867.00/10–2747
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
General Chamberlin’s written report1 submitted to General Eisenhower after his return to Washington contains substantially the same points brought out in his telegram of October 8 from Athens. The only really significant addition is a statement that American policy as at present laid down is not broad enough nor far-sighted enough to provide for future contingencies. General Chamberlin recommends “a broad definition of U.S. objectives in Greece in order to permit timely provision of adequate means (to reach these objectives) automatically prior to emergent situations.” In other words, he believes that we [Page 382] should lay down now a series of steps to be taken by the U.S. in the event of various potential developments in Greece. Among these possible developments General Chamberlin lists:
- a)
- The introduction of “international brigades” to fight with the guerrillas;
- b)
- The introduction of Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav forces to fight with the guerrillas in Greece;
- c)
- An overt attack on Greece by the satellites;
- d)
- An overt attack on Greece by the Soviet Union.
General Chamberlin recommends that we should either get out of Greece now or be prepared to commit whatever forces or adopt whatever means may be necessary to achieve our objectives. He does not, however, recommend the present introduction of American troops into Greece, although he says that this will be necessary if the British troops now there should be withdrawn without replacement by an international force. With respect to the possible new developments listed above, General Chamberlin considers that the appearance of international brigades on the side of the guerrillas would probably force the Greek Army to give a certain amount of ground, the extent of the retreat depending on the size of the brigades in action, but that with proper Greek leadership they could be contained. Introduction of satellite armed forces would, he thinks, mean the immediate loss of Macedonia and Thrace, including Salonika, and the ultimate loss of all of Greece unless outside assistance were furnished the Greek Government. With proper support from Allied ground, air and naval units, he thinks the Greek forces should be able to hold a line on the southern boundary of Macedonia against the satellites and possibly even retake all of Macedonia. Overt attack by the Soviet Union, in General Chamberlin’s view, would bring on World War III.
Other important points made in General Chamberlin’s report are:
- 1.
- It is extremely doubtful that Greece can support the required military force after July 1, 1948 without foreign assistance. An assurance of future support is necessary for present planning. Since such continued support would require new Congressional action, he suggests that there be a prompt decision on this point by the executive branch of the American Government followed by an approach to Congressional leaders.
- 2.
- British forces now in Greece serve the purpose of maintaining Greek morale and deterring overt intervention in Greece by the neighboring countries. Their present reduced strength is sufficient for this purpose but any further reduction would make them non-self-supporting and probably require their complete withdrawal. General Chamberlin considers their retention in Greece essential. If, however, the [Page 383] British should insist on evacuating them, he thinks that they must be replaced either by an international force, not including Soviet troops, or by American forces.
- 3.
- The greatest immediate danger to Greece lies in the possible recognition by the satellite states of a “free Greek” government of the rebels. According to General Chamberlin, if this took place, neither international law nor the Charter of the UN would present sufficiently serious obstacles to deter open assistance by the Soviet Union and its satellites to the guerrillas.
- 4.
- Guerrilla forces at present are in sufficient strength and occupy sufficiently strong positions to maintain themselves through the coming winter and seriously to harrass the Greek army and civil population. No concerted offensive by the guerrillas seems to be imminent, and it appears that the Greek army should be able to maintain its own positions. However, the prolongation of the present unstable conditions with continued substantial guerrilla activity is likely to have a very bad effect on the morale of the people and army.
- 5.
- The great needs of the Greek army are for revivification of its offensive spirit, freedom from political interference and release of its units from static guard duty. (More than one-half of all the infantry battalions are now dispersed for the protection of villages and towns, thereby making it impossible to organize striking forces for a real offensive against the guerrillas.)
- 6.
- To eliminate the need for dispersal of combat forces, it has been proposed that a national guard be created under the direction of the army to take over guard duties. General Chamberlin recommends that this force have a strength of 50 battalions. (It is believed that this would amount to about 50,000 men). The Greek government has already started action to call up reservists to constitute the first 20 battalions.
- 7.
- General Chamberlin considers that under present circumstances the greatest threat to Greece is the military threat and that it should be met by military measures. He therefore recommends that the solution of military problems should be given priority over the development of the broad economic program. Within the military field, he recommends that the army be given priority over the navy and that a study be made to determine whether the navy could not be reduced in size for reasons of economy.
- 8.
- With proper leadership, provided there is no increase in intervention by the Northern states, and assuming that all units are made available for offensive operations, General Chamberlin believes that the Greek Army at its present strength should be able to reduce the guerrillas to small, roving, uncoordinated bands.
- 9.
- General Chamberlin strongly recommends that the British military, naval and police missions be retained in Greece. He thinks it probable, however, that in due course it will be desirable to effect a gradual replacement of the British military training mission by a similar American mission.
- 10.
- As stated in his telegram of October 8, General Chamberlin
recommends the establishment of a joint military planning staff,
nominally under the Ambassador but responsive directly to the
JCS in Washington. He
further recommends the establishment of a group of American
military observers with the Greek army down to division level to
instill offensive spirit and to report to the advisory planning
staff on developments. With respect to the suggestion that the
planning staff and observers should be a part of the existing
American Military Group in Greece, General Chamberlin says:
“The U.S. Army Group Greece is unsuitable as an agency for furnishing operational guidance because it is subordinate to the American Mission for Aid to Greece, an independent agency operating outside the executive department of the Government. Control of advice to the Greek army on planning and operations should be vested in the acknowledged military leadership of the U.S. under local control of the Ambassador. A separate military agency is therefore required, nominally responsible to the senior representative of the U.S. Government in Greece but reporting directly to the JCS on all matters within its competence.”
- General Chamberlin points out that in order to be effective the U.S. military observers with the Greek army would be obliged to enter areas of active combat and would be subjected to the possibility of being killed or captured. He nevertheless considers such officers to be essential.
- 11.
- General Chamberlin recommends that the present irregular Greek defense forces, May and Mad, are ineffective and should be disbanded. Arming of civilians generally should be discontinued. Likewise, the gendarmerie should be reduced from its present size of about 31,000 to 20 or 25,000, and it should be returned to its normal police functions. (At present, a large part of the gendarmerie is being used in tactical operations with the Greek army.) All the military and semi-military duties now being performed by the irregular groups and the gendarmerie should be assumed by the national guard.
- 12.
- General Chamberlin considers it inadvisable to attempt to have the British provide the military operational advice required, because British prestige in Greece has diminished and it is improbable that British advice would be followed by the Greek forces.
- 13.
- The fact that the Communist Party is permitted to function legally in Greece has had a serious effect on the morale of the Greek army.