711.68/8–747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
| Participants: | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Constantine Tsaldaris, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece | |
| Mr. Henry S. Villard, Acting Director, NEA |
Mr. Tsaldaris called at his request. He said that before returning to his country, he desired to take up with me certain matters which were of concern to him as the Foreign Minister of Greece.
[Page 285]Mr. Tsaldaris began by referring to the memorandum he had left in the Department yesterday.2 He wished to supplement this with a further memorandum3 containing new information just received from his Government, dealing particularly with the military situation in Greece and amplifying some of the points he had previously raised in discussions with other officers of the Department.
He said that the Greek people were discouraged at the failure of the Security Council to take effective action on the Greek case, at the renewed threat of danger from the northern boundaries of Greece, and at the announced withdrawal of British troops. He felt that the atmosphere created in Greece by the lack of a solution to the present problem was a dangerous one. For example, a recent article by Mr. Melas, former Foreign Office official, had referred to “our Russian ally”. This trend of thought was due to the absence of progress in meeting the situation, which Mr. Tsaldaris seemed to feel was largely the responsibility of the United States. He asked whether I could not give him some statement which he could “carry back to the people” and which would serve to reassure the Greek population and indicate what plan the United States had for the future.
I told Mr. Tsaldaris that, in my opinion, the United States had already done a great deal for Greece. We had given the Greek case our most careful attention in the Security Council and were continuing to do so. We had taken a very long step in our program of aid to Greece, and supplies were beginning to arrive. Mr. Tsaldaris, I said, must understand that these things took time. I made it clear that we considered Greece one of the most difficult trouble spots in an unpeaceful world and that we were very much concerned indeed with the situation.
As to his request for a statement, I said that until I had had an opportunity to examine the two memoranda he had left with me, I would not be able to make any kind of statement. I said I had listened with the closest attention to what he had said and that I would consider his requests in consultation with my associates. Only then would I be able to determine what reply might be made to him.
Mr. Tsaldaris then said that the Italian Ambassador had called upon him yesterday to express thanks for Greece’s part in bringing Italy into the Bank of [for] International Settlements. The Ambassador had taken the opportunity to discuss the relations between Greece and Italy. The possibility had been suggested of a pact of friendship between Italy and Greece, and Ambassador Tarchiani was telegraphing his Government to ascertain whether a visit by Mr. [Page 286] Tsaldaris to Rome to discuss this subject might be agreeable. Mr. Tsaldaris said that there existed in his mind also the possibility of extending such a pact to include Turkey in the first instance, later bringing in Egypt and possibly Syria and Lebanon. This would result in a regional grouping of states in the Mediterranean area which would be an offset to the Slavic pressure along the eastern shores of the Adriatic and in the general direction of the Mediterranean. Such an arrangement would not be unusual from the historical viewpoint, and Mr. Tsaldaris had brought with him a map to illustrate his point. The particular danger point in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, in Mr. Tsaldaris’ view, was the Straits of Otranto between Italy and Greece, and it was here that Slav control would be most dangerous. Since the whole eastern coast of Italy would be vulnerable, Ambassador Tarchiani had been receptive to the idea of a pact of this sort and he now awaited the reaction of the Government at Rome.
I said that I saw no objection to this proposal. It might be a good thing to bring the region closer together.
Mr. Tsaldaris next discussed at some length the internal political situation in Greece. He maintained that to broaden the Government at this time would in fact result in weakness, since coalitions were of themselves not a strong form of government. What was needed in Greece at this time was a strong government, and he himself possessed the requisite popular support for a leader as shown by the fact that he controlled 210 out of 350 seats in the Parliament. Under the Parliamentary form of government in Greece, it was necessary for the majority leader to be in control if the government were to function strongly and effectively. By broadening the base of the Government still further at this time, nothing concrete would be accomplished since all responsible elements were already represented in it. Even Mr. Zervas had indicated that he would be willing to amalgamate his Party with the Populist Party of Mr. Tsaldaris, if desired, so as to form a strong Government. Mr. Tsaldaris, therefore, begged that before the Department issued any statement on the composition of the Greek Government, we would take most careful account of his remarks.
Mr. Tsaldaris concluded his observations by again asking whether it would not be possible for me to make a statement which he could carry back to his Government and, through his Government, to the people of Greece. I replied again that until I had studied the matter further in consultation with my associates, I could not give him a definite answer. Mr. Tsaldaris indicated that he would be leaving for Greece in a few days and hoped by that time that he would have a statement of some kind in regard to American policy toward Greece.