868.00/7–2147: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
most immediate
1184. Believe no advantage would accrue from my presenting Sophoulis and Tsouderos with Bevin’s three suggested questions.1 King’s reaction to unconstitutional proposal to “evict” govt already [Page 251] determined (mytel 1124 July 152) and Liberal Party’s views well-known except as regards (3) which too unclear for any valid discussion unless by Communist proposers themselves. Also Sophoulis already in touch with Maximos following my suggestion (mytel 1078, July 9), and finally, according to British Chargé’s latest information, Sophoulis not advised of proposals at time Tsouderos “secretly” requested British reactions. Apparently not only aged leader himself but Rendis (with whom I talked today) ignorant of matter. Fact seems to be that Tsouderos (with backing of Lambrakis, editor of Vina) hoped secure British blessing independently and in advance before attempting persuade Sophoulis to embrace proposals (which incidentally not in writing), thus indulging in maneuver typical of division in opposition ranks. In this connection, Rendis appears willing (mytel 1078, July 9) to see increasing collaboration all nationalists against enemies of Greece, but Lambrakis and Tsouderos still cling to old idea (see my conversation with Sophoulis in my despatch 1609 of October 13, 19453) that Communists can be used by Liberals to defeat Govt and thereafter be controlled through political means since they in electoral minority.
In view of above, I have preferred follow other line indicated by Dept and inform Tsouderos as set forth in Deptel [apparent omission] under reference that we consider KKE proposals insincere and dangerous. Since he contacted British Chargé and not me in the matter, I authorized Reilly4 yesterday, when he duly asked Tsouderos Mr. Bevin’s three questions, but also expressed views similar to ours, to inform him likewise of how we feel. Today Reilly reports Tsouderos, after endeavoring to answer questions, accepted our joint caveat without comment, except to say that he too has no belief in sincerity of Communists but felt they might be “used” as above outlined.
Meanwhile I have been able to get Sophoulis’ ideas through conversation with him and Griswold July 18. While maintaining well-known Liberal Party views that Parliament not really representative of popular will, since elections held in “tempest”, and that Centrist govt would more nearly satisfy public at this time, and while holding present Govt in large part responsible for existing situation, he nevertheless conceded that since situation exists it is necessary to cooperate with Govt to some extent for national salvation. “Since they won’t come up to meet us we must go down to them.” When Griswold and I [Page 252] urged maximum possible unity at this time despite political differences, he took occasion assert his awareness of Communist danger to this country and to deny emphatically any justification whatever for Lange’s allegations in SC which he later scored publicly (mytel 1169, July 194). In addition, he reiterated his support of Truman Doctrine and expressed great interest in Griswold’s work so that it may not be impossible that despite contrary advisers, he will yet give his blessing to some sort of integration of his party in the national effort.
[Here follows one paragraph of personal observations.]
My answers to questions in final paragraphs of Deptel 1082 are given in next following telegrams.
- See telegram 1082, July 18, to Athens, p. 243.↩
- Not printed; it reported information from a confidential source that “Sophoulis interview with King July 11 was unsatisfactory to former, Sophoulis insisting that new government should be formed with himself as Premier and King refusing to undertake any political initiative without advice and consent of responsible Ministers.” (868.00/7–1547)↩
- Not printed.↩
- D’Arcy P. Reilly, the British Chargé in Greece.↩
- Not printed.↩