Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.002/9–247: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Athens, September 2, 1947—7 p. m.

1511. While receiving formal call from Henderson¹ and myself yesterday morning, Tsaldaris, who obviously nervous and uncertain as to nature Henderson’s mission, began discussion Cabinet crisis with long and emotional harangue … on his vain efforts to obtain cooperation of Sophoulis and EPE (Venizelos, Papandreou and Canellopoulos). Said Sophoulis insistence on having premiership and exclusive policy control unacceptable, since govt under such conditions would be no more representative of Greek people than his own present one. Added EPE intransigence inspired by confidence in American support, and in this connection displayed particular bitterness over memo of Griswold-Stephanopoulos conversation (mytel 1471, August 27) which he said is now being circulated all over Athens despite my letter to him explaining it. Added that apparent American endeavor to split his own party placed him in almost intolerable situation. In desperation, therefore, and realizing importance of having at least temporary solution, he had set up present emergency government pending outcome continuing efforts obtain broader basis in accordance American wishes. Pointed out that as Minister of Foreign Affairs he had always tried carry out policies in line with those of US, and that shortcomings of outgoing government in field internal affairs due to rivalry between members collaborating parties.

Henderson and I assured Tsaldaris that US Govt did not propose dictate composition of any Greek Govt. Said however we felt bound let him know it would be extremely difficult maintain support US public opinion for AMAG if impression should prevail that latter strengthening certain Greek political groups, and thus becoming disintegrating factor, rather than aiding Greece as whole. Emphasized that if Greeks themselves should fail set up effective government having wide support of great body loyal Greek citizens Congress and American people might well refuse expend further energies and resources on aid to Greece. We made it clear that matter is of extreme urgency in view of growing Soviet and guerrilla activity and of approaching GA session where we would be more vulnerable to criticism if narrow right govt still in power in Greece.

Tsaldaris said he appreciated these arguments and would make every effort for achievement political unity.

In afternoon we called on King. Earlier in day he had received memorandum from Papandreou and Venizelos, acting on behalf of opposition group formed Sunday combining EPE, Markezini, Gonatas and Alexandris, and claiming 125 deputies. Memorandum urged appointment of and pledged support to non-parliamentary Prime Minister of “unimpeachable prestige” who should exercise full authority in selection of Ministers regardless of party and in subsequent discharge responsibilities of office. King said group had suggested General Papagos in this connection.

I told King proposal seemed to us to offer possible solution and repeated what we had said to Tsaldaris during the morning. Henderson suggested that King bring all leaders together in room and insist they remain till government formed since urgency of matter must preclude further delay. King said “I’ll try it”.

Immediately thereafter I attempted arrange meeting of EPE leaders at my house. Could not reach Papandreou but Venizelos and Canellopoulos had long conversation with Henderson and me, British Ambassador Norton also being present. We talked to them along same lines we had taken with King and Tsaldaris. During conversation King telephoned me to say Tsaldaris unwilling accept Papagos, who as Grand Chamberlain now member Royal household, unless at least two members of Liberal (Sophoulis) Party would participate in government. Said Tsaldaris not unwilling accept principle of mutually acceptable non-parliamentary Prime Minister but felt appointment of member Royal suite certain to cause Republican criticism unless thus approved by Liberals. King requested that I ask EPE leaders to approach Sophoulis in this matter, which I accordingly did. In reply Venizelos and Canellopoulos said they felt Sophoulis “hopeless” but expressed their own willingness as shown by above-mentioned memorandum, to cooperate with any strong Prime Minister appointed by King, and pledged their best efforts to find solution.

Today, on my return from Salonika with Henderson and Griswold, Venizelos informed me that Markezini has had “hopeful” conference with King and begged me give King my “moral support” at new audience scheduled for me and Henderson tomorrow morning. I replied that I would certainly continue advocating broadened govt.²

MacVeagh

1. The Department informed the Embassy in Athens in telegram 1443, August 28’ that Mr. Henderson would be arriving shortly “In order that there may be closer informal exchange views between Dept and you and Griswold.” (111.75/8–2847)
2. In telegram 1520, September 4, Ambassador MacVeagh reported that he and Mr. Henderson held further conversations with the King on September 3 and again “underlined urgency of achieving unity stressing possibly ominous significance for Greece of recent international developments as set forth Moscow telegram 2747, August 30 to Department and saying that every hour of continued one party government in Greece imperils development American aid both directly here and indirectly before UN. King thereupon agreed summon all political leaders to Palace in afternoon and read them statement elaborating on these views and pleading for immediate common agreement ‘before you leave this room’ on non-political Prime Minister ‘who would select Cabinet and direct new national policy with support of all’. At King’s request I subsequently prepared this statement which King proposed to read as his own” (868.002/9–447); this communication gave extensive comment on further developments in the governmental crisis.

   In telegram 2747, August 30, from Moscow, Ambassador Smith expressed his belief that the Kremlin planned to set up and recognize a puppet Greek government prior to the meeting of the General Assembly on September 16 (868.01/8–3047).