501.BC Greece/7–2047

The Greek Foreign Minister (Tsaldaris) to the Secretary of State 1

My Dear Mr. Secretary: When I had the privilege of calling on you on the 9th July,2 I expressed to you the growing concern with which we viewed the question of maintaining the Greek Army’s morale. I pointed out that unless steps were taken to strengthen the armed forces morally as well as materially, and unless the Security Council [Page 247] adopted prompt and effective measures to safeguard Greece’s northern frontiers, a situation might develop tending to set at naught any action contemplated in defense of Greece’s independence.

The events of the last week have, unfortunately, served to demonstrate the validity of our fears. It is true that the Greek forces succeeded in repelling the two attacks of invaders from Albanian territory. Nevertheless, they were not able to take a substantial number of prisoners. In view of the fact that fresh incursions must be expected, the imperative need of improving the military situation without delay becomes apparent.

So far as the deliberations of the Security Council are concerned, in spite of the efforts of the United States Delegate, and though time is of the essence, another week has passed largely in filibustering on the part of the members of the Soviet bloc. Discussion of the American draft resolution will begin only on Tuesday next, and insistent rumors suggest that various compromise amendments which can only weaken the original draft are to be submitted.

It is still uncertain whether the Soviet Delegate will veto the resolution or not. What is certain, however, is that the representatives of the three Balkan countries, as well as Mr. Gromyko himself, have stressed in their statements the optional character of any recommendations made by the Security Council under Chapter VI. It may be inferred therefore, that, even without veto, these three countries will choose to disregard such recommendations, and especially those relating to the establishment of a semi-permanent frontier commission. The intention to continue the aggression against Greece is clear and overt.

Greece favored adoption by the Security Council of the American proposal and pledged herself to carry out her part in good faith, because she was hopeful that the findings of the Commission of Investigation would help to put an end to aggressive intentions. But—and here is the crucial point—in the light of the recent incursions and the attitude of the Slav bloc at the Security Council, is the proposed solution a sufficient one? The main point of the American resolution is the establishment of a frontier commission. But such a commission is already at work in the frontier area, yet its presence has failed to avert the recent incursions. In fact, the Subsidiary Group was unable even to carry out investigations of the circumstances under which incursions occur, owing to the three countries’ refusal to permit it to enter their territories. How then will the contemplated frontier commission succeed in preventing further acts of aggression so long as the plan for such aggressive activity continues to exist, and no other provision is made for means that would prove adequate to foil such aggressive activities? There is a very real danger that such a commission may [Page 248] become no more than an instrument for informing the world at long delay, that aggression has taken place and that Greece is no longer a free nation.

The fears which I have expressed above have their origin in the military situation as this has developed in the last week, as well as in the revealing attitude of the Soviet bloc in recent meetings of the Security Council, and I venture to submit these fears to your kind consideration.

I would add that I have thought it expedient to convey to you my views since arrangements have been made for me to meet your immediate assistants at the State Department on Tuesday next in the afternoon, and you may perhaps wish to discuss with them in advance the possibility of a stronger line of action in the light of those views. I am, of course, at your entire disposal for any additional information that you may wish to have regarding the situation as it has developed since our last meeting as well as the measures to be adopted.

Sincerely yours,

Constantine Tsaldaris
  1. Handed to Mr. Villard at 9:55 a. m., July 20.
  2. See telegram 1021, July 11, to Athens, p. 224.