Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/10–1847: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

Athens, October 18, 1947—1 p. m.

1799. Continued public discussions pros and cons rumored impending changes in Greek military leadership (Embtels 1537 [1637], September 21 and 1651, September 24¹) without any categorical Government statement on subject lowering morale of public and particularly of army whose offensive spirit against bands progressively deteriorating. After meeting October 15 called by British Ambassador and attended by General Rawlins, Governor Griswold, General Livesay, Moffat, Minor and me to explore all angles situation, British Ambassador, Griswold, Moffat and I called on Prime Minister to express concern over harmful public discussions and to assure him that British and US were not opposed, as repeatedly alleged, to individual changes in army designed in agreement with Generals Rawlins and Livesay to increase its efficiency and fighting spirit. Sophoulis said he was glad to have our assurance on this score. He recognized that changes based on party considerations undesirable and reiterated previous statements that he wants to change only Chief Staff as symbol to army and people of new leadership and new program military offensive against rebels which must henceforth go hand in hand with extension of amnesty. He had accepted premiership in order pacify country through amnesty and intensified military action and if he were blocked in these efforts, he would resign. While Ventiris possibly excellent soldier, results under his leadership had been unsatisfactory and he was now refusing cooperate with Government. He did not wish hurt Ventiris and would even be agreeable his promotion to Inspector General but General Rawlins was adamantly opposed to any change and had lined up Minister of War Stratos with him. British Ambassador interposed to deny either that Rawlins opposed change Chief Staff or had intrigued with Stratos against removal Ventiris, saying that Rawlins had in fact told Stratos that change Ventiris desirable and that of Army Commander and one or two corps commanders essential. Prime Minister said he only interested removing Ventiris as Chief Staff. He recognized a few other changes might be required but would leave those to military advisers to work out with new Chief Staff. Prime Minister admitted receiving telegram from Tsaldaris saying he had been informed by friends that widespread army changes were contemplated and as this would endanger national cause asking to be consulted before any changes effected. He had not yet replied to Tsaldaris telegram and expressed hope British and American Governments would help in convincing Tsaldaris necessity change Ventiris.

I suggested that as rumors had evidently magnified extent contemplated changes and area disagreement, it might be helpful for Generals Rawlins and Livesay to consult with Minister War and agree upon two or three possible panels of desirable changes which if acceptable to Prime Minister and Cabinet here could be communicated to Tsaldaris, thus at least narrowing discussion to actualities. Prime Minister readily agreed, saying he would accept in advance any slate upon which Rawlins, Livesay and Stratos would agree, provided that, to avoid charges he is playing party politics, no Liberal here included. Said he [apparent garble] was thus “becoming executioner of his party” but he did so in spirit compromise to get on with offensive side his program. British Ambassador interposed to emphasize that all panels should include change in Chief Staff.

Immediately thereafter Livesay and Rawlins called on Stratos and [who?] refused agree any changes, contending (1) there is no military necessity for change and (2) change in command now would be admission weakness and lower army morale. He said that if changes to be made for political reasons, his shoulders not sufficiently broad assume responsibility in absence Tsaldaris, especially since latter had informed him discussion changes had caused bad impression in US. Rawlins stated that while he agreed there is no military necessity remove Ventiris as Chief Staff, there is real military reason for change Army Commander and suggested Ventiris best man in army for that position. Stratos contended this would be demotion. While maintaining refusal to join in any recommendation to [panel?] for changes, Stratos finally said he would convene higher military council during Volos Conference (which meeting October 16–19 and which Livesay and Rawlins are attending) to discuss subject Army Commander.

At meeting later in day at British Embassy, it was agreed Livesay and Rawlins should draw up three panels suggested changes, which in their opinion would in present circumstances improve efficiency of army, for discussion with Stratos at Volos and eventual presentation to Prime Minister with statement Stratos views.

Embassy and AMAG cannot escape conclusion that Rawlins has consistently protected Ventiris first by opposing his removal as Chief Staff and when that appeared untenable suggesting his appointment as Army Commander. While Rawlins’ resistance may have influenced Stratos, his present inflexible attitude may spring from Tsaldaris who, erroneously informed that wholesale changes are envisaged, may honestly oppose them on military grounds or may, as some feel, in [be] conniving to get rid of Sophoulis, It is also possible his attitude is based on belief he is being loyal to commitment to US (OM [see?] telegram 1549, September 9). All other Populists in Government are understood to favor replacement Ventiris and few changes, if only to break impasse. Both militarily and politically continuance present situation harmful and we all feel that we should use our good offices to assist in reasonable solution.

British Commander, Griswold and I are convinced that Sophoulis must in general be given fullest possible support in order strengthen his Government. If this coalition fails, ensuing crisis and probable formation rightist government can have only dangerous consequences for our own transcending interests. We also believe, and Livesay holds same view, that regardless Ventiris’ military ability, it is impossible continue with Prime Minister and Chief Staff at loggerheads (Stephanopoulis, Populist Minister Coordination, told Clay AMAG October 16 re delayed decisions on important budgetary matters including provision for setting up national guard and related cut in gendarmerie that General Staff blocking Government’s policy and no progress possible until Chief Staff changed). While Livesay shares Rawlins’ feeling that Ventiris as soldier would perhaps be best man available for Army Commander, all except Rawlins agree it is too optimistic to believe that Ventiris would exert himself as Army Commander to carry out policy of Prime Minister who forced his ouster as Chief Staff. Consequently we feel it sensible solution to support Sophoulis’ suggestion that to make way for more cooperative Chief Staff, Ventiris be promoted to innocuous position of Inspector General. This as well as few other changes designed to increase army’s offensive spirit, notably in Army Commander and C Corps Commander, which Livesay and Rawlins believe desirable, could, and Sophoulis agreed would, be done according to established legal procedure, which should be reassuring to those who honestly fear a political purge of the army.

I shall revert to subject after Volos Conference and may suggest that Department then approach Tsaldaris.²

Keeley

1. Neither printed; they reported discussions on September 20 and 22 between the Greek Prime Minister and members of the Herter Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid. The Prime Minister deplored his inability to make changes in the Greek General Staff, which he attributed to Governor Griswold. Mr. Minor, at the meeting on September 22, interposed that “there seemed be misunderstanding Griswold’s views and actions. Governor in complete harmony with Embassy’s views had meticulously refrained from any attempt to dictate or control government’s actions, particularly in military matters, confining himself to friendly advice in respect those matters having direct bearing upon success aid program, emphasizing on basis consensus American, British and Greek military opinions that (1) wholesale changes in top commands in midst of hostilities would probably cause confusion which would slow operations and (2) any changes based on political persuasion of individuals rather than on basis increasing efficiency would probably have adverse morale effect.” (868.00/9–2147, 9–2447)
2. According to telegram 1831, October 24, 5 p. m., from Athens, the impasse over changes in the Greek High Command was broken on October 23 when the Supreme National Defense Council approved the appointment of General Yiadjis as Chief of Staff and General Ventiris as Commander of the Greek Army (868.20/10–2447).

   Telegram 1823, October 22, 8 p. m., from Athens reported that Chargé Keeley, Governor Griswold, and the British Ambassador had discussed these changes, the chief ones recommended by Generals Livesay and Rawlins, and had presented them for consideration by the Prime Minister on October 21. Telegram 1827, October 23, 8 p. m., from Athens, reported that the Prime Minister informed the Chargé on the evening of October 22 that he accepted the proposals. (868.20/10–2247, 10–2347)