no longer be maintained. In addition, since no armed forces are as yet available to the United Nations, any action open to the United Nations in its present stage of development—even if not blocked by the USSR—might be ineffective in preventing the continued incursion of armed forces from Greece’s northern neighbors.

The British Foreign Office has expressed deep concern at present developments in Greece. Their Foreign Office expresses the belief that even if a permanent border commission were established under UN auspices, there might eventuate a situation where peaceful action having proved ineffective, consideration might have to be given to the use of force to assist the Greek Army in restoring the integrity of Greece. The British have indicated that they intend to discuss this matter with us.²

1. Mr. Villard and the Secretary of State are listed as drafting officers; the original was sent to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and copies were sent to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on July 17.
2. In a memorandum of July 17, to Mr. Lovett and to Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Secretary Marshall stated: “I had a talk with the President at 12:30 today and discussed with him the situation in Greece. He stated that the memorandum I gave him yesterday was sufficient for his purpose. I told him that I was sending today (and I have just signed and despatched the documents) a detailed statement of the situation in Greece, as now known to the Department, to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   “I told the President that I thought it best merely to send this statement, as indicated above, without any formal request from me or direction by him for action; that it would be better for me to indicate informally to Admiral Leahy that we thought it desirable for the Chiefs of Staff formally to consider the matter immediately. The President agreed to this procedure.” (868.00/7–1747)