868.00/8–147: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
1261. Deptel 1176, July 30. Upon receipt of Foreign Office instructions British Chargé Reilly called on me July 29 and at his request, and for purpose providing British with our best military estimates, I immediately asked General Livesay of AMAG and my Military Attaché and Military Attaché assistants Colonels Smith and Bergquist to confer with General Rawlins, commander of British military mission and Colonel Shortt, British Military Attaché, on subjects in question; Reilly and Secretary Tahourdin of British Embassy and Counsellor Keeley and myself also present. In exchange of views, no commitments made as to future US action and expression only general views possible owing necessity of British Chargé’s replying telegraphically to Foreign Office that evening. Principal US views expressed were:
- (1)
- Feeling that if bandit movement continues depend on present Greek sources for recruitment, Greek army of present strength, if [Page 271] properly used, should be able with presently envisaged equipment greatly to improve situation in coming months and perhaps establish reasonable security in all regions except those immediately contiguous border within coming year.
- (2)
- Conviction that if Slavo-Communists call on foreign sources for recruitment and/or satellite states recognize “free Greek” Government enabling former supply latter’s army with air power, artillery, or other heavy equipment, the situation likely pass beyond anything with which any army of size possible to Greece could expect cope.
- (3)
- As regards proper use of present army, greater employment should be made of offensive commando or bandit tactics against bandits and manpower distributed with greater proportion than at present in active area.
British in general agreed with (2). Regarding (1) Rawlins stressed importance of following strictly military plan without present widespread politicial interference in employment of forces and gave thorough support to idea of increasing use of commando tactics. Reilly and Shortt took more pessimistic view, not only as doubting any useful early discouragement to bandit recruiting through AMAG program as presently being implemented and because of small success of any offensive to date.
Resulting telegram to British Foreign Office not as yet communicated to me.