851s.00/10–1547
The Vice Consul at Tunis (Dumont) to the Secretary of State
No. 316
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy at Paris’ top secret despatch No. 9658,1 transmitting a summary and analysis of the French Foreign Office Policy Folder concerning the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, in submitting certain comments thereon that this Consulate General would like to make, as well as observations with regard to the recommendations made by the Embassy at the end of its despatch.
The first statement which it is thought justifies an observation is that given on Page 1 of the Embassy’s despatch, wherein it is stated that the French Government has now decided to break its way out of the impasse created in Morocco and Tunisia, to impose if necessary democratic reforms on the Sultan of Morocco, and to refuse to recall the deposed Moncef Bey to Tunis. The statement further adds that Moncef Bey is “identified locally with Destourian extremists”. Moncef Bey is, as a matter of fact, identified with every Destourian, Old and New, and is tremendously popular with the Moslem masses throughout Tunisia. While it is true that the popularity of Moncef has been built up to a large extent and is due very little to the personal appeal and personality of the exiled Bey (he was on the throne for less than twelve months), it cannot be fairly said that his return is demanded by extremists. As a matter of fact, the Old Destour Nationalist group is much more insistent upon his return than the New. For further [Page 721] reference in this connection please refer to the Consulate General’s restricted despatches No. 285 and 286, of September 8 and 9,2 respectively.
On Page 2 of the Embassy’s despatch, the statement is made that France is confident that she will be able to win over the overwhelming majority of the people in all social categories if she is given the time to implement her policies, etc., etc. To the reporting officer, this statement rings a familiar bell, for it recalls statements which he has heard now for five years from responsible French officials, both in Morocco and in Tunisia. “If given time” is a phrase which, when uttered by French officials in North Africa, should give pause for thought and reflection. The unhappy record shows that France has had time to carry out a good many substantial reforms in both Morocco and Tunisia. Since for example 1943 (when the Nationalist agitation in Morocco first took on serious proportions), she has accomplished little except to make pronouncements and to name commissions. A few lines further on Page 2, the statement is made that administrative schools are now being established in Tunis and Rabat, and that Moroccans and Tunisians will be admitted to the National School of Administration in Paris. General Mast announced in September, 1946, as a result of an important meeting of the North African Committee, that the National School of Administration in Paris would be open to Tunisians. Little if anything has been done on this score.
At the bottom of Page 2, the French reform program is described as an operation to be accomplished in two stages, first an immediate progressive program in order to prepare the two countries for self-government, and secondly the negotiation of new treaties to grant the two countries self-government within the French Union. Subsequently in the despatch details are given regarding the “immediate” program, but no further reference is made to French plans for the negotiation of new treaties. In this connection it is significant to point out that the Communists in this country and liberal newspaper elements believe that the time is ripe now for the negotiation of a new Franco-Tunisian treaty to replace the Protectorate Treaty.
On Page 3 the Policy Folder reveals that in 1945 the Council of Ministers began to participate in the preparation of further reforms. This statement is believed to be highly exaggerated. In 1945 there were four Tunisian Ministries—the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the Pen, the Ministry of Justice, and the newly created Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. What, if any, participation these Ministries effected was very small. The Prime Minister himself, Salah Eddine Baccouche, a personal friend of the reporting officer, did little [Page 722] or nothing. Even when proposed drafts of decrees were presented to him before submission to the Bey for sealing, the Prime Minister never really gave his opinion. He was a supernumerary, as were all of the other Ministers except perhaps for M’Zali, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare.
As for the reforms instituted in 1947, it is thought that there is much that is moot in the assertions made by the Foreign Office. On Page 3 the statement is made that the Prime Minister “has been given real responsibility and latitude in the selection of his Ministers”. The Tunis press, at the time of Mr. Kaak’s appointment, made a similar statement, but actually Mr. Kaak chose those Ministers who were satisfactory to the Secretary General3 and the Resident General. As for responsibility, his three-month incumbency thus far would indicate that he is directly responsible to the French, though by statute this responsibility is to His Highness the Bey. The Policy Folder also contains the statement that the Tunisians in 1947 have obtained four modern Ministries with “real” powers. It remains to be seen of course whether these powers are real or not. While it is true that the new Ministers do participate in discussions through constant meetings of the Cabinet Council, the Consulate General has learned that the Ministries are still directed and operated by the French Advisers, whose powers are so carefully prescribed by decree as to render them in effect the heads of the Ministries concerned. Reference in this connection is made to the Consulate General’s restricted despatches Nos. 273, 274, and 302, of August 26 and September 29.4 As reported to the Department, the increase in the number of Ministers, the reorganization of the Council of Ministers, and the establishment of a Cabinet Council, may prove to be reforms only if the personal equation is happily solved. In other words, only if the new Ministers and their Advisers can agree to work together compatibly will these reforms prove to be anything more than reforms on paper.
Also on Page 3 of the despatch the statement is made that the new Ministers are not French stooges as they have been heretofore. This observation likewise calls for some comment. The Consulate General’s view at this time is that these new Ministers are indeed stooges, and that they were finally chosen after a frantic period of search and consultation daily and hourly between Mr. Kaak and the Bey, the Secretary General and Pierre Chatenet, Director of the Resident’s Cabinet, only because other more capable persons could not be found. It was, of course, extremely difficult for the Residency General to select even conservative Destourian leaders such as Salah Farhat, because these persons were adamant in insisting upon the return of Moncef Bey [Page 723] before they would accept any portfolio. The Residency’s problems were and still are understood by this office, but the fact remains that the Ministers chosen were chosen because it was known that they would work with the French and would behave themselves as far as political activities were concerned.
It is considered extremely doubtful that the Destourian parties in Tunisia are prepared at this time to resort to the use of force in showing their displeasure over the new Kaak Ministry and the reforms recently effected in Tunisia. They will probably choose for the present peaceful means to register their complete opposition to the reforms thus effected. In asking for independence such persons as Salah Farhat and Salah Ben Youssef are asking for the moon of course, and they knew very well three months ago when they were in constant consultation with Resident General Mons on the subject of the new government, that they would not gain independence for a long time to come. They were prepared for this. But they did think that more thoroughgoing reforms would be carried out.
It is the view of this office that what Mr. Mons has accomplished is little more than to carry out reforms that were promised by General Mast. However, Jean Mons, who is a capable public official and a person for whom the reporting officer has indeed a personal fondness, is not the man for the immense task lying ahead in Tunisia. Either that or the Quai d’Orsay is so far out of touch with world changes that it cannot see the necessity of instituting a more radical program of reform in Tunisia. By and large liberal elements in this country, quite apart from Neo-Destour circles, believe that Mr. Mons made a great mistake in announcing publicly that his program of reforms would be far-reaching. Thus far what has actually happened is that three of the four Ministers have been thrown out of office, one of them kept, and two new Ministries formed. No prerogatives and no effective powers have been vested in these Ministers. The Secretary General remains the most powerful figure in the Tunisian Government, and his decision can be overruled only by the Resident General. People who like Mr. Mons and believe in his sincerity feel sorry for him, because he was sent to Tunis to do a small job and obliged to do a great deal of ballyhooing over it.
The reporting officer is convinced that the Foreign Office will never win over “the masses” to its program of reforms as carried out during this present calendar year and as envisaged in the immediate future, but, more important, it will not win over either the conservative Old Destour group or the Neo-Destours. It may not be necessary to do this, and the inability to do so need not necessarily call up the specter of revolt and riots in this country. Tunisia is by and large a country not too difficult to keep under peaceful control, . . . . It is certainly true [Page 724] that opposition to lawful authority could break out much more rapidly and prove a much greater menace to French control in Morocco than it could in this country, where the present military contingent is 12,000 troops and considered adequate to insure peace and security. But in this year 1947 the Nationalist elements have another weapon which they have learned how to use, and that is a labor group of growing proportions which is completely under their control. The bloody incidents occurring at Sfax August 5, 1947, bear ample evidence of the power of the Nationalists in Tunisia to completely halt the normal economic activity of this country and to disturb the peace. It is conceivable, then, that if the Nationalist elements in the future were to arrive at the conclusion that France had no intention of carrying out real reforms, they would resort to indirect measures which would have no other effect than to disturb the peace and perhaps result in death to a good many Europeans, with further resultant characteristic French measures of reprisal.
This office has one suggestion to make in connection with the recent North African Conference of American diplomatic and consular officers, and the Department’s proposal that the Embassy make overtures to the French Government whereby if the French presented a satisfactory reform program the United States would stand by it, and if necessary tell Nationalist circles in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia that we were behind it. It is hard to see how the United States Government could endorse the present and future program of reform for Tunisia (and this is quite apart from the question of establishing time tables) in view of its announced policy with regard to the necessity of preparing peoples throughout the world for self-government, for if we back up this program for Tunisia in particular, we can expect nothing else but to be accused, and with justice, of having deserted some of the fundamental principles for which we fought this last war. In making such an observation the reporting officer is not a whit unmindful of the fact that the Department of State has more than the North African problem per se considered, when it reaches some important conclusion regarding the three countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The growing power of Communism and the possibility that it may sweep over France is obviously the fundamental element which must enter into any decision regarding American policy in North Africa. On the other hand, the North African problem is not unrelated to the Communist problem either. The French of course are aware of our concern regarding the growth of Communism in North Africa, and undoubtedly they will not fail to take advantage of this knowledge in pointing out how the most effective way of checking Communism in North Africa is to insure the peace and security of [Page 725] this area. The French theory runs along the line that the more is offered to the Arabs the more is asked for, and if they are given an inch they will want an ell, until finally the point is reached where they want everything; that the Arabs mistake concessions for weakness (and here, of course, unfortunately, they are right). The only way to be sure that peace reigns in North Africa is to keep a strong hold over the Arabs. The demonstration of force alone, in the French view, can insure stability in North Africa, and if too many reforms are offered the invitation is thereby given, if not to revolt, at least to try to.… The only effective reform which will enable the Tunisian people to prepare for self-government must lie in a broad program of education. We learned this in the Philippines when, immediately upon their pacification, we sent two or three thousand school teachers to the Islands and began to pour money into the Islands to teach the natives from Bontok to Jolo the conceptions of democracy as we conceived it in America. We were fortunate because we had the money (which was spent in ever increasing sums from 1930 on to 1939) and we therefore had a great advantage over the French, who today lack the money to buy the land for schools, to erect the necessary buildings with modern facilities, to buy textbooks, and to pay for competent teachers. The French are thus handicapped, but it is thought that they will never be able to win over the Arab populations of North Africa to a feeling of friendship as we were able to in the Philippines—and as was so eloquently demonstrated by the fine patriotism shown by Filipinos during this last war—until they embark upon a sincere far-reaching program of education. This program is a program of immediacy. It requires money, or to be more specific, it requires dollars.
It is the recommendation of this officer that more stress be laid on the necessity of a wider extension of the educational reforms in Tunisia at any rate, and that if the American Government is to assume the role of custos morum in North Africa, if it is to back up a French program of reforms, such program should be drastically revised and include as one of its prime immediate objectives the establishment of a real program of education. The earmarking of any dollars allocated to Tunisia it is thought should be for the purpose of Moslem education.
The role of honest broker is a thankless role, and insult and injury as well as high praise may all be heaped upon our shoulders for whatever policy we embark upon with regard to the Moslems in North Africa and French policy in this area. Despite our deep concern lest Communism gain control of France, it is not thought that we should permit this immediate problem to cause us to shut our eyes to the far-reaching consequences which could result from the endorsement of a French program in Tunisia that now appears to be so limited in [Page 726] scope as to be irreconcilable to the democratic principles for which we stand.5
Respectfully yours,