Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/7–2847: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

secret
immediate

Athens, July 28, 1947—7 p. m.

1224. Deptel 1142, July 25. None of Tsaldaris’ arguments seem to me valid in view of serious situation facing country.

(1) Undoubtedly government by majority would be more viable than coalition under normal conditions, but fact that elections held under influence fear of Communists (causing abnormal swing to right) and wide-spread belief that owing to rightist excesses temper of country now more favorably inclined toward Liberals, give latter greater importance than represented by present parliamentary strength. Possibly this importance exaggerated by propaganda but exists sufficiently to indicate that (dictatorship of coalition), if leaders would really coalesce, would go much farther to satisfy public at large than unilateral even though parliamentary rule by Populists alone. Meanwhile increasing country’s confidence in Government most desirable in country’s interest.

(2) If “full national coalition” could be formed, talk of its failure “when and if” seems nonsense, since only possible failure would be failure defend Greece in which case all bets off. Purpose such coalition would be restore security after which it would hold new elections, with incidentally no apparent necessity include Communists.

(3) Full national coalition possibly less desirable than Populist–Liberal coalition with Centrists at present in government leaving out Mataxists and other small extremist elements. However, neither solution possible with Tsaldaris and Sophoulis equally insistent on occupying dominant position. Fear politicians fundamentally convinced Greece will be saved by US assistance or not at all, hence continued personal and party jockeying to ride in on our tail.

(4) Believe Department’s efforts convince Tsaldaris of falisity this view, and need of Greek leaders cooperating to save country, may help, but hope Department will not be drawn into details of possible political reshuffles, both for general policy reasons already expressed and because impossible keep up with Greek intrigues, which continuing merrily in Tsaldaris’ absence, probably many of them without his knowledge. Under these conditions, cannot see clear line ahead for us other than to continue insistent advice for maximum best results in direction greater unity while supporting present partial coalition as step in right direction.¹

MacVeagh

1. A memorandum of conversation by Mr. Witman records that Mr. Villard continued conversations on this subject with Mr. Tsaldaris on July 29. He stated that “we continue to feel that national unity is necessary in the present situation, and would like to see included in the Government as many parties as possible, with the exception of representatives of the extremes. The Secretary, he added, was considering issuing a new press statement along the lines of that of February 11, 1947 reaffirming these views and calling upon the Greek people and political leaders for the maximum unity in the face of the common dangers. We do not want to be involved in Greek party politics, but suggest that Ambassador MacVeagh might be helpful on M. Tsaldaris’ return in acting as an intermediary if M. Tsaldaris desired. We were not suggesting specific personalities or that M. Sophoulis himself necessarily be taken into Cabinet.… Mr. Villard urged that M. Tsaldaris discuss with Mr. MacVeagh the question of broadening the Government Secretary Marshall was very much interested, and considered the matter very important from our point of view.” (868.00/7–2947)