867N.01/6–1847: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iraq (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
259. [Here follows the Ambassador’s account of his discussion of the Palestine problem with Iraqi Prime Minister Jabur.]
I then told him, in sense Deptel 227, June 14 [12], of our concern lest discordant effect among Arab states of King Abdullah’s Greater Syrian agitation might result in weakening Near Eastern stability.
He commented that, so long as his Government held office and at present enjoyed full confidence overwhelming Parliamentary majority, we might rest assured Iraq would make no move whatsoever to support Abdullah’s ambitions. His policy was to strengthen Iraqi relations with both Arab and Saadabad countries and, he hoped, to facilitate coordination policies both groups.
Prime Minister spoke with seeming conviction and sincerity, adding expression personal disapproval Abdullah’s continuing activity. However, like Foreign Minister Jamali (reEmbtel 249, June 121) he admitted there were “some few here” who did not share his views. In context he could have meant only Regent and his intimates including Nuri.
Former Prime Minister Suwaidi with whom I also discussed matter, for I have known him many years and believe him among ablest Arab statesmen, expressed forthrightly view that Regent would support Abdullah’s scheming without counting cost to Arab unity.
[Page 750]Latter view is also held by well-informed Syrian Chargé Bakriz who reasons that, as Palace group well knows pursuance of its plans will greatly weaken Arab League, they must be specifically directed towards that end. He reasons further that, as Nuri’s 1943 plan for a Greater Syria in union with Iraq has failed because of Syria’s refusal to consider union with Trans Jordan under Abdullah, we now see Nuri approaching problem from new angle, namely by laying foundation for Iraq-Transjordan union which will later press for union with Syria.
Sent Department as 259; repeated Jidda and Tehran as 34, paraphrases mailed other Arab capitals and London.
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, above.↩