881.00/10–2947
The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Plitt) to the Secretary of State
No. 748
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the French Foreign Office policy memorandum concerning reforms in North Africa transmitted with the Paris Embassy’s top secret despatch No. 9644 of September 19, 1947 and to offer the following comment on that portion of proposed French policy regarding the French Protectorate in Morocco.
While the appendices to the memorandum relating to Morocco supply an historical note and summaries of past and planned reforms, it may nevertheless be helpful before setting down the Legation’s observations on this subject to touch briefly on the background of the political situation and the problem which has developed therefrom in this area.
After pacification of the country by the force of arms and settling portions of it with the intent to transform Morocco into a modernly equipped country with adequate port facilities, construction of roads, bridges, railways, factories, the reclaiming of arid lands, and the extraction of mineral resources which brought a certain amount of wealth to the French who established themselves here, very little effort was made to instruct the native population with a view to bettering their living conditions and preparing them for active participation in the Government of the country. It is true that because of the general anarchy which is said to have reigned in Morocco at the time, priority had to be given to military action in order to establish order in the country without which the other plans could not be materialized. With the establishment of order and in the face of growing Moroccan demands for participation in Government and eventual autonomy, the French are now finding themselves in a situation which requires the initiation of drastic reforms to appease native aspirations and hampered by an uneducated population which, because of French neglect in fostering their social and civic development, is as yet unfit to assume large responsibilities. The French admit dereliction in this respect. Now, so much will have to be done in such little time that the French may encounter considerable difficulties in attempting to extricate themselves from their dilemma.
The existing problem in Morocco, which has recently assumed great importance as a result of the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter and subsequent contact with the democratic armed forces of the West which, in using Morocco as a springboard for the liberation of Europe, indirectly fostered Moroccan aspirations for autonomy, is how to satisfy the natives’ desires for liberty in the face on the one hand of the [Page 728] feudal conception of independence still cherished in upper class Moroccan circles, and on the other by French determination to protect their investments in blood, brawn and capital in this vast territory of still unexplored riches. Moroccan nationalists want nothing less than complete freedom which France is not ready to provide.
The Foreign Office policy memorandum referred to, when examined in the light of the foregoing, while indicating that the French Government is cognizant of its shortcomings and seemingly ready to apply a new régime in the Protectorate, can be criticized on general grounds as likely to fail to accomplish sufficient to meet a situation which is, to say the least, potentially critical.
In the Paris Embassy’s despatch under reference and in its despatch No. 9658 of September 23 a scholarly exposition of the proposed plan of the French Government has been made. The Legation agrees with much that the Embassy sets forth but cannot subscribe entirely to optimistic views that the already enacted reforms and those contemplated for application can be expected to solve the problem sufficiently well to lead to the orderly and progressive evolution of French Morocco. It is believed that this would be true even if “time tables” were given. The French policy statement might be specifically criticized on the following grounds:
- 1.
- In describing the functions of the Council of (Moroccan) Vizirs and (French) Directors, Appendix XV of the policy statement is very vague. There is no mention of powers or responsibilities of this body other than the meaningless statement that it will “study all governmental problems with an appeal to the Sovereign and to the Resident General only in the most important cases”. If indeed intelligent and enterprising Moroccan vizirs and delegates are to work side by side with French administrative directors, it is very likely that the former will learn something of the arts of government and administration. However, it is doubtful if much progress in this direction can be made unless these Moroccan officials are endowed with a specific grant of power and commensurate responsibility.
- 2.
- It would seem that in putting into effect the reform of the maghzen, referred to in the preceding paragraph, the French have foisted a number of undesired Morocan delegates upon the Sultan. It seems natural therefore that the Sultan should refuse to delegate any part of his sovereign authority to such a body, which he has reason to believe may act simply as a mouthpiece of the French who have as yet failed to give concrete evidence of their desire to bring about democratic reforms at an early date. (It will be recalled that last winter the Sultan attempted to effect a change in the method of selection of Moslem members of Tangier’s Legislative Assembly whereby they would be elected by various groups comprising the local Moslem community instead of being appointed by the Mendoub, on French orders, as at present. Owing to French intervention the plan failed completely. (See Legation’s despatches Nos. 471 and 477 of December [Page 729] 19 and 28, 1946.1) At the present time the Sultan is the only effective check against unlimited French encroachment upon Moroccan sovereignty. If the Sultan is to give up his remaining power—the right of veto—it seems reasonable that he should do so in favor of an executive body responsible to some type of electorate rather than to the French Resident General. (See in this connection page 2 of Consul Pasquet’s despatch No. 159 of June 30, 19472 in which the Sultan is alleged to have made such a proposal).
- 3.
- The proposed constitution of the Council of Government—65 French members, 65 native Moslems and 5 native Jews—gives the French an advantage out of all proportion to the relatively small number of French residents in Morocco. Considering that the Council is to be merely consultative, and not deliberative, in character, it would not seem unreasonable to expect the Moroccan element in it to be clearly predominant. The Council, composed as suggested in the French reform proposal, will seem to most Moroccan Moslems to be predominantly French, as the Jewish members may be expected to follow their traditional policy of making every effort to please the French. Thus the French could generally count upon a clear majority in the Council of Government.
- 4.
- Appendix XIX of the statement, entitled “Public Liberties”, makes it clear that in fact few public liberties are respected in Morocco. It is believed that if the French hope to gain the respect and confidence of Moroccans and some degree of cooperation in a reform program, the present strict control of the press must be relaxed and there must be liberalization of the present restrictions regarding public meetings. If freedom of the press and the right to assemble are denied Moroccans (they are not denied to French Communists in Morocco) there can be little progress toward democracy and independence.
- 5.
- Statistics regarding public instruction (see Appendix XX of the statement) are somewhat misleading and paint a rosy picture not justified by the facts. Almost half (30,000 out of a total of 84,064) the Moslem Moroccans stated to be attending schools are attending the “temporary country schools”. These schools (écoles foraines) are run on a purely voluntary basis by French colons or minor officials who endeavor, in a rather haphazard manner, to teach the bare rudiments of reading. As serious institutions of public education they can be almost entirely disregarded. Thus, according to French figures, a year ago just over 50,000 young Moslem Moroccans were attending serious schools in a country having a Moslem population of some 7,000,000. This is hardly a record of which the French, after 35 years in Morocco, should be proud. It is hoped that substantial progress will be made under the new school program as the political progress of Morocco depends fundamentally upon broadening the scope of education.
- While in theory the statement in Appendix XX regarding equality of opportunity to enter French lycées is true, it is believed that in practice obstacles are placed before Moroccans desiring to attend such schools.
- No mention is made in the policy statement regarding study of Moroccans abroad. Unless the French change their present policy, [Page 730] which virtually precludes the study of Moroccans in the United States even when such students do not draw upon French sources of dollar exchange, it will be difficult for objective observers to believe that the French are genuinely interested in educational progress in Morocco.
The position recently taken by the United States in regard to the situation in Palestine3 has not endeared Americans to Moroccans. Moscow, following its adherence to the recommendations of the majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, inherited an equal amount of censure. It was deplored in the Arabic press of Morocco (see Legation’s telegrams 257 and 259 of October 13 and 154) that on the rare occasions when the United States and Russia agreed on an important issue in the United Nations deliberations such agreement should prejudice Arab interests.
Until feeling in regard to this situation has subsided and a clearer picture can be seen of the extent to which the new French policy will actually evolve in favor of a better understanding with the Moroccans, I question the wisdom of initiating any approach by us to Moslem nationalist leaders and the Arab League in the sense of the recommendations made by the North African meeting in Paris last June. Rather than endorse a French reform program, whose acceptance by the Moroccans is uncertain and whose efficacy in achieving a successful democratic evolution of Morocco remains to be tested, may it not be more expedient to defer, at least for the moment, our proposed approach to Moroccan leaders?
Respectfully yours,