740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–1348: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
1827. Eyes Only for the Secretary. I met this morning with my British and French colleagues to review last night’s talk with Molotov and estimate situation.
We all agree that the central issue with which we must deal from here on, and on which we must have clear and agreed instructions from our respective governments is that of the London decisions. In our view, Stalin and Molotov will play further talks toward final concession from us, or alternatively toward a final break, on this issue.
On the whole, we believe that the outlook for the discussions in Berlin is favored by the fact that this issue is still disagreed and by the firm stand we have taken on it, particularly in last night’s talk. While aware of hazards of prognostication when dealing with Russians, we see as likely course of events one or combination of following:
- (1)
- Talks in Berlin will progress favorably except for one or two essential points on which Soviet military authorities will be adamant. These will therefore have to be referred to Moscow, probably during course of week, and Molotov will attempt to trade them off in return for communiqué statement on London decisions.
- (2)
- Talks in Berlin will proceed to satisfactory conclusion with no major hitches and acceptable report submitted to four governments. Kremlin will refuse to approve, however, or to agree to communiqué unless we include therein statement on London decisions. Talks would then break down on this issue, and Soviet Government would be in favorable position to charge that in spite their demonstrated readiness compromise we had insisted on pursuing course of splitting Germany.
We are inclined to believe Molotov has made a serious tactical error in indicating to us in advance the formula which he would accept on the London decisions for inclusion in communiqué (mytel 1777, August 271), i.e. first part of text we proposed to Stalin (Deptel 1008, August 242) ending with words “did not preclude such agreement”.
Consequently, if this formula can be considered satisfactory by our governments, as we believe it should, we are in a favorable position. If we see Molotov during the coming week, as seems likely (as per numbered paragraph one above), and he raises question London decisions, we could simply inform him, without committing ourselves, that this matter is under serious consideration by our governments, indicating we were hopeful of favorable decision but that our governments could of course not reach a final decision on this matter until the outcome of the Berlin discussions was known. And if and when satisfactory agreement was reached in Berlin (on lines suggested above) we would then be able, after agreeing on approval Berlin finance arrangements, also to agree on terms final communiqué and prevent further wrangling by taking latter with Molotov’s own proposed language.
As to acceptability of Molotov’s formula, we have restudied this carefully and strongly recommend it be approved. It is certainly less desirable from our point of view than our own language specifically refusing any postponement implementation London decisions, but there has never been any possibility of securing Soviet agreement to our language either as part of communiqué or as separate document.
While inclusion of reference to London decisions was initially Soviet proposal, acceptance of which by us may be considered as being a concession, fact remains that this has now become the central issue. At this stage, insistence on our own language (Deptel 1009, August 24) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis might well constitute a breaking issue favorable to Soviet Government.
Molotov’s formula seems to us in many respects better, i.e. less compromising and less subject to misinterpretation, than our original statement which has been officially recorded and is available to the Kremlin for propaganda use. Certainly Soviet propaganda will exploit any possible misinterpretation of Molotov’s formula or any other, and as we know from sad experience, they are quite capable of distorting even language which we regard as air-tight. We must simply be prepared to meet this by propagandizing our own interpretation, and of course the visible demonstration going on in Western Germany that the implementation of the London decisions has not in fact been either delayed or postponed is unchallengeable.
[Page 1099]Please consider urgently and instruct soonest.
Sent Department 1827; Department pass Berlin 360, Eyes Only for Murphy and Clay; Paris 301, Eyes Only for Caffery; London 189, Eyes Only for Douglas.