Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3048

Record of Teletype Conference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret

Washington, September 4, 1948—11 a. m.
London, September 4, 1948—4 p. m.

Conferees

Washington	London
Under Secretary Robert Lovett	Ambassador Douglas
Mr. Samuel Reber	Mr. Mallory Browne
Mr. Charles Bohlen	Mr. Gerald Keith
Mr. J. D. Beam	Mr. Linebaugh
Mr. J. D. Hickerson	Mr. Stebbins

from washington

Subject 1.

1. Sokolovsky’s attempt yesterday to go back completely on the entire understanding concerning restrictions of surface traffic and his reference to new regulations for air traffic require, in our opinion, immediate reference to Moscow, together with his disavowal of the understanding given by Stalin and Molotov concerning the financial commission and bank. We feel that these two blatant renunciations of the foundation of the understanding from our point of view are so gross as to indicate that the Soviet Government has given Sokolovsky special instructions probably designed to produce a break in Berlin.

2. We feel reference to Moscow should be in accordance with the following procedure:

(a) The Governors should continue in Berlin to discuss other points of the directive in order to avoid the publicity which would attend a suspension of their meetings.

(b) The continuance of meetings in Berlin would permit the Soviet Government to issue new instructions to Sokolovsky to adhere to original Moscow understanding.

(c) We feel that the three representatives should call on Molotov and draw his attention in strongest terms, citing Stalin’s remarks, et cetera, to the complete rejection of these understandings by Sokolovsky in Berlin. They should insist that Sokolovsky receive new instructions to adhere to the understanding reached at Moscow.

3. In the event that Molotov refuses or is evasive and no new instructions go to Sokolovsky, the breakdown in fact has occurred and we feel we should follow up immediately with a written communication to the Soviet Government briefly recounting the understandings reached in Moscow, citing Stalin’s and Molotov’s statements on the two main points at issue, stating that it is obvious the Soviet Government has no intention of honoring the agreement reached, and ending with the statement of our intention in the circumstances of referring the Soviet actions in Berlin to the appropriate organ of the United Nations.

4. We feel that the bad faith displayed, plus the denial of rights, and the evident attempts to exercise duress through demonstrations, et cetera, constitute the soundest background for our case before the Security Council.

london

Subject 1.

I have had a brief discussion with Strang in regard to your subject 1. As you know when the fundamental question of principle developed in Berlin, namely, the powers of the international commission over the Berlin bank of emission the British felt that we should promptly have taken the matter to Moscow. This, they felt, was not a matter in which the Military Governors were under the directive to negotiate but rather one which they were to implement. Since Sokolovsky repudiated the principle which had been agreed to in Moscow the British felt there should have been a call to the Soviet Government then. Subsequently, however, the British yielded to our persuasions and agreed that it was probably as well to run over the whole field in Berlin before going back to Moscow. This, as it was reported to them from Berlin and Moscow, appeared to be our position. It was implied in your cable to Smith on this point.² Bevin is away although he can be reached by scrambler. Strang is not prepared to agree to a fundamental change of policy without consultation with Bevin. Strang said that in reviewing the developments in Berlin this morning with Bevin the latter was disposed to adhere to the policy which we had implicitly taken and to which he had been persuaded. At that time of course Bevin was unaware of the change in the modification of our policy. The best I can therefore do at the moment is to go over the matter in greater detail with Strang so that he can discuss it fully with Bevin. I will communicate with you again later. Do you want this further communication from me today?

washington

Subject 2.

Procedure envisaged in our subject 1 would not apply of course if Sokolovsky at today’s meeting recedes from position taken last night.

london

Subject 2.

As an addition to the procedure which is outlined in your subject 1 as modified by your subject 2, I put forward the following suggestions:

That the Military Governors be instructed to call Sokolovsky’s attention to the two fundamental points of principle which Sokolovsky has apparently repudiated (a) the power of the financial commission over the German bank of emission and (b) the removal of restrictions on all communications between Berlin and the Western Zones. As to (a) the conversation with Stalin is ample confirmation of the Soviet Government’s acceptance of the principle. As to (b) the record of conversations in Moscow made it clear that it was agreed that the restrictions on transportation and communication, etc., as to which restrictions would be removed was prior to June 18.

That they say to Sokolovsky these two fundamentals were agreed to at Moscow and were incorporated in the directive to them and that they are not appropriate subjects for negotiation among the Military Governors but that they are principles to be implemented by the Military Governors.

That the three Military Governors put the question bluntly to Sokolovsky whether he proposes to accept these two principles and to negotiate as to their implementation or whether he proposes to continue to deny them.

If Sokolovsky’s reply is in the latter sense then the Military Governors of the Western Powers might respond to the effect that they are not authorized to discuss principles. They must still continue, however, to discuss the implementation of other matters in the directive.

We can then, depending upon the substance of Sokolovsky’s reply, take up these two questions in Moscow or not as the case may be.

The only point in your analysis about which I have some doubt is that it is not clear that Sokolovsky has instructions designed to produce a break in Berlin. He may merely be trying to push us. We should, I think, be careful not to act upon a presumption but rather only on demonstrable facts. This is the reason for the suggestion which I put forward above. If followed, we can determine as a fact whether Sokolovsky is prepared to accept the two basic principles and to negotiate as to their implementation or whether he is not.

Further re your suggestion 1:

Paragraph 2 (c) and paragraph 3, I presume your reference to new instructions to Sokolovsky means a clarification to bring his action into accord with the Moscow agreement. I did not suggest that the two basic questions be discussed further with Sokolovsky. Quite the contrary. I realized that the three Military Governors of the Western Powers challenged Sokolovsky’s position but I did not find in the record of the proceedings in Berlin either (a) that they put the question which I suggested clearly and unmistakably to Sokolovsky or (b) that they told Sokolovsky with equal clarity and bluntness that these two matters were not subjects for negotiation among the Military Governors, since they were principles which had been agreed to in Moscow but, were before them rather, solely for the purpose of implementation. They approach (b) in the language which they used as it was reported but they did not state it unmistakably.

washington

Subject 3.

In view of present situation in Paris³ we assume the best way to coordinate with French would be through Massigli.

london

I agree completely with the analysis of the proceedings so far in Berlin and with the procedure which you have outlined in subject 1 qualified by your subject 2.

While this is being sent to you I will talk with Strang. Please wait a few minutes until I have discussed the situation.

As to your subject 3 I think it is preferable to coordinate with the French through Massigli here if you concur.

Strang agrees that the coordination with the French can best be achieved through Massigli here.

washington

Subject 4.

We had not intended to preclude possibility of going to Moscow during Berlin talks but had not intended to—had not wished to go only on the first sign of disagreement as we anticipated other major points of difference would come up.

However Sokolovsky’s repudiation of the agreement on lifting blockade restrictions is so gross a violation of the agreed directive that we now believe both fundamental points should be called directly to Molotov’s attention particularly since our entire objective was to secure lifting of blockade and we only agreed to discussion of currency to obtain a practical solution. If Soviets won’t lift blockade as Stalin specifically agreed there is little value in discussing other points except for tactical reasons in Berlin to permit major issues to be met in Moscow which in our opinion is most important.

Subject 5.

Reference your addition to our suggested procedures we do not consider that in view of Sokolovsky’s repudiation of the two basic issues, they should be discussed further with him. See instruction to Clay—Army’s Warx 88764, repeated to you through Military attaché.⁴

Replying to your comments re: Sokolovsky, Military Governors have already challenged his position and very bluntly. Further attempts to debate in Berlin may give Sokolovsky chance to engineer break.

Subject 6.

Please get British and French views and reply urgently as soon as possible.

That is all here.

Subject 7.

The only demonstrable fact is that Sokolovsky has repudiated the Moscow agreement on lifting the blockade—unless he has shifted his position today when Clay was to challenge his previous statements and to refuse to discuss blockade on this basis.

london

Subject 3.

As to the United Nations in your suggested procedure, the British have agreed, in the event of a break, to submit the issue to the appropriate organ of the United Nations. They are, I think, more favorably disposed to the Security Council now than they were before my last discussion with them.

The French never agreed to submit the issue in the event of a break to the appropriate organ of the United Nations. They merely committed themselves to consider the submission of the issue to the United Nations. Even if there were a government in France that could make a decision on this question, and it would take several days to persuade the French not only to go to the United Nations but to the Security Council, there is no government in France or at least there was not this morning. Indeed, my information indicates that Schuman after experiencing difficulties in forming a cabinet has told Auriol that he either is unable to form a government or wishes to be relieved of the responsibility for forming one. When a government may be formed in France is hard to tell. After it has been formed, when it will be able to make a decision on this question, is still another matter.

Hold on, please, more coming.

Your subject 7

I have just received through the Military attaché a copy of the Army’s instructions to Clay. If I read them correctly they, in effect, instruct him to do precisely what I was suggesting. I doubt, however, if they would have been received in time for him to follow them today.

Nothing further here but do not look for any agreement on the United Nations or Security Council from the French in any great haste. I think I may have made real progress with Massigli at the last meeting.

washington

Subject 8.

Re—your comments on new instructions to Sokolovsky—yes. Our purpose is to bring his instructions in line with directive.

Nothing further here.

Pending report of today’s meeting in Berlin, believe we have covered all ground possible now. We hope you can persuade British to accept procedure outlined at beginning of conference, at least as to first step of reference to Moscow. Please let us know British views urgently. Lovett has gone on—and other Conferees have to leave. Unless you have question requiring immediate answer, further comments could be cabled.

Nothing further here.

london

Subject 4.

In view of Bevin’s absence and the fact that Massigli is out of town for the evening, do not expect anything from me before tomorrow morning London time. That’s all.

1. The precise sequence of the transmissions in the source text has not been followed. Instead, the transmissions from Washington have been followed, where possible, with the appropriate responses from Embassy London.
2. The reference here is to telegram 1050, September 2, to Moscow, p. 1104.
3. The reference here is presumably to the current French cabinet crisis.
4. Not printed; see footnote 4 to message CC–5804, supra, for a summary of these instructions.