Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

Department of State Atomic Energy Files¹

Minutes of Meeting at the Department of State, April 2, 1948, 4 p. m.

April 2, 1948, 4 p.m.

top secret

Subject: International Control of Atomic Energy

Those present:	U—	Mr. Lovett2
	U—	Mr. Gullion3
	C—	Mr. Bohlen4
	EUR—	Mr. Hickerson5
	UNA—	Mr. Rusk
		Mr. Blaisdell
		Mr. H. C. Johnson (IS)
	NEA—	Mr. Wright6
	USUN—	Mr. Osborn
		Mr. Arneson7

Mr. Rusk outlined the program to be followed in the United Nations between now and December 1, on the question of international control of atomic energy.⁸ The Third Report will be submitted to the Security Council and the matter will be discussed by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Mr. Rusk stated that the Third Report would recommend that until such time as the sponsors of the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946,⁹ find through prior consultation that there exists a basis for negotiations on international control of atomic energy and so report to the General Assembly, negotiations in Atomic Energy Commission should be deferred. He indicated that there was general agreement that during the Security Council and General Assembly consideration there should be no AEC activities. He indicated that it appeared to UNA that substantial work should be done during this period:

a. to fill out the Baruch proposals;

b. to determine whether these proposals require all or not all the Governments;

c. to examine alternative defense arrangements, and

d. to investigate other major weapons of mass destruction, particularly B.W.

He indicated that UNA hopes to leave open at this time the question as to what will be done after December 1. To take the initiative now in stopping and accepting an arms race puts us under an unnecessary political handicap.

Mr. Lovett stated that all countries involved were absolutely in accord on the procedure. He was concerned that there is any doubt that we have reached the end of the road. The time had come to be frank and he felt the time had come to stop.

Mr. Rusk read Mr. Lovett’s memorandum of March 12,¹⁰ which stated that the Third Report should leave “a loophole for renewal of discussions in the unlikely event that there should be significant new proposals or concessions on the, part of governments of the majority, or of the Soviet Union”. He stated that UNA wanted to be sure to leave this loophole. Mr. Lovett replied that he wanted to reserve only the United States right to re-open.

Mr. Rusk indicated that we had looked at no other alternatives and that we might wish to have UN support other arrangements.

Mr. Lovett replied that if we say we are through, that does not prevent us from re-opening the question but the others should not be given the opportunity to do so.

In response to a request from Mr. Lovett Mr. Osborn indicated that we must call off negotiations on the broadest possible basis until the Soviets give some indication of the change in their position, but that this must be done in such a way as to indicate that we are not taking the problem out of the UN.

Mr. Rusk indicated the desire to leave the greatest flexibility. The U.S. might wish to have UN back some sort of alliance. Mr. Gullion indicated that this would not be done in AEG. Mr. Rusk replied that AEG was established to consider atomic energy on the broadest possible basis. Mr. Lovett felt that this would not apply to an alliance.

Mr. Rusk referred to material proposed for inclusion in the Third Report (Appendix “A”), and expressed the hope that everyone should agree upon what it means. In his view, if later studies indicate that we wish to take some additional steps in this field in the UN, this should not be foreclosed, Mr. Lovett replied that the loophole is for the U.S., not for others.

Mr. Rusk referred to the minutes of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, September 11, 1947,¹¹ in which the three secretaries agreed that, “It was also the sense of the discussion that the U.S. take no initiative at this juncture in the UNAEC, in the Security Council, or in the General Assembly, to terminate negotiations looking toward international control of atomic energy. We should, however, review our whole position in view of the situation arising out of failure to reach agreement in UNAEC thus far, particularly with respect to our defense plans and our atomic energy relationship with Great Britain and Canada.” He also referred to Secretary Marshall’s statement at this meeting: “That it appeared certain that we should not break off negotiations in the UNAEC until we have considered and decided our position following the break off.” Mr. Rusk expressed the view that we should not break off one thing until we know where we are He was worried about a flat break-off. Mr. Lovett replied that the situation referred to by General Marshall had been taken care of by a continuing arrangement with the United Kingdom and Canada.¹² Mr. Lovett felt that the position paper should indicate a clear decision.

Mr. Rusk stated that there was no question of dissolving the AEC or withdrawing the United States offer. Mr. Lovett indicated that no mention should be made of withdrawal. However, it was his view that Congress would not authorize the making of the offer today.

Mr. Rusk indicated that the U.S. Government’s work on the Baruch: proposal on international control should not be suspended. Mr. Lovett indicated that he did not object.

Mr. Gullion pointed out that it was dangerous to discuss stages. Mr. Hickerson agreed and Mr. Lovett indicated that we could not do that.

Mr. Lovett indicated that others should take the initiative rather than the United States.

Mr. Lovett asked what the advantage was of paragraph 2 of the Appendix. Mr. Osborn indicated that the General Assembly should debate the question of atomic energy with a specific purpose in mind and that this recommendation provided such a purpose. Mr. Lovett was: fearful of the open-end offer of this paragraph and asked why it might not be omitted. Mr. Osborn replied that others feel that it would lay us open to a charge of calling off, and that by this formula we can more effectively sell our position that negotiations be moved to a higher level.

Mr. Hickerson expressed concern that winding up at this time in connection with other contemplated actions, might have an unusual effect, and might enable Communists to say this was an atomic alliance-Mr. Gullion replied that this would be a good effect. Mr. Hickerson indicated that the paragraph would help.

Mr. Rusk indicated that the paragraph would be very important in convincing people that we want to continue negotiations whenever there is a basis. Mr. Gullion feared that it might be interpreted as indicating that we wished to continue negotiations. Mr. Rusk replied that we never want to close and lock the door.

Mr. Blaisdell interpreted paragraph 2 of the Appendix as requiring agreement of all sponsors. Mr. Rusk indicated that it was not necessary to decide this at this time. Mr. Arneson and Mr. Hickerson expressed the view that the paragraph in question contemplated agreement by all sponsoring governments. Mr. Rusk stated that we should not create another veto. Mr. Lovett agreed with Messrs. Arneson and Hickerson and asked that the policy paper be brought in line with this.¹³

Mr. Lovett said the paper should be cleared with Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Bohlen asked when this decision might be announced. Mr. Osborn replied “next week or the week after”.

Mr. Rusk indicated that UNA would take the initiative in making studies mentioned by him at the opening of the meeting.

Action:

There was general approval of the Appendix.

Appendix “A”

In the course of nearly two years of negotiation and study the Governments of the majority have agreed on the principles essential to any fully effective system of international control of atomic energy. The Commission has been unable to secure Soviet agreement to even the essential elements of such a system. The Commission has not found any willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to accept the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission.¹⁴ Failure to achieve agreement on these matters has created a situation that is beyond the competence of this Commission. Until this situation is resolved, the Commission concludes that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the Commission level.

The Commission therefore recommends that until such time as the sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of January, 24, 1946 (Canada, China, France, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and United States) find, through prior consultation, that there exists a basis for negotiations on the international control of atomic energy and so report to the General Assembly, negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission should be deferred.

In accordance with its terms of reference, the Atomic Energy Commission reports this evaluation of the situation and its recommendations., thereon to the Security Council for its consideration and transmittal, along with the two previous reports of the Commission, to the next regular session of the General Assembly as a matter of special concern.

1. Lot 57D688, the consolidated lot file on atomic energy, 1944–1962, located in the Department of State, including the records of the office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for atomic energy policy and the records the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
2. Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State.
3. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (for atomic energy policy).
4. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State.
5. John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs.
6. Edwin M. Wright, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
7. R. Gordon Arneson, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
8. For information regarding previous negotiations on this subject, see memorandum RAC D–30/1a, April 9, 1948, infra.
9. For text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions, p.9
10. In the memorandum under reference, in which he had approved an antecedent draft of document RAC D–30/1a, Lovett stated the following:

    … I want to make clear that I know of nothing in the evolution of the atomic energy debate in the United Nations or in the development of the world political situation which would indicate that there is any useful purpose in continuing discussions on their present terms of reference at the AEC level. I believe, therefore, that the Third Report should make this as clear as possible, while leaving a loophole for renewal of discussion in the unlikely event that there should be significant new proposals or concessions on the part of the governments of the majority, or of the Soviet Union and Poland, This saving clause should not be dwelt on or emphasized in such a manner as to dilute the definitive character of the report.

    Moreover, while I agree that we do not at this time want to bind ourselves absolutely to discuss the matter in the General Assembly, it should certainly be our decision in principle to do so. … (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

11. For the pertinent portion of the text of the minutes, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, p. 838.
12. Documentation on the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom and Canada in regard to atomic energy is scheduled for publication in part 2 of the present volume; see also Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, pp. 781 ff., passim.
13. The policy paper under reference is RAC D–30/1a, infra.
14. For text of the First Report, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council (1946). For text of the Second Report, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947 (hereafter cited as AEC, 2nd yr., Special Suppl.).