851G.00/1–847
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Mr. Acheson: Lacoste, Minister in the French Embassy, called this afternoon by appointment. He referred to your conversation of some two weeks ago with Ambassador Bonnet and to the Ambassador’s statement at the time that he would inform the French Government of our views and communicate back to us the views of the French Government.
Lacoste said he was under instructions to state that the French Government appreciated the understanding attitude that Mr. Acheson had shown in discussing the problem of Indochina; that it had taken note of Mr. Acheson’s offer of “good offices” and appreciated the spirit [Page 59] in which the offer was made; and that the French Government did not feel that it could avail itself of our offer but must continue to handle the situation single-handedly along the lines stated by Moutet. Lacoste went on to say that the principal objective of the French military was to restore order and reopen communications. He said that after this was done the French Government would be prepared to discuss matters with the Vietnamese. He said that the French Government had every intention of living up to the agreement of, last March 627 and the modus vivendi of September 15,28 once order was restored. I asked him whether he thought the French military could restore order within any foreseeable future time. He seemed to think, without much evidence of conviction, that they could.29
Mr. Lacoste then described to me at some length the acts of perfidy and cruelty on the part of the Vietnamese. He gave me detailed accounts of atrocities, etc., etc.
I expressed my sympathy for the French who had suffered in this manner. I then repeated to him that, although we had no ready-made solution for the Indochina problem, we were greatly concerned over it and continued ready to be helpful should an appropriate occasion arise. Speaking personally, I told him that I thought there was one flaw in the French approach to the problem worth mentioning. I had in mind an apparent assumption by the French that there was an equality of responsibility as between the French and the Vietnamese. I said that this did not seem to me to be the case; that the responsibility of France as a world power to achieve a solution of the problem was far greater than that of the Vietnamese; and that the situation was not one which could be localized as a purely French-Vietnamese one but might affect adversely conditions throughout Southeast Asia.
Mr. Lacoste quickly substituted the word “authority” for “responsibility” and said that the French were now faced with the problem of reasserting their authority and that we must share the responsibility for their delay in doing so because we had not acceded to French requests in the autumn of 1945 for material assistance. Seeing that I was more amused than impressed with his argument, he said that he fully understood what I was driving at and that he knew it was the earnest hope of the French Government to arrive at a peaceful solution for the Indochinese situation as soon as possible.
- See telegram 20, March 7, 1946, 7 p.m., from Saigon, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. viii, p. 32.↩
- See telegram 4671, September 17, 1946, 5 p.m., from Paris, ibid., p. 59.↩
- In reporting this interview in telegram 89, January 9, 3 p.m., to Paris, the Department said it hoped “this does not represent definitive crystallization Fr view that problem is purely internal. Less dangerous situations have been raised in SC in past.” (851G.00/1–947).↩