Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

top secret   us urgent
niact

Washington, September 8, 1948—8 p. m.

1081. To assist Douglas in preparation with Brit and French of aide-mémoire for presentation to Molotov we sent following in telecon² with London today:

“Following for background info on our thinking:

Sokolovsky’s partial retreat on surface communications has blurred the clarity of that basic issue and thereby made it more difficult to obtain the necessary safeguards from the Sov Govt on this basis of Sokolovsky’s attitude in Berlin alone. We are disturbed by tendency to regard Sokolovsky’s slightly less blatant repudiation of the agreement on lifting the blockade as a ‘concession to our point of view’.

We have tried to work out a practical solution through the agreed directive plus Stalin’s confirmation of our interpretation without meeting head on fundamental issue of rights. This has been to date visibly a failure and it seems clear now that no clarification on specific points in directive will solve the problem. Sov actions in Berlin make this plain if nothing else does.

It seems to us that we either accept Sov delaying tactics and start a new round of fruitless talks while Sovs proceed to take over city Govt or we face squarely up to fundamental question of rights. We therefore feel very strongly that time has come to get back to fundamentals. The main points of disagreement seem to be generally as outlined your 4008³ with minor modifications. All these, however, derive directly from the position of the Sovs that we have lost our juridical rights in Berlin. We do not accept this view and we have consistently asserted our co-equal rights as victors and by agreements among Four Powers. The time has come therefore to recognize that all the troubles stem from this wide open difference and we are convinced that we must now insist that the Sovs recognize these rights.

Consequently we want to stop yielding to the obvious delaying tactics and the manifest bad faith being shown and demand an admission of our co-equal status by appropriate clarification of the directive.

We will give our views on the procedure and approach in a few minutes. Above is for info.

1. As to procedure we suggest as first step that the three western reps should present aide-mémoire containing following points:

(A) It should be made clear that unless directive clearly reflects the objectives we had in mind and the understanding reached with Stalin, it has been shown that the Mil Govs have an impossible task. Therefore we feel the directive ought to be amended to cover three points: (a) that all restrictions should be lifted as of Mar 31 (Sokolovsky has only agreed to a partial lifting of surface transport restrictions and has called for new restrictions on air and water transport); (b) the powers of the finance commission to control the operation in Berlin of the German bank of emission, which could be accomplished by re-insertion of ‘under the control of the finance commission’ in the penultimate para and (c) protection against unilateral Sov control of trade. This point should be mentioned in aide-mémoire.

(B) The aide-mémoire should also refer to the fact that the Sovs have not only permitted but have intervened to assist minority groups to disrupt with violence the orderly functioning of the duly elected city administration, thus violating previous agreements.

2. In the event that Molotov refuses to amend directive or attempts to bargain on these points the three western reps should state that it is obvious that as long as the fundamental question of the co-equal rights in Berlin remains in dispute no real basis exists for a practical solution of the Berlin situation. They should inquire whether the Sov Govt recognizes that we are in Berlin by right and therefore have coequal rights, duties and obligation in regard to the administration of the city. If Molotov indicates that the position of the Sov Union remains unchanged then the three western reps will state they have to report accordingly to their Govts.

If the procedure just sent you is acceptable we feel the approach should be made to Molotov. To go to Stalin would almost certainly inaugurate a new round of discussions in Moscow revolving around the same old points and approach to Stalin only preferable when informal discussion would be useful. Presentation of written communication is best done to Molotov rather than Stalin. Classic Sov tactic is to be absolutely adamant up to and including Molotov’s level in the confident belief that the west will come to plead with Stalin and thus afford the opportunity for further bargaining on points which should already have been agreed.

In the event that this approach to Moscow fails to produce any results and three reps report back to their Govts, we would then favor sending parallel communications from the three Govts including reference to placing matters before UN. Reber is bringing rough draft of such a note when he leaves this afternoon.⁴

In para 1(A) above we referred to need for clarification of objectives in the directive. In this connection we used the expression ‘directive ought to be amended to cover three points’. What we have in mind is not technically an amendment but the issuance of agreed written instructions clarifying the intent and objectives of the present directive. This could be done either by the issuance of agreed Four-Power instructions to the Mil Govs along the lines we outlined or, if the Brit and French consider preferable, the language in the directive itself could be re-worked. We point out, however, that the directive is an agreed document and that attempting to re-work it may give Molotov opportunity to claim we are going back on our undertaking. Our main point is that the instructions as to specific points raised must be clarified in some form in writing, as we have seen in Berlin that oral statements, even from Stalin, have not been sufficient to bring Russians into line.”⁵

Marshall

1. Repeated to Paris as 3509 and Berlin as 1596.
2. Not printed; the transcript of this telecon is in file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–3018).
3. Not printed; in it Douglas listed three main points of disagreement: the powers of the financial commission, Soviet insistence on the control of trade by Soviet authorities, and Soviet insistence on restricting air transport (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–848).
4. Not found in Department of State files. Following the failure of the Military Governors in Berlin to reach agreement, the United States, United Kingdom and France worked on the text of a final note to the Soviet Government. The coordination of the various drafts was done by Strang, Massigli and Douglas in London, ad referendum, to their respective Governments. The texts of the various drafts and related documentation are in file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–848 through 9–2648. The text of the final draft, delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington September 26, is printed, p. 1184.
5. In telegram 2289, September 9, from Berlin, not printed, Murphy reported his own and Clay’s concurrence with the substance of this telegram (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–948).