Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/135

Department of State Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the Third Session of the General Assembly ¹

confidential

[Washington,] August 24, 1948.

Report of the Interim Committee on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council

problem

The problem is to determine the United States position with respect to the Interim Committee Report and the statement to be made with respect to consultations among the permanent members.

recommendations

1. With the exception of the amended Argentinian resolution, which will be dealt with in recommendation 2, the United States should support adoption by the General Assembly of the conclusions and recommendations of the Interim Committee Report. However, the United States should be willing to acquiesce in modifications of certain items in the several categories of decisions in the event of a strong opposition by friendly states such as France and the United Kingdom who had reserved their position on a number of items in the Report.

2. The Argentinian Resolution which is set forth as Conclusion B of the Report is to the effect that the General Assembly should consider whether or not the time has arrived to call a general conference of the Members of the United Nations as provided for in Article 109 of the Charter to consider amendments to the Charter. The United States, while not opposing General Assembly discussion of this question, should take a strong position that the time has not arrived for the convocation of such a conference or for substantial amendments of the Charter and should attempt to keep discussions of this point at a minimum. It should so far as possible, however, let other delegations take the lead on this point.

3. With respect to consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council, as requested by the General Assembly resolution, the United States should state to the General Assembly that a consultation in fact took place before the commencement of the Interim Committee studies of the voting problem without any tangible results; that the consultation confirmed an urgent need for a systematic study and further discussion of the problem and that the door was left open for further consultations; that the United States believed that further consultations would have a greater chance of producing tangible results if based on General Assembly recommendations expressing the views of the overwhelming majority of the Members; and that accordingly it seemed appropriate that any further consultations be deferred until after General Assembly consideration of the results of this first comprehensive study of the problem as expressed in the Interim Committee Report.

Discussion

1. Conclusions of the Interim Committee Report.

The first conclusion of the Report is that the General Assembly recommend to the members of the Security Council that they deem as procedural on the basis of Charter interpretation, 36 of the possible decisions of the Security Council and that the “members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly.[”] This would apply to the positions which the members of the Security Council take on the question whether or not any of these items is procedural, in case this question is raised; to the manner in which any member of the Security Council, when acting as President, interprets the result of a vote on such a question; and, finally, to the manner in which the members of the Security Council vote if the ruling made by the President is challenged.”

This conclusion does not, however, take the further step of recommending that members of the Security Council, despite the opposition of one or more permanent members, regard as adopted a decision of the Security Council which receives the support of seven members without the concurrence of all the permanent members and which likewise is voted to be procedural by seven members without the concurrence of all the permanent members. In other words, the United States considers that the General Assembly recommendation does not require the United States to depart from the attitudes expressed in the Four Power Statement, particularly the provision that the preliminary question as to whether a decision not expressly covered by the Charter or the Statement itself, is procedural or non-procedural shall be decided by a non-procedural vote. It should be noted that the conclusion does not call for adoption of new Rules of Procedure for the Security Council.

These 36 decisions may all be deemed procedural under the Charter and within the definitions contained in the Four Power Statement and the United States has consistently taken this position whenever the question has arisen. The United States believes that it would be desirable by consultation among the permanent members, to secure agreement on the procedural nature of these decisions.

As indicated above, the procedural character of the decisions covered in the first conclusion is based exclusively on the interpretation of the Charter. The second conclusion of the Report, on the other hand, is based on a different criterion; under this conclusion the General Assembly would recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they agree that 21 of the possible decisions of the Security Council be adopted by the vote of any seven members regardless of whether the decisions are considered procedural or non-procedural. It is expressly pointed out in the Report that the recommendations with reference to these decisions should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the question whether or not these decisions are procedural or non-procedural.

The sole basis for the selection of the decisions included in this conclusion was the view that “if these decisions are taken by a vote of any seven members of the Council it would improve the functioning of the body and permit it, promptly and effectively, to fulfill its, responsibilities under the Charter”. These 21 decisions include the various decisions which the Security Council may make under Chapter VI of the Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and in connection with admission of States to membership in the United Nations. In most instances they would not be deemed procedural under the Four Power Statement. The Secretary of State has, however, on a number of occasions advocated the elimination of the veto on such decisions and the recent Senate resolution supports such a course.

It should be noted that the recommendation based on the first conclusion is directed to all members of the Security Council and if adopted it would be hoped that each member of the Security Council would act accordingly. The recommendation based on the second conclusion, on the other hand, is directed to the permanent members and will be put into effect only if these members agree to it. In the event of the failure of the permanent members to reach an agreement, these members will be free within the limits of the Charter to exercise their own judgment as to the vote which should govern any of the 21 decisions.

One of the 21 decisions contained in the second conclusion (No. 21) recommends elimination of the veto in connection with the decision to determine whether a matter is procedural. The United States believes that this is desirable in order to prevent the extension of the veto to fields where it was never intended to apply. However, as the United Kingdom and France opposed this item and Belgium, India, the Netherlands and Norway reserved their positions, the United States should acquiesce in the elimination of this decision from the list of decisions in this category if those nations press their opposition strongly and receive substantial support in the General Assembly. The deletion of this item would not constitute an affirmative General Assembly recommendation that the veto be retained in connection with such a decision.

This conclusion likewise recommends the elimination of the veto in connection with decisions relating to the establishment of the existence of a dispute and parties to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 3 which requires a party to a dispute to abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter relating to such disputes; it recommends also a definition of the term “dispute” designed so as to include most of the “situations” where there are parties. The United States believes that the elimination of the veto in this type of decision is necessary in order to give effect to the underlying principle of Article 27(3) that no state shall be a judge in its own cause, whether a dispute or situation, in connection with Security Council decisions relating to pacific settlement.^*

The third conclusion, which follows closely certain proposals of the United Kingdom, seeks to establish by agreement among the permanent members certain standards of conduct to be followed by them in dealing with matters brought before the Security Council and in the exercise of the veto.

The fourth conclusion is that the General Assembly recommend to the Members of the United Nations that in agreements conferring functions on the Security Council, such conditions of voting be provided within the body as would exclude the application of the principle of unanimity. This conclusion, which was based on a proposal of the representative of Belgium, refers to new Security Council functions not provided for in the Charter. It is in accord with a practice which developed in the League of Nations and might appropriately develop in the United Nations.

The United States supported both the third and fourth conclusions, which were not seriously disputed.

2. Amended Argentine Resolution (UN Document A/578, Part 4, Conclusion B)

The resolution of Argentina as amended by Colombia and approved by the Interim Committee reads as follows:

“The Interim Committee recommends to the third regular session’ of the General Assembly to consider whether the time has come or not to call a general conference as provided for in Article 109 of the Charter.”^†

Argentina also placed on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly a separate item relating to this subject which reads as follows:

“Convocation of a General Conference under Article 109 of the Charter in order to study the question of the veto in the Security Council.”

While it is entirely appropriate for the General Assembly to discuss this question, the United States should take a strong position that the time has not yet arrived for the convocation of such a conference and should press for keeping the discussions to a minimum. The chief reasons for this position are:

(a) The United States believes that the period during which the United Nations has thus far operated under the present Charter is too brief and the experience too limited to warrant the institution of an amending procedure.

(b) The United States believes that the present Interim Committee conclusions may be implemented without Charter amendment, but would not object to a Charter amendment on this subject. Therefore the chief purpose of a Charter amendment would be to secure liberalization of the voting procedure beyond that contained in the Interim Committee conclusions. It is unreasonable to suppose that an attempt to amend the Charter to accomplish such a result would be acceptable to all of the permanent members, and in the absence of ratification by all permanent members, the Charter amendment could not take effect. Even if ratification of a proposed Charter amendment could be obtained, the amendment procedure would have the additional disadvantage of “freezing” the situation with little prospect for further liberalization.

(c) Argentina has repeatedly indicated that if a conference is called and an amendment adopted by ⅔ of the Members of the United Nations, it should be put into effect regardless of the Soviet refusal to ratify it. This might be seized upon as an occasion for forcing the USSR out of the United Nations.

3. Consultation Among the Permanent Members.

The General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1947 requested consultation among the permanent members, “in order to secure agreement on measures to assure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions”. One such consultation actually took place on January 11 [19?], 1948 without any tangible results. The consultation confirmed not only the reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to modify its position on the veto but disclosed also a very serious disagreement among the United States and China on the one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other on such issues as the desirability of eliminating the veto in decisions under Chapter VI. The results of this consultation further confirmed the need for a thorough comprehensive study of the problem and for a continued discussion designed to bring the positions of the individual members as close to each other as possible. Despite the absence of concrete results from the single consultation, the door was left open for further consultations.

While it was agreed that no announcement would be made at the time of the consultations, nevertheless, it was recognized that it might be necessary to refer to the fact that such consultations had taken place, and Ambassador Austin, in his statement to the House Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 1948,² found it desirable to make such an announcement. Under these circumstances it is appropriate for the United States to make a statement along the lines of recommendation 3.

The Interim Committee has now completed the comprehensive study of the Security Council voting problem. The most important conclusions of the Interim Committee Report are directed towards consultation among the permanent members on certain specific matters. A General Assembly recommendation based on this first comprehensive study of the problem ever made in the United Nations and reflecting an authoritative expression of the views of an overwhelming majority of the Members would serve as a more effective basis for further consultations among the permanent members. For these reasons the United States believes that such further consultations would be more likely to produce tangible results after the adoption of the General Assembly recommendations rather than before and no attempt was made to arrange for additional consultations.

As indicated above, two of the permanent members, France and the United Kingdom, reserved their position on a number of items contained in the Interim Committee Report. It might be advisable for the United States to initiate without delay further conversations with the representatives of France and the United Kingdom with a view to Obtaining agreement on such items in the Report on which the three powers still disagree.^‡ For this purpose it might become necessary for the United States to agree to the elimination of at least some controverisial items from the conclusions of the Report without of course abandoning its basic position.

It might further be desirable for the United States to suggest to France, the United Kingdom and China that informal talks with the U.S.S.R. might be initiated at an early stage on the basis of the Interim Committee paper. These talks should be designed to obtain an agreement by the U.S.S.R. to future consultations among permanent members. If such an agreement could be obtained, its announcement in the General Assembly would be of considerable assistance to the opponents of the Argentinian resolution for the convocation of a General Conference. This argument might be effectively used in conversations with the Soviet Union.

1. The General Assembly was scheduled to convene at Paris on September 21. A detailed “Comment Paper” (document SD/A/C.1/136, Aug. 24, 1948), not printed, supplemented this position paper.
2. For amplification, see “Technical Aspects of Proposals for Liberalized Interpretation of Article 27” (document SD/A/C.1/38; SD/S/668A), included in position papers on voting in the Security Council for second half of first session of the General Assembly; Speech of Senator Connally before Committee I. November 15, 1946. [Footnote in the source text; see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, footnotes 53, 58, and 14, pp. 286, 290, and 340, respectively.]
3. It may well be argued that in approving the resolution calling for “a general conference as provided for in Article 109 of the Charter” without limiting the resolution to such provisions of the Charter as deal with the voting procedure of the Security Council, the Interim Committee acted ultra vires. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. See footnote 11, p. 28.
3. If feasible, the Representative of China should participate in the discussions. [Footnote in the source text.]