868.00/8–247: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
1275. In connection Greece’s chances to preserve territorial integrity in face Slavic pressure. I regard this astonishingly ill-timed decision (Deptel 1179, July 31 [30]1) as little short of catastrophic and hope implementation may be postponed pending determination of other possible security measures equally valid with presence British troops. British Chargé informing Under Secretary Foreign Affairs here today but saying date not yet fixed. Told me, however, indications are for completion withdrawal by end September.
Department will realize situation Salonika very similar to that Trieste, and perhaps even more critical since Soviets already control Otranto Straits. Though British troops remaining Greece now number only few thousand and seem inactive because playing no part in internal affairs, their presence north Greece supplies precious deterrent to possible Slavic irruption and establishment of occupation of Aegean littoral as fait accompli. With UN stymied by veto, and should British troops be withdrawn, such irruption might occur running into international complications except ex post facto. It could also be given specious pretext by an appeal from “free Greek” Government to satellite states to “come over into Macedonia and help us”.
[Page 277]Greek patriotic opinion thoroughly aware of above salutary function served by British troops and serious collapse of morale, especially in north, only too likely occur at very moment inception of reconstruction program unless early announcement of compensatory measure possible. While determination such measures outside competence this Embassy, Department may be interested in opinion of highly placed US military officer Greece to effect that if British troops withdrawn and not replaced with at least equal numbers of US, “we might as well pack up and go home.”
Meanwhile that, immediately following strong Soviet action to avoid effective border control, British should decide on withdrawal long time insistently demanded by Communists, and furthermore that they should do so unilaterally, cannot fail increase at least appearance of fundamental weakness and lack of unity of western democracies. Perhaps no other action at present moment could be better calculated to reinforce local Communist morale, which security sources state already rising in anticipation increased assistance, under Moscow orders, from satellite states to guerrilla forces.
Have read above to Griswold and Cochran2 who concur. Griswold will send early independent reply from special point of view AMAG.