Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–448

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretary of State With the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France¹

[Translation]

top secret

Paris, September 21, 1948.

Present

France	United Kingdom	United States
Mr. Schuman	Mr. Bevin	Mr. Marshall
Mr. Massigli	Mr. McNeil	Mr. Douglas
Mr. Chauvel	Sir Oliver Harvey	General Clay
Mr. Couve de Murville	Sir William Strang	Mr. Bohlen
General Koenig	General Robertson	Mr. Murphy
Mr. Alphand	Mr. Patrick Dean	Mr. Caffery
Mr. Seydoux	Mr. Tomkins
Mr. de Guiringaud	Mr. Jamieson

Mr. Andronikof, Interpreter

Mr. Schuman opens the meeting by stating its object: to draft a note to the Soviet Government. Several drafts have been submitted to the Ministers, in particular, a British draft (by General Robertson) and an American proposal (by Mr. Douglas).

Mr. Marshall, drawing a conclusion from the exchange of views which took place during the morning and the afternoon between the experts, considers that, on the whole, it has been agreed to send a further note to the Soviets. The problem which arises is the following: shall this be a new note recognizing the break, or a note raising new questions?

Mr. Bevin states that he is in favor of a new note, that he would like a new note to be sent and that he would like them to wait for a reply through diplomatic channels. It is not a question of reopening the Moscow discussion or negotiations. Nor is it a question, in this new note, of making lengthy comments on the negotiations which have taken place, or on our position. This is precisely the subject of a “white book” which is already in process of preparation. It is merely a question of making our position clear in case of a probable break.

Mr. Bevin believes that by combining the two drafts, British and American, they could attain their aim.

Mr. Schuman states that he agrees with Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Bevin states that certain expressions in the proposal of the American Delegation (proposal made by Mr. Douglas at the afternoon meeting) are only partly satisfactory to him. He believes that it is neither timely nor tactful to describe the blockade as “illegal.” In our eyes the blockade is obviously illegal, but in the eyes of the Soviets the currency reform is likewise illegal. If we embark on that subject we are giving the Soviets further opportunities for controversy.

Mr. Marshall states that he is willing to omit the words “illegal” and “unlawful”. He asks if Mr. Bevin would accept a substitute wording to the effect that the blockade is a violation of our rights.

On the other hand, he believes that the note should not become involved in technical questions. It should remain on the level of principles and of the blockade. However, Mr. Marshall feels that while the blockade is perhaps an appropriate subject for popular opinion, it is not the fundamental thing for us; what is fundamental is Russian activity in Berlin and in all that part of Germany under Russian control. We have broken the blockade by the air ferry. At this point Mr. Marshall gives some details of the operation of the air ferry. He calls on General Clay for further information, and states that except for the unusual case of a storm lasting several days in a very severe winter, the air ferry counteracts the blockade very well and will take care of the needs of the western sectors of Berlin for as long as we wish. It is not even as expensive as one might expect.

In every field, continues Mr. Marshall, the Russians are retreating. From now on, Berlin is the only foothold which they have against us; everywhere else, and particularly in Germany, they are losing ground. We have put Western Germany on its feet and we are engaged in bringing about its recovery in such a way that we can really say that we are on the road to victory. The attitude of the Russians in Berlin and the manner in which they will continue their attack, will be a real indication of their intentions toward us.

However, adds Mr. Marshall, the American Government understands very well the position of the French and British Governments. If the latter believe that we should make still another approach to the Russians, raising definite questions with them, he cannot object, and he will agree to this, provided that it be concise and unequivocal.

Mr. Schuman thanks Mr. Marshall for this statement, and he concludes that the problem under consideration is not only one of drafting and phraseology. A lengthy exchange of views follows between Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman on the basis of the English text, in which an attempt is made to include the substance of the draft prepared by Mr. Douglas in the afternoon.

Mr. Schuman states that he cannot agree to the final sentence in Mr. Douglas’ draft, asking the Russians to raise the blockade “in recognition of our rights”, as such an expression would obviously make it impossible for the Russians to agree to our requests. What we want, adds Mr. Schuman, is not to have the Russians recognize our rights but to have them raise the blockade.

Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin show a certain hesitation, but Mr. Schuman maintains his viewpoint which is accepted, and the expression in question is struck out of the draft.

Mr. Marshall then states that if he agrees to send a further note to the Soviets and makes a concession to the point of view of the French and British Governments, it is because he believes that it is clearly understood now between us, that if the Russian reply is not satisfactory, without any other alternative, we are absolutely decided to bring the matter before the United Nations.

Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman state definitely that they agree with Mr. Marshall on this point.

Mr. Schuman states that if it is desired to mention in this note that the next step in our procedure will be to bring the matter before the United Nations, he would have no objection.

Mr. Marshall also has no objection.

Mr. Bevin is not very favorable to the insertion of such a statement.

They again read the draft which has been drawn up in a general way and which includes in substance the beginning of the British draft, then the main points of Mr. Douglas’ proposal, and finally the last paragraph of the British draft.

Mr. Bevin states that the final wording should be prepared by the experts. He suggests that they start to work on it at once. As it appears in general outline, the note seems satisfactory to him because it states a definite question to which the Russians must reply with Yes or No.

Mentioning possible recourse to the United Nations would not produce any greater effect and would only weaken the note by depriving it of its character as a formal notice or summons.

Mr. Marshall agrees to omit mention of recourse to the United Nations if it is clearly understood, as he said earlier, that such recourse will be the next step if the Russian reply is not satisfactory.

Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin again agree to this unofficial understanding.

Mr. Marshall makes it clear, for the benefit of the experts who will now go to work, that they should take care not to word the present note in such a way as to make it an invitation to further discussions. This will perhaps be difficult, but it is necessary.

The experts (Mr. Massigli, Sir William Strang, Mr. P. Dean, Mr. Douglas and several members of each delegation) withdraw in order to prepare the exact wording of the document, in accordance with the general outline decided on by the Ministers.

After their departure, Mr. Marshall, with General Clay’s assistance, gives his colleagues detailed information on the operation of the air ferry.

The Ministers’ meeting ends about 7:30 p. m., and the Drafting Committee finishes its work about 8:30 p. m.²

1. This meeting took place at 6 p. m. at the Quai d’Orsay. These minutes were apparently prepared by the French Delegation.
2. The draft text of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee was transmitted to Washington in telegram Martel 3, September 21, from Paris, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–2148). The final agreed text of the note was completed on the morning of September 22 and transmitted to Washington in telegram 4955, September 22, from Paris, not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–2248). The note transmitted to Ambassador Panyushkin on September 22 is printed infra.