Editorial Note
Mr. Henderson met with Mr. Tsaldaris on October 15 at the latter’s request for a private and informal conversation. Mr. Henderson then prepared four memoranda dealing with as many aspects of their conversation. The Greek Foreign Minister expressed concern lest the willingness of the American Delegation in New York to have the Greek resolution watered down indicated a weakening of American determination to support the integrity and independence of Greece. Mr. Henderson informed him that “he could rest assured that the determination of the American Government to support the independence and integrity of Greece had not weakened in the slightest. I had no reason to believe that the United States would falter in its determination to support Greek independence and integrity so long as the Government and people of Greece demonstrated a similar determination by taking all appropriate measures to strengthen Greek economy and to restore law and order.” (501.BC Greece/10–1547)
Mr. Henderson informed Mr. Tsaldaris that no decision had yet been made with regard to establishing a Greek National Guard of 50,000 men (868.20/10–1547).
Mr. Tsaldaris stated he had reason to believe that within the next two weeks, Albania and Bulgaria would recognize the guerrillas in northern Greece as the Government of Greece, an action he interpreted as aggression. He expressed the hope that the United States Government would answer such an act of recognition by sending at least a token detachment of American troops to Greece. Mr. Henderson advised the Greek Foreign Minister that as far as he knew, “no American plan had been formulated to reply to recognition by the neighbors of Greece of the guerrillas as a government by sending American forces to Greece. I said that it seemed more likely that we would not [Page 367] interpret the mere act of recognition as aggression unless that act should be accompanied by increased aid to the guerrillas. I was not in a position to say what we would do in case the neighbors of Greece should recognize the guerrillas and should at once begin to aid them openly on a large scale.” (868.01/10–1547)
Lastly, Mr. Tsaldaris raised the question as to whether the United States Government had formulated a policy as to what it would do in case Greece’s neighbors sent troops openly into Greece. He felt that Greece would be invaded unless continued pressure and infiltration would result in his Government’s overthrow without an invasion, or unless the United States Government would make it absolutely clear to the Soviet Union that it was prepared under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to defend Greece by force in case of armed invasion. Mr. Henderson made no reply. (868.00/10–1547)