Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.01/11–1747

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)¹

secret

[Washington,] November 17, 1947.

With reference to our meeting of November 14, there are outlined below various measures which might be taken if some one or more of the Soviet satellite states or the USSR itself should accord recognition to the Greek guerrillas. I am indicating the Division which I think could most appropriately study the pros and cons of each step, and I would appreciate it if the indicated Division in each case would prepare an informal statement setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of the particular measure in question, together with a recommendation as to whether it should be seriously considered or discarded. Needless to say, I would welcome any additional suggestions which may occur to you.

1. The permanent Balkan Committee of the General Assembly should at once consider the situation created by an act of recognition of the rebel government, in the light of the recent General Assembly resolution on Greece, and should make a prompt report to the members of the United Nations. This report should include a recommendation for the calling of a special session of the General Assembly. It might also include suggestions for interim action by the members. (For consideration by IS)

2. In line with arguments advanced by Foreign Minister Tsaldaris, Greece might declare that the act of recognition itself constituted a new aggression against Greece, and/or violation of the recommendations of the General Assembly, and request special action by the U.N. (For consideration by IS and LE)

3. What action might the UN take in response to the recommendations of the permanent Balkan Committee or the special request of the Greek Government? Should the United States seek to obtain such action through the General Assembly or through the Security Council? (For consideration by IS)

4. Could the Greek Government properly call for urgent assistance under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, pending action by one of the UN organs? (For consideration by IS)

5. In response to a Greek request for aid under Article 51 the United States might send American troops and naval units to Greece to give moral support to the Greek Government and people and to protect strategic points and relieve the Greek forces to that extent. (For consideration by SE and GTI)

6. Simultaneously, the United States might urge other nations members of the UN (excluding of course the USSR and satellites) to respond to the Greek request for help by sending troops to the extent of their ability. (For consideration by IS, SE, and GTI)

7. As one measure which might be taken through the UN, (point 3 above) the United States might seek to have the General Assembly condemn the act of recognition as contrary to the recommendations of the General Assembly, as a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Charter of the UN, or something of this sort. (For consideration by IS and LE)

8. Would it be desirable and practicable to invoke Article 106 of the UN Charter, either before, during, or after a meeting of the General Assembly? (For consideration by IS)

9. Could any action be taken under the terms of the peace treaty with Bulgaria, assuming that Bulgaria extended recognition to the rebel government? (For consideration by LE and SE)

10. In addition to or instead of the despatch of American armed forces to Greece the United States might increase its assistance to the Greek armed forces through the provision of supplies and equipment and funds to permit further increases in the size and effectiveness of the Greek forces. (For consideration by GTI)

1. Addressed to Walworth Barbour, Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs, Harding F. Bancroft, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, and Raymund T. Tingling, Assistant Legal Adviser for Military Affairs and Occupied Areas.